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
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J. E. Johnston

GREAT COMMANDERS



GENERAL JOHNSTON

BY

ROBERT M. HUGHES



NEW YORK
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I TAKE PRIDE IN DEDICATING TO THE
ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
AS A TRIBUTE TO ITS CONSTANCY AND VALOR,
THIS SKETCH OF THE GREAT CAPTAIN
WHO LED IT IN ITS PALMY DAYS,
AND WITH WHOSE RENOWN IT IS INSEPARABLY ASSOCIATED.

PREFACE.

EARLY in the year 1891 General Joseph E. Johnston was informed by General James Grant Wilson, the editor of the series of "Great Commanders" then in contemplation by Messrs. D. Appleton & Co., that he would be included in the series; and he was requested to designate the person whom he would prefer as his biographer. General Johnston, after communicating with the author (on March 12th), did him the honor to devolve upon him this highly responsible task. The death of General Johnston within a fortnight thereafter prevented any conference as to the details of the work. A year previous to this designation the author had, at General Johnston's request, undertaken the preparation of a more elaborate biography, but the present work supersedes the one originally designed.

The limited space at disposal has put out of the question elaborate controversial dissertations, despite the temptation furnished by the fact that three publications abounding in criticism of General Johnston—namely, General Pierre G. T. Beauregard's *Manassas*, General Gustavus W. Smith's *Seven Pines*, and the *Memoir of Jefferson Davis* by his wife—appeared, by a remarkable coincidence, just at or after his death.

In the preparation of this biography the main source of information has been the Official War Records now in process of publication by the Government. Webb's

Peninsula, Swinton's Army of the Potomac, McClellan's Own Story, and the Memoirs of Generals Grant and Sherman have been freely consulted. General Johnston's private papers, now in the possession of the author, have also been used; and in one or two instances the liberty has been taken of incorporating the views of General Johnston embodied in conversations which the author has had the privilege of holding with the general since the close of the war. General Johnston's Narrative, published in 1874, has purposely been referred to as little as possible, for fear frequent reference to it might impair independence of thought and that impartiality essential to accuracy, and lest this biography might degenerate into a mere paraphrase.

In the preparation of this work much valuable assistance has been rendered the author by his own and General Johnston's friends. Special acknowledgments are due to Joseph M. Brown, Esq., of Atlanta; Colonel Benjamin S. Ewell, of Williamsburg; Colonel Thomas L. Preston, of Charlottesville; Colonel Edwin J. Harvie, of Washington; Hon. Robert M. McLane and James I. McLane, Esq., of Baltimore; Henry B. Smith, Esq., of Williamsburg; and Charles Sharp, Esq., of Norfolk. The author is also indebted to General James Grant Wilson, the editor, and Messrs. D. Appleton & Co., the publishers, for numerous courtesies; and to Mr. E. B. Treat, the publisher of Edward A. Pollard's Lee and his Lieutenants, for permission to use without stint the admirable Memoir of General Johnston contained in that work.

Those who may desire to study General Johnston's military career critically, and to learn his side of the differences which he was so unfortunate as to have with the Confederate Executive, are referred to the following of his writings:

Narrative of Military Operations. (D. Appleton & Co., 1874.)

Responsibilities of the First Bull Run. (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. i, p. 240.)

Manassas to Seven Pines. (Ibid., vol. ii, p. 202.)

Jefferson Davis and the Mississippi Campaign. (Ibid., vol. iii, p. 472 ; also North American Review, December, 1886.)

Opposing Sherman's Advance to Atlanta. (Ibid., vol. iv, p. 260.)

My Negotiations with General Sherman. (North American Review, August, 1886.)

The following treatises of other writers may also be consulted :

Memoir of General Johnston in Pollard's Lee and his Lieutenants, published by E. B. Treat & Co., New York, 1867. (This was written by Judge Robert W. Hughes, of Virginia.)

General Sherman, by John C. Ropes. (Atlantic Monthly, August, 1891.)

Sherman and Johnston, by Colonel Charles C. Chesney. (Fortnightly Review, November, 1875 ; republished in Eclectic Magazine, January, 1876.)

Broken Idols. (Galaxy, August, 1874.)

NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, *April*, 1893.

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GENERAL JOHNSTON.

CHAPTER I.

LINEAGE, PARENTAGE, AND YOUTH.

THE shire of Dumfries, one of the border counties of Scotland, is traversed by three considerable streams, which rise in the hills that form its northern boundary, and, pursuing a general southerly course, empty their waters into Solway Firth. Each of these has its own narrow "dale," and receives from the watershed which divides it from its neighboring stream many smaller branches to swell its volume as it courses to the Firth. The hills which form these watersheds attain altitude almost sufficient to dignify them with the name of mountains, and make the region quite rugged in character.

The eastern of these streams is the Esk, and from it the valley which it waters is called Eskdale. The next, to the west, is the Annan, and on its banks is situated the district which is called Annandale. This stream rises in the hills above Moffat, in the same vicinity as the head waters of the Tweed and Clyde. Its total length is about forty miles, and into it drain as tributaries the Moffat, Wamphray, Dryfe, and Ae, besides others of less magnitude.

The western of these three water courses is the Nith, which, following the example of the others, bestows its name upon its bordering vale. At its mouth is the town

of Dumfries, which needs no introduction to the lover of Burns.

Each of these districts is rich in tradition and famous in Scottish song and story. Here was waged constant warfare, not only between the men of the two nations whose boundary was so near, but between different Scotch families or clans as well. On the Esk was the "Debatable Land," which alternately belonged to England and Scotland, according to the relative prowess and good fortune of the English or Scotch who contended for its possession. The Graemes, Forsters, Fenwicks, and Musgraves, who pursued the fair Ellen and young Lochinvar over Cannobie Lee, but whose steeds were distanced by the runaways, here found a field for their combats. Here, too, was Gretna Green, the favorite resort of English lovers fleeing on the wings of love from irate parents.

In Nithsdale dwelt the powerful family of Maxwells, whose retainers were spread along the Nith, and whose sway extended over the lower valley. In Annandale dwelt the Johnstone clan, mainly in the region which stretches from the town of Lockerby to the Wamphray. Their original family name was Jeanville, the equivalent of the present French name Joinville. The Norman chronicler names "Le Seigneur de Jeanville," along with Robert de Bruis, Pierre de Balleul, and other names of Scottish families subsequently eminent, among those who took part in the battle of Hastings. Partly Saxonized into Janvil, it appears in that form on the roll of Battle Abbey. Thence it was anglicized into Johnestoun, and appears in that form as witness to a grant to Sir Robert Bruce in 1249. It next became Johnstone, and is to this day indifferently Johnstone or Johnston, according as the scholastic or phonetic taste predominates with the individual bearer. In Johnstone church-

yard these two fashions of spelling it—Johnstone or Johnston—are found side by side, even on the tombs of father and son.

Being so near the border, the Johnstones were often summoned on short notice to aid their compatriots of the vicinity in repelling English raids; and, always responding promptly, they assumed for their crest the device of a winged spur, and for their motto the words *Nunquam non paratus*, which they rendered "Ready, aye ready." Though friendly with their eastern neighbors, probably from the mutual esteem formed and fostered by constant armed association in battle against their national foes, the English, they carried on continual warfare with the Maxwells on the west, and with various alternations of fortune. So bitter was the enmity, that when, in one of the mutations of royal favor, Lord Maxwell was declared a rebel, the King knew no better means of apprehending him than by authorizing the Laird of Johnstone to do it. In this, however, the laird was unsuccessful, though supported by strong detachments of Government troops. The Maxwells defeated them, and captured the Castle of Loughwood or Lochwood, the abode of the Johnstones. The captors committed it to the flames, one of them saying exultantly that they would "give Lady Johnstone light enough to show her to set her silken hood."

The contest was maintained with all the ferocity of hereditary hatred, the military operations consisting mainly of forays upon each other when least expected, with the usual concomitants of butchering the party surprised and carrying off all the live stock on which they could lay their hands.

Not long after the above-named occurrence a peace was patched up between the clans, in which Maxwell and Johnstone mutually covenanted to "freely remit

and forgive all rancors of mind, grudge, malice, and feuds that had passed or fallen between them in any time bygone." After this the Johnstones, supposing that they had nothing to fear from the Maxwells, indulged in raids against their neighbors in the upper part of Nithsdale, with the result of greatly reducing the cattle and horses of that region. One of the Johnstones, however, made the serious mistake, if the old ballad of *The Lads of Wamphray* may be accepted as authority, of taking a blind horse, instead of "Sim Crichton's winsome dun." He was, in consequence, soon overtaken and unceremoniously suspended to a convenient tree. The Johnstones in revenge raided the region with a yet larger party, and on their return, laden with spoil, defeated their pursuers in the fight of Biddesburne, whereupon the vanquished went to Lord Maxwell and offered to become his liegemen if he would break with the Johnstones and side with them. The opportunity to form a strong alliance against his hereditary foes was too strong to resist; and Lord Maxwell, regardless of his late compact with the Johnstones, accepted their offer, reasoning, perhaps, that though the treaty covered everything in "times bygone," it did not commit him as to the present or future. To resist this combination, the Johnstones sought the aid of their eastern neighbors, the Buccleughs, Elliotts, Armstrongs, Scotts, and Grahams. The two little armies met near the confluence of the Dryfe and Annan, which, being in the heart of the Johnstone settlement, showed the Maxwells to have been the invaders. Here they fought the battle of Dryfe Sands. In this Sir James Johnstone displayed the military skill which seems to have been innate in the family. Placing his main body in ambush, he sent forward a small party of horsemen, with instructions to make a weak attack and then flee as if in rout. When the Maxwells pursued

in disorder, confident of victory, his main body attacked them, and the result was decisive. The Maxwells were put to flight and pursued with the relentlessness of men burning to avenge murdered kindred and desolated homesteads. Many of the vanquished were overtaken in the streets of Locherby and dispatched by a slash in the face, a kind of blow that is still called in that part of Scotland a "Locherby lick." The feud was only ended by the execution of Lord Maxwell, son of him who commanded at Dryfe Sands. He invited Sir James Johnstone, the opposing commander in that combat, to a conference; and when the attention of the latter was attracted by an altercation between their two retainers, Maxwell shot him in the back with a pistol loaded with poisoned bullets. Johnstone's tomb in the ancient family churchyard records that "he was cruelly murdered by a pistolet."

The name of the first emigrant of the Virginia Johnstones was Peter, which was the family name of the oldest son as far back as can be traced. He was born in Annan in 1710, but emigrated from Edinburgh in 1727, settling on James River at Osborne's Landing, then the chief place in the colony for the inspection of tobacco, and an important shipping point. He engaged in mercantile pursuits, passing through all the stages of the business before he became independent. His business apparently so absorbed his attention as to leave no room for sentiment until his fifty-first year, when, having been measurably successful, he bethought himself that it was time to marry; and he accordingly paid his devotions to a widow, Mrs. Martha Rogers, daughter of Mr. John Butler, himself a merchant, whose dwelling was on the Appomattox a short distance below Petersburg. His affection was reciprocated, and on March 19, 1761, they were married. They lived at Osborne's until 1765,

when they removed to the county of Prince Edward, in the Piedmont region of Virginia, and settled on an estate near Farmville, which they called Cherry Grove, in accordance with the custom of dignifying family homesteads by appropriate names. They were people of cultivation and learning. Mr. Johnston was a member of the Episcopal Church, and all his predilections and opinions were conservative in their tendency and in favor of the crown.

The first child of this union was born at Osborne's, on January 6, 1763. He was therefore but two years old when the family removed to Prince Edward. The family name of Peter was bestowed upon him.

Although Mr. Johnston was a staunch churchman, he was so warm a friend of learning that he did not hesitate to contribute liberally toward securing greater facilities for education than the colony then enjoyed. At that time the only mode of obtaining a finished education was at the college of William and Mary, at Williamsburg, which in those days of bad roads was quite a journey. Accordingly, when the Presbytery of Hanover interested itself in furthering a move for the foundation of a college under its control in Prince Edward, Mr. Johnston offered to donate one hundred acres of land for the purpose. His offer was accepted on February 2, 1775, and an institution of learning was erected thereon, which has ever since been under the auspices of the Presbyterian Church. It was first called Prince Edward Academy, but in May, 1777, its name was changed to Hampden Sidney, which name it still retains.

Three other sons were born to Mr. and Mrs. Johnston. Determined to give them the best possible education, their father provided private tutors for his sons until they attained sufficient maturity, when he entered them as students at Hampden Sidney. The eldest,

Peter, was in attendance there during one of its earliest sessions. Association at college with the zealous youths whose ears were ringing with the stories and exploits of friends or relations in the Continental army, and probably, most of all, a desire to emulate the students of a previous term, who in 1777, under their president as captain, had formed a company sixty-five strong and marched to Williamsburg to aid in the defense of the colony, soon effaced the paternal instructions and made of him an ardent patriot. So earnest was he in his opinions, that at the age of seventeen, knowing his father's views too well to dare consult him, he and a young friend as much of a Hotspur as himself (Clement Carrington, of Charlotte) ran away from college, and in 1780 enlisted in the legion of Light Horse Harry Lee, which was then on its way south to take part with Greene in the ensuing campaign. As they were both provided by the indulgence of their parents with horses while at college, they needed little preparation for their escapade.

Peter Johnston served with Lee's legion throughout the remainder of the Revolution. Having the hereditary turn for the profession of arms, highly ambitious, and endowed with dauntless courage, he soon made himself known; and, despite his tender age, had risen by the end of the war to the rank of lieutenant, and had become a favorite with his commander, Colonel Lee, and with the entire legion. This grade in the little armies of the Revolution meant much more than it did later; and for a boy of eighteen to rise to it from the ranks in the space of a year was specially remarkable. In the quaint Anecdotes of the American Revolution, compiled by Alexander Garden, Lieutenant Johnston is frequently mentioned. Thus the basis of the friendship between the families of Lee and Johnston was laid in the last century by the fathers of the two great Southern cap-

tains of the civil war—a friendship which, as will hereafter appear, was yet closer between their sons. So well had Lieutenant Johnston borne himself during his military service, that on his return to the paternal roof at the close of hostilities his father forgave the truancy and received him with pride and affection; and, on dying, left him the family homestead, in accordance with his English sentiment in favor of the law of primogeniture.

At the end of the Revolution Lieutenant Johnston was not twenty years of age, and it became his next care to select a profession. He chose that of the law, and applied himself to its mastery as assiduously as he had devoted himself to the profession of arms. The result was that he soon rose to prominence both in law and politics, for at that period the two were almost inseparable. His political affiliations were with the Republican party, as the adherents of the Jeffersonian school were then called; and he was a member of the committee which reported the Virginia resolutions of 1798-'99 on the question of State rights. In 1788 Lieutenant Peter Johnston married Mary Wood, daughter of Colonel Valentine Wood, of Goochland County. He had formed her acquaintance and won her love while attending on circuit the court of which her father was clerk. The wife of Colonel Wood was Lucy Henry, a sister of Patrick Henry. She was a lady of the highest accomplishments, and is said to have equaled her distinguished brother in mental force. Her uncommon conversational powers made her in the family circle as much admired as her brother was on the hustings. The Henry family also was of Scotch origin, being nearly related to Robertson, the historian, and to the eloquent Lord Brougham. Its ramifications in the United States were extensive.*

* Another sister of Patrick Henry married General William Campbell, of King's Mountain fame. He died in 1781 on his way to join

Mrs. Johnston inherited her mother's talents and attainments. She was so highly educated as to be competent to fit her sons for college not only in the elements of learning, but in the ancient classics as well.

Peter Johnston and his wife resided at the family homestead in Prince Edward for some time after their marriage. They had a large family, consisting of nine sons and one daughter. The eldest, John, was the father of John W. Johnston, who represented Virginia for two terms in the United States Senate subsequent to the civil war. The next, Peter, was a well-known practitioner of law in southwestern Virginia. The third, Charles Clement, named after his father's companion in arms, was a man of great popularity and of a very high order of eloquence. When quite young he was sent to Congress from the southwest Virginia district, and, as an ardent advocate of State rights, took a prominent part in the exciting debates of the period of 1831-'32 on the nullification question. He was accidentally drowned in attempting to cross, during the night, from Alexandria to Washington. His wife was Eliza Madison Preston, of the extensive Virginia family of Prestons. She had predeceased him, so that at his death his two children—a son of about nine and a daughter of about seven—were left orphans. The son adopted the military profession,

the American army at Yorktown, and left an only child, a daughter, who married Francis Preston, of Abingdon. They left a large family, all of whom attained distinction. The sons who reached mature age were William C. Preston and John S. Preston, the orators, and Colonel Thomas L. Preston, who served on the staff of General Joseph E. Johnston during the first part of the civil war. The daughters were Eliza, the wife of General E. C. Carrington; Susan, the wife of Governor James McDowell; Sally, the wife of Governor John B. Floyd, who was Secretary of War under Buchanan; Sophonisba, the wife of Robert J. Breckinridge; Margaret, the first wife of General Wade Hampton; and Maria, the wife of John M. Preston.

was educated at West Point, and was killed in battle at Contreras in Mexico. The daughter married Judge Robert W. Hughes, now the United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia.

Another son of Peter and Mary Johnston was Beverly Randolph, who attained high eminence at the bar of southwest Virginia. Still another, Edward W., was a well-known writer and editor, who for a time edited the *National Intelligencer*. His contributions to the press, under the name of "Il Secretario," were specially admired. At one time intimate with John M. Daniel, who became afterward so well known as the great war editor of Virginia, they lost their temper in a newspaper discussion over the merits of Powers's Greek Slave, and fought a duel, the usual mode of settling such controversies at that time. Fortunately, its result was as bare as the statue which caused the quarrel. Another son, Algeron Sidney, was also an editor, and the author of a book called *Memoirs of a Nullifier*, which made something of a sensation in the exciting times of nullification. The eighth son of this marriage was Joseph Eggleston Johnston, who was born at Cherry Grove, in Prince Edward, on February 3, 1807. He was named after Joseph Eggleston, another military associate of his father, and the captain of the company in Lee's legion of which his father was lieutenant.

In 1811 Peter Johnston, who had been appointed a judge of the General Court of Virginia, was assigned to the Abingdon circuit, and removed to his new field of labor. He settled at a place which he named Panecillo, in the edge of the town of Abingdon. At that period the country in that section of the State was thinly settled, and the conditions of life exceedingly primitive. The town of Abingdon was then in the heart of the forest, having been first called the Wolf Hills, from the

number of wolves which made their den in a cavern at that place. The country is mountainous and rugged; at that time the woods were dense in their primeval growth, and the roads, or "trails," few and difficult. The region included in Judge Johnston's circuit was extensive, and the most convenient mode of travel in attending their courts was on horseback.

The country had then been but recently explored, and was only in process of settlement. Its inhabitants were men whose youth had been spent in contending with the savages for its possession, and who in 1780, under their countryman and leader, General William Campbell, furnished the largest contingent to that suddenly improvised army of mountaineers which annihilated Ferguson's force at King's Mountain, and disappeared as mysteriously as they had come, after having in that fight given the first check to the career of victory which till then the British had pursued in the Southern States. Numerous participants in the battle then resided in the neighborhood. The traditions of that wonderful combat which still ring through that country as tradition were then related by the actors as matters of personal experience and observation. They gave the name of the battle to one of the hills on which the town of Abingdon is built, and fired the minds of the youths with anecdotes of their experience in the campaign and fight, and of their not less thrilling encounters with the Indians. The effect of such narrations on a boy naturally addicted to military matters, especially when reinforced by not less daring exploits of his father, may well be imagined. Young Johnston soon had the boys of the neighborhood, hardly less zealous than himself, organized into an "army," as he termed it; and he was chosen as their "general," with one of his brothers as "colonel." The combined strength of the general and

colonel was sufficient to insure and enforce that obedience which is the foundation of discipline.

At that time the country abounded in all sorts of game. Judge Johnston was passionately devoted to the chase, and was accustomed to take his sons with him on his hunting expeditions, which usually extended over great distances and continued for many days. They accompanied him even before they were large enough to handle the long rifle which was the favorite arm of the pioneer, and which in the hands of its hardy owners had proved so efficacious against the enemies of the young republic. As soon as, under his tuition, they had learned to balance it and accurately aim it, they were permitted to take an equal part in the hunt. While the bear was not infrequently the object of their quest, the usual sport was chasing the deer, then very abundant. Joseph also was passionately fond of this amusement, and always preferred to be one of the drivers, as it kept him in motion, instead of fastening him for hours on a stand. In that mountainous region the drivers rode their steeds over places which would strike dismay into an ordinary pedestrian; and such experiences were the best possible training in inuring him to fatigue and hardship, and in accustoming him to danger. To this early experience he owed the constitution which he retained through life, despite numerous wounds and long-continued exposure. It also made of him a fine horseman. Striking as was his bearing afoot, he underwent a complete change when he mounted a horse. Perhaps the most vivid recollection of him among those who have seen him was his magnificent bearing when mounted.

He had his first experience in the dangers of military life when he was but ten years of age; and it was brought upon him by his fondness for it. He had gone out with his father and brothers on a hunt a few

miles west of Abingdon. He was on horseback, with a colored boy about his own age riding behind him. When they became separated from the others, the conversation turned on warlike themes, and Joseph was describing to the darkey (named Robert) the mode in which cavalry charged infantry and the latter received the shock. Nothing would satisfy him but a practical illustration; so he made Robert dismount, take the gun and place himself in position to receive the assault, kneeling with gun presented. Joseph thereupon withdrew the horse to a sufficient distance to obtain the necessary impetus, and thundered down upon the stationary square. The horse, however, not being equally interested in the experiment, sheered off just before reaching the infantry, and did it so suddenly that his rider was thrown forward. Of course he was wounded—he always was on every available occasion. In the fall his leg was broken, the ends of the bone coming through the flesh; yet he quietly lay down till Robert went for aid and returned with it. The first doctor who came was something of an amateur; he set the limb, however, and sewed up the wound as well as he could. Soon afterward a skillful surgeon arrived, who, on examination, found that the leg had been set crooked. He therefore cut out the stitches and reset it. The manner in which the boy of ten, in a time when anæsthetics were not known, endured the operation without a tear or groan, and his patience under the three months of suffering which followed, showed his fortitude.

His education was begun by his parents, both of whom were amply competent to give it, and carried on by them until he became old enough to enter the Academy at Abingdon, which was a fair classical school. He was a good student, and made the most of his opportunities. He retained through life a taste for the

classics, as is evidenced by the large number of works of that character in his library. Homer was his special favorite.

Increase of years only strengthened his determination to be a soldier, and he adhered to it with a constancy which showed it to be the natural bent of his mind and not a mere boyish fancy. He burned to emulate his father's revolutionary record and the deeds of his neighbors and relatives of the King's Mountain campaign. His father did not discourage this predilection, but, on the contrary, presented him, though he was next to the youngest son, with his revolutionary sword. Though he owned this sword from his youth, he did not wear it during his earlier military life, but drew it for the first time in defense of his native State at the outbreak of the civil war.

In 1825, at the age of eighteen, he secured, through the influence of James Barbour, United States Senator from Virginia and Secretary of War under President John Q. Adams, an appointment to the Military Academy as a cadet, thus obtaining an entrance into the field of his cherished ambition.

CHAPTER II.

EARLY MILITARY LIFE.

IN 1825, Joseph E. Johnston, having successfully passed the necessary examination, was admitted as a cadet at West Point. He was one of one hundred and five who were so fortunate as to enter in that year. The institution had then attained a high stand, it was flourishing, its course of study comprehensive and practical, its professors able and zealous. The number of matriculates who received their military education at that epoch of its history, and who subsequently rose to rank and distinction during the Mexican and civil wars, is the strongest testimony to the thorough and judicious nature of its training. The astonishing achievements of the American army during the Mexican War, against largely superior numbers fighting on their own soil to repel foreign invasion, were due as much to the exceptional courage and ability of the young officers of inferior rank as to the talents of the commanding generals. Johnston was one of nine Virginians who then entered the Academy. Another was Robert E. Lee. Slightly older, son of the commander of Johnston's father in the Revolutionary War, and endowed with tastes and habits of the same nature, they soon became fast friends. They were both imbued with that intense State pride which is a prominent element in the Virginia character; and as the other Virginians, one by one, lagged behind the class, and finally dropped out, their intimacy increased. In

their graduating year they were the only remaining representatives of the Old Dominion—a striking instance of the survival of the fittest. There is nothing specially noteworthy in the career of Johnston at West Point. He made the most of his opportunities, and was unremitting in his studies. But during his cadetship a very serious obstacle supervened in an affection of the eyes, which totally debarred him from using them at night, and probably made his graduation mark lower than it would otherwise have been. He completed his course in 1829, being number thirteen in a class of forty-six. Lee was second in the same class, Charles Mason, of New York, standing at the head.

It was at West Point that he imbibed that special fondness for French and astronomy which he retained through life. He was always ready to converse on subjects cognate to these studies with the same relish as on military matters; and his library reflected this predilection, containing valuable treatises on astronomy, French biographies of nearly all the great soldiers of that warlike nation, and French dissertations on all the *technique* of the military art. These works show by internal evidence that they had been thoroughly mastered, and that he had made himself familiar with the campaigns of the leading generals of history—a strong proof that in the military, as well as in the other departments of human art, application and study are aids that may justly claim a place upon the staff of genius.*

Johnston's first military service was as second lieutenant in the Fourth Artillery; the next, in garrison at New York, followed by similar service at Fortress Mon-

* Colonel J. F. Maurice, in an able article on War, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, says: "It is an unanswerable assertion, that only by study of the past experience of war has any great soldier ever prepared himself for commanding armies."

roe. This period, extending from 1829 to 1832, was uneventful, being mainly utilized by him in acquiring that knowledge of the soldier's duty which is essential to success. His first experience in actual campaigning was in the Black Hawk expedition of 1832, under General Scott, in which he participated, though without any opportunity for distinction.

In the fall of this same year the nullification troubles in South Carolina were at their height, and Johnston was with the small body of United States troops stationed at Charleston by President Jackson for the purpose of preserving order. Here the contingencies of civil war were forcibly impressed upon his mind, for three of his brothers resided in Columbia and belonged to the South Carolina minutemen then drilling for the conflict with the United States which every one expected, and they would have been the first to come into collision with the national forces if matters had proceeded to extremities. Fortunately, events took a turn which prevented them from being confronted in fratricidal strife. From this period till the beginning of 1836 he was on duty at Fortress Monroe and at Fort Macon, North Carolina; and he was also assigned to topographical duty.

In the beginning of 1836 General Scott was ordered to Florida to take charge of operations against the Indians, and Johnston accompanied him as a member of his staff. These operations against the Florida Indians are the least creditable in the history of the Union, and were the grave of many a military reputation. Their long duration and the heavy expenditures of life and treasure necessary to reduce the Indians to submission and to transport them to their reservations west of the Mississippi are well known. At the outset the difficulties were little appreciated, and, as campaign after campaign failed to attain the object desired, disappointment occasioned

many feuds among the officers of rank who were connected with the war. But no one, after an actual experience however brief, felt disposed to criticise any one else, lavish as his strictures may have been beforehand.*

The expedition led by General Scott suffered just as those which preceded and those which followed it. The difficulty was not so much to defeat the foe as to find him. The Indians, on the approach of a strong hostile force, scattered to the swamps, in whose inaccessible recesses they defied discovery. The only fights were between small parties on each side, almost invariably commencing with a volley poured into the troops from an unseen foe, and ending by the disappearance of the enemy into morasses yet more impenetrable. The scene of operations was wild and totally unknown, and an advancing column had perforce to open its own roads. This rendered transportation of supplies and ammunition so difficult, that the excursions of the troops were generally limited to a length of time measured by the subsistence which they could carry on their backs. Officers and men alike were required to convey their supplies in this manner, and even the weight which could thus be carried was limited by the character of the country to be traversed; for it was so swampy, that the mud and water were frequently up to the waists of the soldiers, whose amphibious campaigning was the harder to endure as it did not even promise the soldier's reward of being confronted with his adversary.

In this region the summer is so unhealthy and fatal

* This is well illustrated by General Jesup's report of February 7, 1837, which he thus concludes: "If I have at any time said aught in disparagement of the operations of others in Florida, either verbally or in writing, officially or unofficially, knowing the country as I now know it, I consider myself bound, as a man of honor, solemnly to retract it."—Sprague's Florida War, p. 173.

to men from more northern latitudes that the campaigning was necessarily carried on in the winter and early spring. General Scott's expedition lost much of the available season by its late departure, which rendered it of short duration. It accomplished nothing except to gain experience which might be useful in future. No battle marked its path, and but few captives were led back in tangible proof of prowess. General Scott, on his return, reported that the only means of ending the war would be to send a force sufficiently strong to stretch across the peninsula and sweep it gradually down, thus surrounding the troublesome enemy as in a tinchell. General Scott's failure to achieve any substantial result caused much unfavorable comment and violent recrimination, the result of which was that a court of inquiry was convened to report upon his operations. This court met at Frederick, Maryland, and Johnston was one of the witnesses summoned before it, which brought him back from Florida. The result of the investigation was a complete vindication of General Scott.

In this same spring a large number of Indians surrendered to General Jesup, and the war was generally supposed to be at an end; indeed, this was announced as a settled fact by Jesup in his official report. Johnston, who during the seven years succeeding his graduation had attained only the rank of first lieutenant, and whose military ardor had probably been chilled by observing these dissensions among his superiors, saw no prospect of active service, and determined to leave the army. Accordingly, on May 31st he tendered his resignation, which was accepted. He selected the profession of engineer, and found ample work in this line under the Government.

It was soon realized that the flattering hopes of peace were doomed to disappointment. One night Jes-

up's prisoners mysteriously disappeared, and fled to their marshy fastnesses to resume the life of murder and rapine. It was evident that the work was to be done all over again. By this time Johnston had thought better of his resignation, and volunteered for service. An expedition under Lieutenant Powell was then being organized. It was a mixed command of soldiers and sailors, its object being as much exploration as warfare. Johnston, on offering for duty, was attached to this command as a topographical engineer, and accompanied it to Florida. The command landed at Jupiter Inlet, with the intention of exploring the lagoons on the eastern coast and their tributaries. In a few days it moved southward in boats, and consisted of about eighty men, of whom twenty-five were regulars and the remainder were sailors. It had moved but a few miles when the smoke of an Indian village was observed, whereupon Powell landed from his boats and pushed toward the village. He was met by a superior force of Indians, who vigorously attacked him, with the result of soon stampeding the sailors of his command. All the officers were disabled, and the men made a disorderly and precipitate retreat to the boats. Johnston succeeded in collecting a small number, mainly regulars, and covered the retreat by interposing between the pursuers and the boats. He held them at bay until all had embarked and departed, leaving him and his gallant little rear guard to escape as best they could. Covered by the darkness, they retreated through the woods, and succeeded in intercepting the last of the retiring boats, in which was the guide Hagan, who recognized Johnston's voice and took him and his party aboard just in time to rescue them from their pursuers, who by this time were close upon them.

Johnston's escape on this occasion was almost mi-

raculous. He was wounded twice in the forehead, and carried the marks of these, the first of his numerous wounds, to the day of his death. His clothing had thirty bullet holes in it, his hat had two, while a red sash which he wore, and which attracted the Indian aim on account of its conspicuous color, as it streamed in the breeze, was literally riddled. Such gallantry was the theme of universal commendation, and won him golden opinions throughout the country. He was generally regarded as the saviour of the expedition, and Lieutenant Powell in his official report attributed to him the safety of the command.

But his conduct was worth something more than mere applause. It gained for him an appointment as first lieutenant in the topographical engineers, thus restoring him to his former rank and preventing him from losing anything by his resignation. It gained him also the brevet of captain, which was conferred upon him "for gallantry on several occasions in the war with the Florida Indians." These were conferred upon him on July 7, 1838, the fight having occurred on January 15, 1838. Johnston remained with this party till its return. After a short service in Florida in the fall, he was assigned to various duties devolving on the corps of topographical engineers—first in river improvements, then with the party marking the boundary between Texas and the United States, afterward with the party making a survey of the Great Lakes. In 1842 he was ordered to report to General Worth, who then commanded in Florida and was fighting the Seminoles, for they still persisted in considering the war as not closed, despite the repeated proclamations of the different commanders announcing the fact. It was the good fortune of General Worth to end it. By his summer campaign he broke up the crops and encampments of the Indians and reduced them to

submission, so that his announcement of the close of the war, in 1843, was justified by the fact. In hardships and the lack of any considerable combats his operations were like those of his predecessors; but they finally terminated this annoying and expensive war, which is estimated to have cost the United States two thousand lives and twenty millions of dollars.* On his final return from Florida, Johnston was attached to the topographical expedition which had in charge the survey of the boundary between the United States and the British provinces; and on its completion he was attached to the coast survey, in which he was engaged until the outbreak of the Mexican War.

During this period of comparative rest he had formed the acquaintance of Lydia McLane, daughter of Louis McLane and sister of Robert M. McLane, whose intimacy with Johnston, great even at that early period, continued without interruption during his long life. She was a lady of great personal beauty, and none the less attractive were her qualities of mind and heart. Amid her host of admirers Lieutenant Johnston was so fortunate as to be the favored suitor, and on July 10, 1845, they were married. Their union was a specially happy one. The absence of offspring but served to draw them closer together and make their lives more nearly one. Throughout his distinguished career she was a worthy helpmate, whether in the circles of society or the more sacred one of private life.

The family to which Mrs. Johnston belonged is distinguished in the annals of Delaware and Maryland. Her father was often honored with high office, having served in the House of Representatives, the Senate, also as Minister to England, and as Secretary of the Treas-

* Mansfield's Life of Scott, p. 273.

ury under Jackson. During Jackson's second administration he was transferred to the Department of State. For many years he was president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. Her brother Robert is also an eminent citizen, having been Governor of Maryland, member of the House of Representatives, and Minister to France, the latter during the administration of President Cleveland.

CHAPTER III.

MEXICO TO THE CIVIL WAR.

JOHNSTON, for more than a year after his marriage, enjoyed a period of rest from active service. On September 21, 1846, he became captain of topographical engineers. By this time the differences between the United States and Mexico had reached a crisis, their armies had come into collision on the fields of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, and victory had on each occasion remained on the side of the United States. In the fall the Government decided upon sending an expedition *via* the Gulf coast of Mexico against the Mexican capital, under the command of General Scott, and was proceeding to make the necessary arrangements to carry this plan into effect. This was considered as destined to be the line of the principal operations for the remainder of the war; and Johnston, who was not the man to let slip an opportunity for active duty, succeeded in securing an assignment to this army, which was the easier to accomplish as he was already favorably known to Scott from their joint service in Florida. At the outset he accompanied the expedition as captain of topographical engineers.

The point selected for debarking was on the beach immediately south of Vera Cruz, and under the distant fire of its guns. The landing was successfully accomplished from surf boats without the loss of a single life; and the army, about twelve thousand strong, proceeded to occupy the lines of investment which it had been the

duty of the engineers and topographical engineers to locate. This work was accomplished with such precision that confusion was unknown. Though but a small part of the necessary transportation and siege artillery had arrived, the disposable guns were placed in position, increased gradually by others as they came, and fire was opened upon the city. The landing had taken place on March 12, 1847; on the 27th of the same month the city and castle surrendered, thus securing to the American army a safe base for its projected operations.

Scott at once prepared for his advance into the interior. He was delayed by the slowness with which the immense number of wagons necessary for the transportation of supplies and ammunition through a hostile country arrived; but by April 6th he was able to send off the first division under Twiggs, and this was at once followed by the others. On April 9th Johnston was appointed lieutenant colonel of voltigeurs, a new regiment of regulars raised for the war and forming a part of Cadwalader's brigade of Pillow's division. This, however, did not prevent him from rendering freely his services as topographical engineer whenever there was need of them. He accompanied the division of Twiggs, and is mentioned by that officer as in the advance in the latter's dispatch to Scott of April 11th. By this date Twiggs, with his division, had reached the pass of Cerro Gordo, where the road from Vera Cruz to Mexico passes through the mountains, and which was found to be fortified and held by the Mexicans in strong force. The next day, in endeavoring to ascertain by actual and close observation whether this apparently impregnable position had any weak points, Johnston pushed his reconnoissances so far that he was twice severely wounded under the very works of the Mexicans. This misfortune prevented his participation in the brilliant action of

Cerro Gordo, which was fought six days afterward, though it gained him favorable mention in the reports of Scott and Twiggs. It gained him also the brevet of major, and subsequently that of colonel, in the regular military establishment.

The victory of Cerro Gordo opened the road to the capital, and the American army continued its advance, occupying in succession La Hoya, Perote, and Puebla. At the latter place it remained for some time, recruiting its strength from the re-enforcements which were sent forward, and awaiting the result of the peace negotiations. These finally proving abortive, the march upon the city of Mexico was resumed in the early part of August. Notwithstanding its re-enforcements, the total fighting force which was to capture the city and to dictate a peace from its plaza was less than eleven thousand men; and this small army was subject to a constant drain from casualties and necessary detachments.

On approaching the city by the road from the east, the difficulties were found to be so great as to suggest the choice of another line of offensive operations. The enemy was expecting the attack by this route, and had lavished upon it his means of defense. It was blocked by El Penon, a mound so fortified as to be impregnable; and, even if that was masked, the sole approach was over narrow causeways, which furnished the only practicable crossings over the bog in which the city was situated. Scott therefore determined to move around Lake Chalco and to gain the Acapulco road to the city about San Augustin, with the view of operating by it, or by one farther to the west, as might be found most convenient. Here he had reason to believe that the defenses would not be as formidable, and that the ground was firmer, though more broken.

The transfer of the army to this line was completed

on the 18th. Directly in front, on the Acapulco road, was San Antonio, and still nearer to the city, on the same road, was Churubusco, guarding the crossing of a canal, or river, and strongly fortified. To the left, and separated from San Augustin by the Pedrigal, or lava field, and it apparently impassable, was Contreras, guarding another road to the city; and still nearer the city, on this road, was Chapultepec, with Molino del Rey and Casa Mata at its foot. A cross-road passing by Coyahacen connected the Contreras and Acapulco roads, coming into the latter in the rear of San Antonio. At Contreras was General Valencia with seven thousand of the best Mexican troops, and in its rear was Santa Anna with a reserve of twelve thousand more.

After reconnoissances Scott decided to cross the Pedrigal and attack Contreras, designing to capture this road and thus to turn San Antonio. Accordingly, the division of Pillow was ordered to open a road through the Pedrigal, with that of Twiggs covering it. As stated above, the voltigeurs were a part of Pillow's command. The division of Twiggs moved first, accompanied by Magruder's battery and some howitzers. On emerging from the Pedrigal in front of Contreras, these batteries were placed in the best position that could be found. Magruder could bring but three pieces into play, and found himself opposed to twenty-two pieces, with all the advantage of position, numbers, and caliber. In this unequal contest the American artillery suffered severely; among the killed was Lieutenant J. Preston Johnstone, Colonel Johnston's nephew, who commanded a gun in Magruder's battery. He was a young officer of great promise, and the reports of his superiors show the estimation in which he was held.

While this artillery duel was in progress, the American infantry was forming and striving to work around

the left of the Mexicans to interpose between them and the city. They remained for hours under a heavy fire of infantry and artillery, resolutely facing immensely superior forces with their weak brigades. Night found them in this position, backed up against the Pedrigal, and confronted by hosts of enemies.*

Before morning additional troops had come up; the Americans had worked their way around to the left, until they occupied the village of Contreras, between Valencia's intrenched camp and the city; and it was resolved that Shields should hold this point, charged with the double duty of cutting off Valencia's retreat and preventing him from being re-enforced, while the brigades of Riley, Persifer F. Smith, and Cadwalader should avail themselves of a ravine to get in the rear of Valencia, and storm his lines from that direction. The plan was completely successful; the brigade of Riley rushed pell-mell into the Mexican works, closely accompanied by Cadwalader and Smith, and the victory was complete. The forces engaged on the American side amounted to only forty-five hundred men, opposed to fivefold odds.†

* Mr. A. R. Shacklett, who belonged to the voltigeurs, and subsequently served under Johnston in the civil war, says about their situation: "Without leading off into old soldiers' habits (fighting them over), when viewed by subsequent events (fifty battles), I consider that at Contreras, after crossing the Pedrigal, when forming to meet the twelve thousand Mexicans advancing from San Angel, five hundred yards off, with Valencia six thousand strong one mile in our rear, cut off from support or retreat by darkness and the Pedrigal, the most perilous in my history without disaster."

† Johnston, up to the time of this assault, had not heard of the death of his nephew the evening before. His friends, knowing his devotion, had selected Lee, as his most intimate associate, to break the information to him. While Johnston, flushed with pride at the success of the assault, was standing on the captured intrenchments, Lee joined him and communicated to him the sad intelligence. The shock

The effect of this victory was to cause the evacuation of San Antonio, and to bring the Americans without further resistance to Churubusco. The troops moved by the cross-road to Coyahacen until near the convent which stood to the west of Churubusco. This and the works at Churubusco were soon successfully assaulted. The voltigeurs took no part in this action, being on the ground but held in reserve.

These successes brought the Americans to the very gates of Mexico on the Acapulco road, and to the castle of Chapultepec on the Contreras road. They brought about a proposition for an armistice from the Mexicans, which was concluded; and hostilities in consequence were suspended till September 7th. By that time Scott had become satisfied that the Mexicans, contrary to the provisions of the truce, had been conveying arms and munitions of war into Chapultepec, and he thereupon gave notice of the resumption of hostilities. The first operation was directed against Molino del Rey, with the object of its destruction. General Worth, with a force of about three thousand men, was intrusted with the enterprise. The Mexican line extended from Molino del Rey on the left to Casa Mata on the right. Worth assaulted the position near its center, and, after a severe contest, carried it. Cadwalader's brigade acted as the reserve in this fight, and did not take part in the first assault, though part of his force was soon called into action to support the charge at a critical period when

was so great that he fell prostrate upon the works. Lieutenant Johnstone had been left an orphan at an early age, and, adopting the military profession, had been accustomed to look up to Colonel Johnston as to a father. Their attachment was not less than that between father and son. Up to the day of his death, forty-four years later, Johnston kept a likeness of his nephew in his room, and never failed to look at it immediately after rising.

the line was wavering. While the assault was raging, a large body of Mexicans was seen approaching the American left flank, whereupon the voltigeurs were moved in that direction to support Duncan's battery and to repulse the attack, which, with the aid of Sumner's cavalry, they gallantly and successfully accomplished. In Worth's report of the action the part taken by Cadwalader's brigade is particularly signalized, and Johnston is mentioned by name with other officers of the brigade. The best proof of the share of the voltigeurs in the glory of this fight is the fact that they carried three hundred and forty-one men into the battle, and that their loss was ninety-eight out of this number.

The next step in the scheme of the American commander for the capture of the city was an assault upon Chapultepec. This was situated upon a mound of commanding elevation, strongly fortified, and held by a numerous garrison. Scott first placed four heavy batteries in position to bear upon it; all day on the 12th they poured their iron hail upon the castle. The next day was fixed for the attack. Pillow's division was to advance upon the left from the west and Quitman's from the southeast, each to be preceded by a storming party. In this charge the voltigeurs were divided into two detachments, one under the immediate command of Andrews, their colonel, the other under the lead of Johnston. The force pressed up the slope under the command of Cadwalader, Pillow having been wounded early in the action. In the language of Scott's official report: "The broken acclivity was still to be ascended, and a strong redoubt midway to be carried, before reaching the castle on the heights. The advance of our brave men, led by brave officers, though necessarily slow, was unwavering, over rocks, chasms, and mines, and under the hottest fire of cannon and musketry. The redoubt

now yielded to resistless valor, and the shouts that followed announced to the castle the fate that impended. The enemy were steadily driven from shelter to shelter. The retreat allowed not time to fire a single mine without the certainty of blowing up friend and foe. Those who at a distance attempted to apply matches to the long trains were shot down by our men. There was death below as well as above ground. At length the ditch and wall of the main work were reached; the scaling ladders were brought up and planted by the storming parties; some of the daring spirits first in the assault were cast down, killed or wounded; but a lodgment was soon made; streams of heroes followed; all opposition was overcome, and several of the regimental colors flung out from the upper works, amid long-continued shouts and cheers, which sent dismay into the capital. No scene could have been more animating or glorious."

In this assault the voltigeurs took a most prominent part. They are mentioned in Scott's report as being in the lead, and it was their standard which first waved from the captured ramparts. The report of Pillow, the division commander, describes their behavior as follows: "The voltigeur regiment, which was ordered forward in advance as skirmishers to clear the intrenchments and large trees of the large force of the enemy, who were directing a most galling fire into the command—the right wing under the very gallant and accomplished Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston, and the left under the brave Colonel Andrews himself, assisted by his gallant Major Caldwell—having united, cleared the woods and pursued the enemy so hotly that he was not able to ignite his mines, drove him inside the parapet itself, and occupied the broken ground around the ditch of the fortifications, all in the face of a most heavy fire from the enemy's small arms and heavy guns. The ladders arrived, and several

efforts were made by both officers and men to scale the walls. But many of the gallant spirits who first attempted it fell, killed or wounded. Colonel Andrews, whose regiment so distinguished itself and commander by this brilliant charge, as also Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston and Major Caldwell, whose activity enabled them to lead this assault, have greatly distinguished themselves by their gallantry and daring. Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston received three wounds, but they were all slight, and did not at all arrest his daring and onward movements."

Johnston's bearing on this occasion won something more than words of compliment; he was brevetted Lieutenant Colonel, to date from September 13, 1847, "for gallant and meritorious conduct in the battle of Chapultepec," and it increased the estimation in which he was held by Scott, who said of him: "Johnston is a great soldier, but he has an unfortunate knack of getting himself shot in nearly every engagement."

On this same day Worth was sent forward in the direction of the city, and Cadwalader's brigade was ordered to support him. There was some skirmishing in the suburbs, and the next day Worth and Quitman entered and took possession.

The fall of the capital closed this wonderful war, in which a powerful republic was conquered by a force hardly equal to a division of a modern army. The American numbers on entering the city were barely six thousand.

After the cessation of active operations there was little of importance in Johnston's Mexican career, though the fact of his being placed in charge of expeditions to the coast to bring up re-enforcements and supplies bears strong testimony to the reputation which he had made by his conduct in the war. Though his rank in the per-

manent military establishment was simply that of captain, he had acted throughout as lieutenant colonel of the regiment of voltigeurs. In the summer of 1848 this regiment was mustered out of service. It being doubtful whether this did not have the effect of retiring him along with his regiment, Congress, unwilling that such a result should be the reward of five wounds and indefatigable services, passed a special act, approved July 19, 1848, reinstating him in his rank as Captain of Topographical Engineers from September 21, 1846.

After the close of the war he was engaged for some time in topographical service in Texas and on the Western river improvements. In 1855 Congress added to the army two regiments of cavalry, and he was commissioned lieutenant colonel of one of them (the first), Colonel E. V. Sumner being its commander. With this regiment he served in the West in various unimportant though laborious duties, and in 1858 acted as inspector general of the Utah expedition.

In the summer of 1860, General Jesup, Quartermaster General of the United States, died. As he was next in rank to General Scott, the question as to the proper man to fill this vacancy was of great importance, since, owing to the advanced age of General Scott, the appointee might be called at any moment to the chief command of the national army. Scott was requested to name to the War Department the officer who was, in his judgment, best fitted for the trust. He declined to limit himself to a single name, but suggested that the selection should be made from one of four: Joseph E. Johnston, Robert E. Lee, Albert Sidney Johnston, and Charles F. Smith. The career of these officers justified the accuracy of Scott's judgment, all having attained high distinction. The contest for the appointment soon narrowed down to the two Johnstons. John B. Floyd,

Secretary of War, was warmly in favor of J. E. Johnston, while Jefferson Davis, his predecessor in office, was equally earnest in advocacy of A. S. Johnston. Mr. Davis was then Senator from Mississippi, and chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, so that the contest for a while was doubtful. It was finally settled by the appointment of J. E. Johnston, who was promptly confirmed by the Senate, and commissioned on June 28, 1860. Upon his appointment, Lee, with his usual magnanimity, addressed him the following letter :

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, *July 30, 1860.*

MY DEAR GENERAL : I am delighted at accosting you by your present title, and feel my heart exult within me at your high position. I hope the old State may always be able to furnish worthy successors to the first chief of your new department ; and that in your administration the country and army will have cause to rejoice that it has fallen upon you. Please present my cordial congratulations to Mrs. J., and say that I fear, now that she will have you constantly with her, she will never want to see me again. May happiness and prosperity always attend you, is the sincere wish of

Very truly yours,

R. E. LEE.

GENERAL J. E. JOHNSTON, *Quartermaster General, U. S. Army.**

* Mrs. Davis, in a note to vol. ii, p. 150, of her *Memoirs of Jefferson Davis*, states that the confirmation of General Johnston's nomination as quartermaster general was violently opposed in the Senate, and that Mr. Davis spoke for two hours to carry the point, and did so. On page 158 of the same volume she quotes from a letter of Mr. Davis to Mr. James Lyons, of Richmond, written August 30, 1878 (long after their estrangement), in which he says : " It [the nomination] met serious opposition ; and all my power and influence were required to prevent its rejection." The records of the Senate show that the nomination was sent to that body on June 27th, and at once referred to the Committee on Military Affairs. Mr. Davis, on behalf of the committee, reported the nomination, and on June 28th, the very next day, it

This appointment made Johnston a brigadier general, and in attendance on its duties he remained in Washington until the crisis which brought on the civil war, an event which allowed him to enjoy his new dignity only a few months. Personally he was opposed to secession, though he held it to be the duty of a soldier to take no part in such debates. He saw with grief the successive withdrawals of the Southern States from the Union, but awaited the action of Virginia, to whom he felt that he owed his first allegiance. His brother, Peter C. Johnston, was a member of the convention, and kept him informed as to the possible action of the State. In a letter of March 10, 1861, he wrote that there was no probability of the passage of an ordinance of secession at that time, and that the conservatives had a decided majority in the convention. It is a well-known historical fact that this convention was opposed to secession, and that the ordinance was only carried when Mr. Lincoln's call for volunteers forced Virginia from neutrality and compelled her to choose her side in the coming contest. When her choice was made, Johnston considered that her lot was his, and that no honorable course remained to him but to follow her fortunes.

was confirmed by a vote of thirty-one to three. The only adverse votes were those of Messrs. Hale, King, and Trumbull, and they were evidently on political and not personal grounds. This does not indicate any "violent" or "serious" opposition. Mr. Davis is undoubtedly entitled to credit for his generosity in supporting the nomination after his zealous advocacy of another, but this claim of having saved it from rejection is refuted by the Senate records. The author is informed by relatives of General Johnston, who then resided in Washington and were watching the proceedings with interest, that there was no opposition.

CHAPTER IV.

RESIGNATION—THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

THOUGH Johnston was opposed to secession as a question of expediency, he did not doubt it as a matter of right. A grandnephew of Patrick Henry, son of one of the draughtsmen of the resolutions of 1798-'99, and brother of Charles C. Johnston, he believed that his first duty was to his home and kindred. After the failure of the Peace Conference called by Virginia as a last expedient to avoid internecine strife, the convention—impelled by the attack on Sumter, the call for volunteers, and the irresistible current of events—became almost a unit in favor of secession, and on April 17th passed the ordinance to that effect. Johnston, immediately on receipt of this information, decided to hand in his resignation. He received the intelligence late on Friday, the 19th. The next day his resignation was written, and he applied himself to the duty of winding up his accounts as quartermaster general. This occupied him until Monday, the 22d, on which day the resignation was presented to the Secretary of War, with the request for an order announcing its immediate acceptance—a request which was granted, though, as the Secretary stated, with great regret. His letter of resignation was as follows :

WASHINGTON, *April 22, 1861.*

SIR : With feelings of deep regret I respectfully tender the resignation of my commission in the army of the

United States. The feelings which impel me to this act are, I believe, understood by the Honorable Secretary of War. I hope that long service, with some labor, hardship, danger, and loss of blood, may give me some claim to ask the early consideration of this communication.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON, *Quartermaster General*.

On Tuesday, the 23d, he left for Richmond, accompanied by Mrs. Johnston. He arrived on the morning of the 25th and reported to Governor Letcher, who at once made him major general in the State service. On the following day he was appointed to the command of all the State forces about Richmond. Lee, having no accounts to settle, had reached Richmond earlier, so that his commission antedated Johnston's by two days.

It was at great personal sacrifice that Johnston gave up his commission in the army of the United States. He was the officer of highest rank in that army who resigned, the only general who came South. He stood high in the estimation of Scott, on whose staff he had served, and who had recently shown his estimate of Johnston by recommending him as one of the four upon whom the office of quartermaster general could most fitly be conferred. The rank which he held by his tenure of that office, considered in connection with the advanced age of Scott, would soon have made him the senior officer of the national armies. His services in the Seminole and Mexican wars were well known and, in that day of small combats, were looked upon as much more important than they would now be considered by readers accustomed to studying the campaigns of armies tenfold as numerous. It can not be doubted that rapid preferment would have been his reward had he remained in the old army. In fact, it was the common supposition at the time that, if

either he or Lee had espoused the Northern cause, the one who remained would have been chosen for the chief command of the national forces. However this may be, it is undoubtedly the fact that, when Johnston presented his resignation, Scott earnestly endeavored to persuade him to withdraw it, adding his personal solicitations to the arguments which he adduced.

But allurements of rank and position had no effect upon Johnston, whose intense love of State outweighed all other considerations. His feeling is well illustrated by the expression which he gave to it in a conversation with one of his nearest relations at the time when he tendered his resignation. He had with him the sword which his father had worn during the Revolution, and which he himself had never used in his previous military service. When this fact was noticed and commented upon, he replied that he had promised his father, when the sword was given him, never to draw it except in defense of Virginia, and that the occasion had now arisen when he could draw it in defense of his native State. It was, in fact, the only property which he took with him when he left the city of Washington for Virginia, his departure being so hurried that his remaining effects had to follow at a later date.

Johnston was not of those who believed that the coming war would be of short duration. On the contrary, his opinion was freely expressed that it would be protracted and bloody; and that the South should prepare for it as promptly as possible by extensive purchases of arms and munitions of war, and by incessant education and discipline of the fine material which she had available for armies. Nor was he of those who indulged the foolish conceit that "one Southerner could whip five Yankees." While believing that, at the outset, the greater familiarity of the Southern people with fire-

arms, and the fact that they were acting on the defensive as guardians of home and kindred, would give them the advantage, he knew as a soldier of experience that discipline would in time remove this inequality, and that the Northern troops only needed education and good officers to make fine soldiers.

This unwillingness to underrate his foe, and respect for the soldierly qualities of those arrayed against him, extended throughout the war, and was one cause of his unpopularity with the Confederate Executive. His refusal to make such an idea the basis of his plans, and throw his army in wild assaults upon a veteran foe superior in numbers, was, in fact, the explanation of his removal at a subsequent critical epoch of his military career. Impressed thus with the importance of prompt preparation, Johnston zealously co-operated with Lee in the task of instructing and organizing the Virginia levies which had been called out by Governor Letcher, and were in want of everything but courage and enthusiasm. He was actively engaged in this work till near the middle of May.

Meanwhile, the State of Virginia had entered into a convention with the Southern Confederacy, and the conduct of military affairs had been turned over to the latter. The Confederate Congress had passed an act authorizing the appointment of five brigadier generals in its armies. This was then their highest grade. The first name sent in for one of these appointments was that of Samuel Cooper, whose experience and knowledge of the details of the adjutant general's duties promised to be, and was, of immense advantage to the new nation. On the accession of Virginia to the Confederacy, Mr. Davis offered two of these appointments to Lee and Johnston. They both accepted, and on May 13th their names were sent to the Confederate Congress and the

nomination promptly confirmed. At the telegraphic request of Jefferson Davis, Johnston went to Montgomery for an interview, that city being then the Confederate seat of Government. On his arrival, elaborate conferences were held with the President and military authorities, after which he was assigned to the command of the troops near Harper's Ferry, and instructed to proceed to that point *via* Lynchburg, at which latter place he was to make arrangements for sending forward to Harper's Ferry such force as he might deem necessary to strengthen his command.

After stopping, on his return, at Abingdon for a day to recuperate, his labors and journeys having been very arduous, he proceeded to Lynchburg, where he was disappointed in any expectation of strengthening his command, as he found no troops there; and he continued his journey to Harper's Ferry, where he arrived on the 23d, accompanied by Colonel E. Kirby Smith, Major W. H. C. Whiting, Major E. McLean, and Captain Thomas I. Preston. He found Colonel Thomas J. Jackson in command of the post and the troops assembled there, and, after some explanations, assumed command and issued orders to that effect. Harper's Ferry had been first seized by Virginia troops at the order of Governor Letcher, the prime motive of the seizure being to secure the arms and machinery for their manufacture, both of which were essential to the South. Though the arms were unfortunately destroyed by the foresight and activity of the Federal commander on his evacuation of the place, the machinery was secured.

The troops occupying this point at the time of Johnston's assumption of command consisted of nine regiments and two battalions of infantry, of which six regiments were Virginians, four companies or sixteen pieces of artillery, all from Virginia, and a small regi-

ment of Virginia cavalry. Their effective total was slightly in excess of five thousand men, their strength being greatly reduced by the large numbers of sick, who were suffering from the contagious diseases inevitable among new troops raised in the rural districts, like those from the South. The gifted Jackson, who had commanded them until Johnston's arrival, had not had sufficient opportunity to instruct them, though their discipline was improving every day under his efforts and those of his subordinates. ¶ Their armament and equipment were also very incomplete. The artillery had neither caissons, harness, nor horses, the cavalry were short both of sabers and carbines, the infantry of serviceable muskets, and all of ammunition. This latter deficiency was especially serious. It was among the very first things that arrested Johnston's attention; for on the 26th, only three days after his arrival, the published correspondence shows him writing to Richmond that there were on hand only twelve or fifteen rounds for his force of fifty-two hundred men—a quantity "scarcely half enough for an action." Colonel Jackson had been equally impressed with the necessity for increasing the stock of ammunition, and had inaugurated the manufacture of cartridges in the neighborhood as far as he could with the means at his disposal. Johnston increased the force so employed, though much hampered by the want of bullet molds and cartridge paper. By the 6th of June this supply had only increased to forty rounds; and the arrival of new regiments without ammunition and accouterments, for this reason, gave him no additional strength. As late as June 17th, when General Robert Patterson was on the eve of an advance, the amount of ammunition on hand was only thirty rounds; and Johnston is writing to Richmond that "the want of ammunition has rendered me very timid," and

again on the following day that "these troops have not a supply for half an hour's fighting." Percussion caps were even more difficult to procure than cartridges, on account of the lack of facilities for their manufacture.

The artillery and cavalry were equally lacking in necessary equipment. Caissons could only be procured by fastening roughly-made ammunition chests to the running parts of farm wagons, and sabers could hardly be procured at all. The necessary transportation for the army was not less scarce. These difficulties were inherent to the absence of manufactures in the South. The imperfect armament of the Southern troops added largely to the odds against which they contended. In the important branch of artillery the Northern pieces throughout the war were far superior to the Southern, both in caliber and range, and many of the Southern cavalry, even in the later campaigns, were armed with shot-guns. It was a long time before they secured sufficient sabers. The inability to arm the cavalry long kept the numbers of that arm below the requirements. As late as February 9, 1862, Johnston wrote to the Confederate Government suggesting their increase by the organization of a large body of lancers. The suggestion was not adopted. This paucity of resource added greatly to the anxiety of Johnston, who was daily expecting an advance of his enemy and the possibility of an engagement, and who was yet without half enough ammunition to fight a general action.

General Johnston had received from Mr. Davis and General Lee the impression that they regarded Harper's Ferry as a stronghold commanding the approaches to the valley of Virginia, and that it was an important strategic point which should be held. His examination of the place soon satisfied him that it was untenable as a military position, and that troops stationed there

would be out of position to meet an invasion of the valley, and would be liable to be cut off. The place itself was completely commanded by the heights which surrounded it, and could be turned either above or below. The main road from the north enters Virginia at Williamsport, twenty miles above Harper's Ferry, and by that road an invading force could march direct upon Winchester *via* Martinsburg, thus isolating any force that would remain at Harper's Ferry. As Johnston's command was the only body available for the defense of the valley, it was necessary to so place it as not only to check any invasion by Williamsport and Martinsburg, but also an advance *via* Romney of the Federal army under McClellan in northwest Virginia. And it was important also that it should be so stationed as to be in position to unite with the troops at Manassas in case of need. Harper's Ferry was not suited for either of these objects. It interposed no barrier to the advance of Patterson by Williamsport, or of McClellan by Romney; and the route from Harper's Ferry to Manassas Junction followed the course of the Potomac for a short distance, and would have been commanded by artillery on the north bank.

On the other hand, Winchester fulfilled all three conditions. An army stationed there not only blocked invasion by Martinsburg, but was in position to meet a force advancing from Romney. In addition, it gave a short line by which to form a junction by way of Snicker's Gap and Aldie with an army at Centreville, or by way of Ashby's Gap and Piedmont Station with an army at Manassas. These views were explained to Lee in letters of May 26th, 28th, and 31st, and June 6th, and instructions asked. Lee, on behalf of the Government, wrote on June 1st, expressing apprehensions of the difficulty of holding Harper's Ferry, but giving no permission to

evacuate it. On June 3d he again wrote, saying that its abandonment would be depressing to the cause of the South; to which Johnston replied by inquiring whether the loss of five or six thousand men would not be more so. Lee wrote again on June 7th, saying that the President regarded the position at Harper's Ferry as an important one, and that its evacuation would interrupt the communication with Maryland. It was not until June 13th that the requisite authority to abandon Harper's Ferry was granted. Johnston, however, confident that this would be the final decision of the War Department as soon as a thorough understanding of the region was obtained, proceeded to make all necessary preparations for the evacuation of the place. He continued the work of removing the machinery of the armory, and sent off also the baggage of the troops (for there was one period of the war when Confederate troops had baggage) and the various army supplies to Winchester. Everything that was worth transporting was carried away, and on June 15th the place itself was evacuated, the army reaching that evening a point a few miles south of Charlestown, where it encamped for the night. This was before the receipt of General Cooper's letter of the 13th granting the requisite permission for withdrawing from the place. This letter was received on the morning of the 16th, while the troops were on the march to Bunker's Hill to meet Patterson's advance.*

When Johnston assumed command at Harper's Ferry his nearest antagonist was General Robert Patterson, an old comrade in arms of the Mexican War, who was then collecting an army at Chambersburg and organizing it for an advance into the valley of Virginia. John-

* The best proof of the untenability of Harper's Ferry as a military position was the easy capture of its large garrison in September, 1862, by Jackson, *approaching from Maryland*.

ston, on taking charge of operations, had continued the judicious arrangements of his predecessor, Colonel Jackson, for observing this force. The Potomac River was watched by the Confederate cavalry from Point of Rocks for many miles up the river. It was under the command of "the indefatigable Stuart," as Johnston termed in his report the young and promising J. E. B. Stuart, and the gallant Ashby. All the intelligence obtainable represented Patterson's army as greatly outnumbering Johnston's. On June 10th Patterson advanced from Chambersburg to Hagerstown, which indicated an intention to cross into Virginia. He did cross the Potomac on the 16th, with a force stated by him to be ten thousand men, exclusive of cavalry and artillery, and after deducting certain troops which were withdrawn from him by order of General Scott just after he crossed. Johnston's army then numbered about seven thousand effectives, all told; but on the 13th, in consequence of a report that McClellan with his army had entered Romney, he detached two regiments, under Colonel A. P. Hill, to meet this new foe.

It was in consequence of this move of Patterson (which was promptly reported to Johnston) that the evacuation of Harper's Ferry had been decided on and effected by the Confederate commander. In order to place himself in position to check it, he directed his march on Bunker's Hill, which he reached the afternoon of the 16th. Next morning he placed his army in line of battle. They were disappointed, however, in their anxiety for a fight, for on that day Patterson recrossed the Potomac. His information had magnified Johnston's force of sixty-five hundred into "fifteen thousand trained infantry"; and the withdrawal of a Rhode Island regiment and his regulars under orders from Washington had served as an effectual damper to his

aggressive aspirations. The moral effect of this withdrawal on the Confederate army was highly beneficial, for they were ignorant of his reduction of force and naturally attributed it to a fear on his part to meet them. The next day the army, having no enemy to oppose, marched to Winchester, and was stationed to the north of the town. In the meantime the detachment under Colonel A. P. Hill, consisting of the two Virginia regiments sent from Harper's Ferry and the Third Tennessee Regiment, which had joined them at Winchester, had proceeded to Romney, only to find that the report of McClellan's advance was false. A. P. Hill, however, was not a man to take a long march for nothing. It was throughout the war a cardinal object of Confederate strategy to break the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at as many points as possible, and thereby impede communication between Washington and the West. Colonel Hill therefore sent a detachment from Romney of four companies, under Colonel Vaughan, of the Tennessee regiment, to destroy the railroad bridge over New Creek. The bridge was defended by a detachment of two hundred men, with two guns. Colonel Vaughan advanced upon them, but did not overtake any of them. He, however, captured their colors and cannon and burned the bridge. The detachment then returned to Winchester.

Johnston improved the leisure which the withdrawal of Patterson gave him by assiduous attention to drill and organization, and by endeavoring to increase his supply of ammunition, which still gave him great solicitude. He was a strict disciplinarian, and in all the armies which he commanded this was his first care. By this time additional regiments had joined him, and their training and grouping into larger units for certain mobility in action had become of the highest impor-

tance. This opportunity was therefore taken to form the army into brigades. He had already recognized the marvelous talents of Colonel Jackson, and he placed Jackson in command of the First Brigade, which was composed of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Twenty-seventh Virginia Regiments, with Pendleton's Battery. This was the origin of the famous "Stonewall" Brigade, which subsequently on many fields reflected such honor upon its commanders and its founder. The Second Brigade was composed of the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Georgia Regiments, a battalion of Kentuckians, and Alburtis's Battery; and Colonel Bartow was appointed its commander. The Second and Eleventh Mississippi, the Fourth Alabama, and the Second Tennessee Regiments and Imboden's Battery were formed into the Third Brigade, and placed under the command of General Bee, who had just joined the army of the valley. The Fourth Brigade was formed of the Tenth and Eleventh Virginia, the Third Tennessee and Maryland Regiments, and Groves's Battery, and placed under the charge of Colonel Elzey.

Under this arrangement the troops from the same State were grouped, as far as possible, into the same brigade. Their different degrees of efficiency and the desire to have the brigades as nearly the same strength as possible rendered it impracticable to carry out this arrangement perfectly. This brigading by States produced the natural emulation which is so great an incentive to gallantry, and added greatly to their efficiency. The troops were in the highest spirits, and eager to measure their strength with the enemy. Their fighting force was not quite nine thousand effectives. The official return of Patterson's army for June 28th shows his strength to have consisted on that day of 14,344 of all arms present for duty. The return of Johnston's

army for June 30th showed his total force present for duty to have been 10,654; but this includes some troops which, though assigned to his army, did not join him till after July 3d.

It was not long before the newly formed Stonewall Brigade had an opportunity to show its mettle. Johnston had placed it nearer the Potomac, to support the cavalry and impede an advance of Patterson which was daily expected, but with instructions to avoid a general engagement. On July 2d Patterson again crossed the Potomac and advanced upon Jackson, driving Stuart's cavalry before him. Jackson, in obedience to his orders, sent the mass of his brigade to the rear, retaining with him as a rear guard the Fifth Virginia and one piece of artillery. With this and Stuart's cavalry he took a position near Falling Waters and fought Patterson for several hours, only retiring when he was about to be surrounded. When he did withdraw he carried with him forty-five prisoners, captured by Stuart's cavalry. He reported a loss of twenty men. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was not known. Jackson retired skirmishing till he met Johnston with the main army at Darksville, six miles south of Martinsburg.

In transmitting the reports of this engagement, Johnston, whose good opinion of Jackson and Stuart increased with each day of association, warmly urged the promotion of the former to the grade of brigadier general and the promotion of the latter to the grade of colonel. Patterson's report of this affair represents Jackson's small force of three hundred and eighty men as a body of thirty-five hundred, and their loss at sixty killed. He omits to mention his own loss, but his account shows that he had two brigades engaged—those of Thomas and Abercrombie. Yet he terms Jackson's rear guard a "foe superior in number." He character-

izes his leisurely occupation of Martinsburg as a "hot pursuit."

At Darkesville, Johnston encamped in order of battle, expecting and hoping that Patterson would advance and attack him. His force was only nine thousand men, while that of Patterson, who had been largely re-enforced, consisted, according to his own estimate, of eighteen thousand two hundred. Johnston remained at Darkesville for four days, awaiting and desiring an attack. But by this time Patterson had received information which caused him to estimate Johnston's army at forty thousand men! A Mr. McDowell, who was a reporter and therefore incapable of exaggeration, calculated his strength at forty-two thousand men, and stated that Winchester was strongly garrisoned and fortified, among the garrison being a regiment of Kentucky riflemen armed with heavy bowie knives, who refused to take more than one round of cartridges, and who were placed in the bushes in readiness for assault.*

An attack upon such a force so desperately armed was not to be thought of, and therefore Patterson remained at Martinsburg. It would have been madness with such inferior forces to attack him in Martinsburg, with its houses and stone inclosures; so that Johnston, after awaiting an attack till he saw there was no likelihood of one, withdrew to Winchester, so as to be in better position for the other contingencies which it was his duty to keep constantly before his mind. The withdrawal was a great disappointment to the troops, who were anxious for a fight, and had not as yet seen enough service to cure them of the desire. After the withdrawal Patterson advanced to Bunker's Hill, where he rested, on July 16th, and the next day he moved easterly to Smithfield.

* Patterson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign, p. 60.

As has been seen, a prime object of Johnston in taking post at Winchester was, that he might be enabled to join the army at Manassas in case of need. On June 2d, only a week after Johnston's arrival at Harper's Ferry, Beauregard had reached Manassas and assumed command. He and Johnston at once communicated with each other, and agreed in their views of the importance of mutual support. Beauregard, in his military writings, claims to have originated this idea of a junction of the two armies. He may have been the first to suggest it in writing, but its importance was so obvious that it had occurred to all concerned (the enemy included) as a matter of course. The importance of Patterson's detaining Johnston in the valley, and thereby preventing him from re-enforcing Manassas, was fully appreciated in Washington, and is reiterated by Scott in his communications to Patterson, thus showing that Beauregard was not alone in the opinion. In fact, as early as May 30th, before Beauregard's arrival at Manassas, Lee had suggested to Johnston a joint movement with Bonham (Beauregard's predecessor) against any Federal advance by Leesburg. There was nothing brilliant or original in the idea. The only question was as to its feasibility.

As soon as Johnston ascertained from Hill's expedition that McClellan was not moving on Romney and Winchester, the feasibility of this movement to Manassas at the right time became greater. The only problem then remaining was to so time it as to arrive just long enough before the impending battle to take part in it, and not so long as to cause, by the news of his arrival, a corresponding transfer of Patterson, which latter result, in view of Patterson's superior force, would have been worse than useless. It was for the purpose of gaining as much start as possible on Patterson that

Johnston had retired to Winchester, instead of remaining opposite the Northern force at Martinsburg. He kept his cavalry well out, in order to be informed as promptly as possible of the slightest change in Patterson's position.

Meanwhile the grand Federal advance upon Manassas had commenced. Their army of thirty-five thousand men under McDowell had moved out from Washington with the cry of "On to Richmond!" on its lips, confident that they would reach in a few days the goal which proved a four years' journey. On July 18th a portion of it had fought with Beauregard's troops the action of Blackburn's Ford, and had been repulsed. Early that morning the Confederate War Department telegraphed Johnston as follows: "General Beauregard is attacked; to strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your discretion."

The question of practicability depended entirely on the possibility of giving Patterson the slip. As a reconnaissance by Stuart's cavalry showed him to have merely moved laterally from Smithfield to Charlestown, evincing no inclination to advance, Johnston, who thus had a start of a day's march, made his arrangements to move at once. He could not send his sick to Culpeper Court House, as it would have required all his meager transportation and defeated the movement. He therefore left them in Winchester (they were about seventeen hundred in number), guarded by a strong body of militia, which was sufficient for the purpose, as the chances were that Patterson, on discovering his movement, would at once attempt a similar one, and move to the support of Mc-

Dowell. Johnston covered the movement by a curtain of cavalry under Stuart.

The success of the operation is best shown by Patterson's dispatches. On July 18th he telegraphed Scott: "The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and caused him to be reinforced." And again on the 19th: "The enemy, from last information, are still at Winchester, and being reinforced every night." He did not discover that the Confederates had departed till the next day, when it was too late to redeem Scott's promise to McDowell, that if Johnston moved for Manassas he would have Patterson upon his heels.*

* It should be stated, in justice to General Patterson, that he disapproved of the line by which he was operating, and favored a movement to Leesburg with his army, in which position he would have been as near McDowell as Johnston was to Beauregard. If he had made this advance, Johnston would have been greatly perplexed how to meet it and at the same time confront McClellan advancing from West Virginia *via* Romney. It would have been still more difficult for him to have joined Beauregard quicker than Patterson could join McDowell. Scott, however, did not adopt this plan of Patterson, but kept him in the valley, rendering Johnston's strategy practicable.—See General Patterson's testimony in the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War to the third session of the Thirty-seventh Congress, Part II, pp. 80 *et seq.*

CHAPTER V.

MANASSAS.

WHEN the troops first moved out from Winchester in a direction leading away from the position of Patterson's army, they interpreted the march as a retreat, and, in consequence, were much downcast. But they had proceeded a few miles only on their way when Johnston decided to make his entire army his confidant, and communicated to them the intelligence that they were in motion to take part in a decisive battle in conjunction with their comrades at Manassas. He exhorted them to make a forced march in order to share in its dangers and glories.

They left their camping grounds around Winchester about noon of the 18th of July, Jackson's brigade being in the lead. He had shown even at that early period the talent for celerity of movement which subsequently gained for his troops the sobriquet of "foot cavalry," and it was certain that he would by his example stimulate the others to a generous rivalry.

The announcement of the proposed destination and its object was received by the men with cheers and exultation, and they manifested their eagerness by a somewhat quickened speed. But the volunteer's idea of rapid marching is quite different from that of trained soldiers. In consequence, their pace, as compared with that of regulars, was snail-like. They could not understand, when they came to a rivulet crossing their road, why

they could not stop and walk across single file on a sapling, or jump across on stepping-stones, instead of wetting their feet, thereby compelling a visit to their trunks. They were still Southern gentlemen with baggage and body servants, blissfully unsuspecting of that time in the near future when their scant apparel and equipment enabled them to make those marches which astonished the world.

As Johnston had to bear constantly in mind the contingency of Patterson's attempting to follow his example by moving along a more northern line to unite with McDowell—thus imitating the parallel march of the English and French to Salamanca—and as promptness was of the last importance, he was so disturbed by the slow progress of his troops that he hurried one of his staff forward to Piedmont Station on the Manassas Gap Railroad, with instructions to arrange for sufficient transportation by rail to convey them from that station to Manassas more expeditiously than they could march. Major Whiting, the officer designated, on returning from his errand, met Johnston at Paris and reported that he had executed his mission, and had received assurances from the railroad officials that ample transportation would be provided for the infantry, and that promptly.

A little after nightfall Jackson's brigade had reached Paris, a village in Ashby's Gap, seventeen miles from Winchester, and encamped there for the night. The remainder of the army reached the Shenandoah, where their road crossed it east of Millwood, and bivouacked there. The next morning Jackson's brigade was early in motion, and by eight o'clock had reached Piedmont, which is about six miles from Paris. Trains sufficient for them were soon in readiness, and they at once moved off to Manassas, being the first to arrive. The

only other troops for whom transportation was furnished that day were the Seventh and Eighth Georgia, of Bartow's brigade. The remaining infantry were compelled to wait at Piedmont, while the cavalry under Stuart and the artillery under Pendleton pursued their journey by the country road.

Johnston passed the night at Paris. While there a member of Beauregard's staff arrived, bringing one of those plans which Beauregard was always ready to furnish to his associates. It was that Johnston, instead of moving straight to Manassas, should march by Aldie and attack the Federal right rear at Centreville, his guns to be the signal for Beauregard to attack them in front. Such an attempt to unite two armies on a field of battle during the progress of the fight itself is difficult and hazardous even with veteran troops. With new troops the risk and difficulty are of course much greater. The operation involves voluntarily placing an enemy between the two bodies—a position which is itself frequently the object of a battle. Nothing would have suited McDowell better than such a manœuvre. He had left Washington with thirty-five thousand men. Johnston, even if he could have calculated the rate of marching of his raw troops with sufficient precision to have concentrated them in condition for battle in the proper position and unsuspected by his foe, had but eleven thousand. Had he madly rushed into such a position, McDowell could have turned upon him and crushed him long before Beauregard could have collected his army from the different fords of Bull Run, along which he had placed them, and come to his relief. It is evident from Beauregard's arrangement of his forces that he expected McDowell's advance to be against his right.*

* "In reality, McDowell had at first intended to move on the Confederate right, *in anticipation of which, as the most probable operation,*

McDowell's real plan was to turn Beauregard's left, for the purpose of cutting the communication between him and Johnston. The move by Aldie would have secured for McDowell the very thing which he vainly fought a battle to obtain. Johnston, deeming the manœuvre too uncertain and hazardous, declined to accede to the suggestion, and preferred the safer one of utilizing the railroad for a prompt junction of the two armies, leaving the plan of action to be selected when such junction was accomplished.

On the 20th, Johnston succeeded in procuring enough transportation for two additional regiments, and sent off the Fourth Alabama and Second Mississippi and a part of the Eleventh Mississippi. These were all a part of Bee's brigade, and Bee accompanied them. Johnston was so disappointed at the tardiness of the railroad officials, and so fearful of arriving too late for the impending battle, that he decided to go along with these troops. He left General E. Kirby Smith to superintend the shipment of the remainder. Elzey's entire brigade, half of Bee's and half of Bartow's, numbering altogether more than half of the army, were left behind at Piedmont Station. Johnston reached Beauregard's army about midday on the 20th. As the Seventh and Eighth Georgia, of Bartow's brigade, had reached the field the previous day, and as part of Bee's brigade had also been left behind, these two regiments were for the moment attached to Bee's, thus giving him the strength of a full brigade.

Johnston's first care on arrival was to confer with Beauregard and inform himself as thoroughly as possible, in the limited time at his disposal, of the disposition of the troops and the character of the country.

the strongest Confederate brigades were posted in that quarter."—Roman's Beauregard, vol. i, p. 98. The Italics are the author's.

He had come fully impressed with the opinion that Patterson would, as General Scott expressed it, be on his heels, and bring to McDowell a greater accession of strength than he had brought to Beauregard. He therefore considered it essential that, in order to reap any fruit from his movement, the Confederates should, with their united forces, at once assume the offensive against McDowell and decide the event before the possibility of such a mighty re-enforcement to their opponents. He found Beauregard equally impressed with the same idea, and the two at once proceeded to discuss the best means of carrying this determination into effect.

Though Johnston was the ranking officer, his late arrival and ignorance of the topography of the region made him largely dependent on Beauregard for necessary information. The latter indicated to him on a map the disposition of his own army. It was ranged along the line of Bull Run, and its distribution was predicated on the supposition that McDowell's main effort would be against the Confederate right flank, for the purpose of seizing Manassas Junction, which was Beauregard's base of supplies. Accordingly, Beauregard's army was arranged with its "strongest brigades" (to borrow Colonel Roman's expression) down the stream. Ewell's brigade guarded the approaches to Union Mills; D. R. Jones's brigade guarded McLean's ford; Longstreet's, Blackburn's ford; Bonham's, Mitchell's ford; and Cocke's, Ball's ford. Colonel Evans, with fourteen companies and a battery of the latter brigade, was the only guard to the Stone Bridge, by which the Warrenton pike crossed the stream, and to a private ford still farther above. Holmes's brigade was supporting Ewell, and Early's was supporting Jones. Jackson, on arrival, had been ordered by Beauregard to support Bonham, and Bee to support Longstreet. Johnston, on learning

the details of this formation, was apprehensive of the comparative weakness of the left, and transferred Jackson and Bee in that direction. General Beauregard gave a similar direction to Hampton's legion, which had just arrived.

The result of the conference between the two generals was a determination to take the offensive and attack McDowell the next morning. To put this into effect a plan suggested by Beauregard was adopted. It was, in substance, to make available the several roads leading to Centreville through the different fords guarded by the Confederates, for the purpose of an advance against McDowell's left flank and rear. As soon as this plan was decided upon, instructions were given for its reduction to writing and for the preparation of the proper number of copies which were to be furnished to the different subordinate commanders; and Johnston lay down to secure some rest, having had none the three previous nights.

The momentous morning of the first great contest between the North and South broke clear, and the battle order was brought to Johnston at early daylight and signed. On the operations of this day depended the fate of the new Confederacy. A Federal victory, following so closely McClellan's recent success in western Virginia, would have ended the war then and there, and severed the new nation with the sword. The Federal army under its promising young general numbered, including its detachments, 35,732 men present for duty. The combined Confederate armies that morning consisted of 29,188 men present for duty, which included its garrison at Manassas, but did not include those troops of Johnston's army which arrived later in the day.*

* Roman's Beauregard, vol. i, p. 98.

The number actually brought into action on each side was of course much less. Each army was equally confident. The Northerners—basing their hopes on the immense superiority of their artillery, conscious of the better armament of all their troops, trustful of their commander, and thinking themselves directed by the sagacious counsels of the veteran Scott—scouted the possibility of a reverse, and considered themselves so invincible, that civilians and ladies followed in their path to witness their exploits and celebrate their victory. The Southerners—elated by their first slight success, standing as the defenders of their firesides from invasion, and firm believers in the superior manhood of the South, often asserted—were burning with a desire to vindicate it on the battle field.

When McDowell formed his plan of battle he was not aware of the arrival of Johnston upon the field, though he knew that the move from Winchester was in contemplation, if not actually begun. The difficulty of crossing Bull Run and the ruggedness of the vicinity were not so great above the Stone Bridge as below it. McDowell had decided to take the offensive himself, in order to anticipate the arrival of Johnston's army. No double-trumpet signals or consular standards betrayed to him the arrival of another foe, as Hasdrubal at the Metaurus discovered the success of a similar march of the Roman consul Nero. Ignorant of the successful junction of Johnston and Beauregard, he determined to take advantage of the easier character of the country up the stream and turn the Confederate left and rear with the object of interposing himself between Johnston and Beauregard, and destroying Beauregard before Johnston could arrive. Instead of moving directly on the Stone Bridge, which at first was guarded by only fourteen companies, he instructed Tyler with his divi-

sion, except Richardson's brigade, to make a demonstration against the Stone Bridge while he formed a strong flanking column, consisting of Hunter's division of 2,648 men and Heintzelman's division of 9,777 men, and sent them on a long detour around by Sudley ford, which was unguarded. As soon as they cleared the way Tyler was to cross at the Stone Bridge and join in the attack. Tyler's division consisted of four brigades and was 9,936 strong, but one of these—Richardson's—was attached to Miles's division at Centreville, and with it constituted the reserve. Assuming his brigades to be of equal numbers, Tyler's division, exclusive of Richardson, was 7,500 strong. Thus Evans with his fourteen companies was soon to deal with 19,925 men.

After some delay Tyler proceeded toward the Stone Bridge for the purpose of holding Evans there by demonstrations, while Hunter and Heintzelman made their circuit. But Tyler was not sufficiently demonstrative to deceive Evans, who soon penetrated his design, and, leaving three companies to watch him and sending word to Colonel Cocke of the appearance of affairs, he led his remaining force across the valley of Young's branch to meet the flanking column. Here he formed his handful of men. Just before ten o'clock Burnside's brigade, which was leading the Federal body, deployed and attacked him, supported by its fine battery of six rifled guns. Evans repulsed two assaults and held his ground until another brigade joined Burnside, when, being hard pressed, he called on Bee, whom he saw approaching, to support him. Bee's brigade consisted of four regiments, two of which belonged regularly to Bartow's brigade and were only temporarily attached to Bee, for the reason heretofore explained. From this fact it is spoken of as two brigades in some Federal accounts of the battle.

Its strength was only twenty-seven hundred and thirty-two men, and the eleven companies of Evans numbered only nine hundred men.

Bee moved his force forward in accordance with the request of Evans, and this small force held in check the flanking column until near noon. By this time it was forced back, which enabled Sherman's and Keyes's brigades of Tyler's division to cross the stream and join in the offensive movements of the Federals. Thus the thirty-six hundred men of Evans and Bee were fighting Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, aggregating 12,425 men, re-enforced by half of Tyler's division, or about five thousand men.

This heavy movement against the Confederate left, which gave by its mighty voice full notice of its serious nature, and the difficulty of having orders properly delivered, destroyed all hope of carrying out Beauregard's plan, or a subsequent modification of it which he proposed. It was evident that up to this time McDowell was the *dominus litis*, and that the only remaining hope of the Confederates was, by rapid hurrying forward of their reserves to the point of danger, to frustrate his plan without attempting to execute their own. Accordingly, Johnston, attended by Beauregard—both of whom, on an eminence in rear of Mitchell's ford, about the center of the line, had been awaiting the sounds of battle from their own advance—convinced by the noise of the conflict and the indications of mere defense in the front that the main battle was to be fought on the left, decided to repair in that direction and fight it out there, and hastened to make the necessary arrangements. Orders were sent to Holmes and Early to push rapidly for the sound of the firing, to Bonham to send a part of his force in the same direction, and to Bonham, Longstreet, and Jones to make demonstrations in their front. The

two generals then galloped to the point of danger, about four miles distant.*

When Bee and Evans were forced back across the valley, Bee attempted to make a stand and rally his troops on the Henry hill. Hampton's legion, which was

* The following quotation, from a graphic account of the battle by Colonel Thomas L. Preston, a member of Johnston's staff, describes the reconnoissance by means of which General Johnston, attended by General Beauregard, decided that the main Federal movement was against his left, and the orders issued by him in consequence :

"As I left the [adjutant general's] office I heard the cannon on the extreme left of the Confederate lines. . . . As soon as the cavalry escort reported as ready, the generals—Johnston and Beauregard—followed by their staffs and escort, started on the road leading to McLean's ford of Bull Run. Before reaching the open flat on the south of the stream the generals were halted by a man on the side of the road, who told them that a battery on the opposite hill was firing at every one who entered the open field at that point. General Johnston ordered the staffs and escort to scatter in the timber, so as not to attract attention. After a brief delay we were called together, and proceeded through the woods on a narrow road up toward Blackburn's ford and in rear of General Longstreet's command. By this time the firing on the left had increased, and the rattle of musketry could be heard in the brief intervals. The approaches to the several fords of Bull Run from McLean's to the Stone Bridge were shelled, and there was almost a continuous roar of cannon. The *cortége* was again halted, ordered to dismount and scatter among the trees. The two generals went alone and on foot to the top of a hill which commanded an extended view of the country on both sides of Bull Run. Some time was spent in observation, and, as General Johnston walked back briskly to where his horse was held and gave the order 'Mount and follow,' I saw that he was excited, and inferred that an important movement was promptly to be made. The generals, riding abreast, dashed off at a brisk canter, closely followed by their staffs without reference to rank, nor did they pull rein until opposite Pendleton's battery, when General Johnston suddenly stopped his horse, and, turning in the saddle, asked, 'Whose battery is that?' He was answered, 'It is Pendleton's.' 'Order him to go in a gallop to the left

just arriving, had joined him in the withdrawal, and as he reached the Henry plateau he met Jackson with his brigade in the act of forming. This made an aggregate of about six thousand men on the Confederate side who so far had been brought into action. Bee's troops had lost heavily in their retreat, and were in great confusion. He attempted to rally them on Jackson's brigade, exhorting them to imitate the firm attitude of the

of where the firing is heaviest.' Similar orders were given to Albur-tis's battery, which passed soon afterward. As we reached an open field in rear of the fighting a dispirited-looking body of men were seen standing along an old fence. General Johnston turned his horse toward the center of the line, and, approaching the color bearer, asked, 'What regiment is this, and what are you doing here?' He was answered, 'It is the Fourth Alabama. Our officers have been disabled or killed, and there is no one left to command us.' General Johnston put his hand upon the staff, and said, 'I will lead you. Follow me.' The standard bearer retained his hold upon the staff, and, looking up to the general as he walked quickly by the side of his horse, said, 'General, don't take my colors from me. Tell me where to carry them, and I will place them there.' The general relinquished his hold upon the staff, and, turning aside, put Colonel S. R. Gist in command, who led them back into the fight. The regiment had barely passed beyond General Johnston and myself when General Bee rode up, and as he faced General Johnston he dropped the reins of his bridle, and in a voice tremulous with emotion and tears rolling down his cheeks he said, 'General, my command is scattered and I am alone.' General Johnston replied, 'I know it was not your fault, General Bee. But don't despair; the day is not lost yet.' . . . Not long after the incidents related I was sent to the rear to bring up re-enforcements, with instructions to direct them to positions on the left of the heavy firing. . . . When I returned to report to General Johnston I found him unattended near the Lewis house. The cloud of anxiety had passed from his face, and his orders were given in so cheerful a tone that all who received them seemed to catch the confident spirit in which they were issued. . . . As aid-de-camp I not only executed orders, as did other staff officers of both generals, given by General Johnston, but had opportunity of knowing that he alone directed the manœuvres of the Confederate troops. . . . "

latter by telling them, "Look at Jackson's brigade! it stands there like a stone wall"—a name that has gone down into history with the brigade and its great commander.

While Bee was attempting to rally his shattered command, Johnston and Beauregard arrived upon the field, and, reckless of their own danger, rode forward with the color bearers. Johnston, on the way, had found the Fourth Alabama with all its officers struck down, and, seizing their colors and placing Colonel S. R. Gist in charge, he had marched it back to its place in the line. The gallant example of the two generals, and the consciousness of their presence, revived the wearied and disheartened men, and resulted in the restoration of the line of battle. The efficient handling of Imboden's battery from the time that it was first placed in position by Bee, and its support for hours of a contest with twice its number of rifled guns, contributed greatly to delay the Federal advance and to enable the Confederates to deploy and form.

The question now was simply whether the Confederates could endure the pressure until their re-enforcements should arrive from other parts of the field. After a hurried conversation, Johnston placed Beauregard in charge of the troops at the point of conflict and retained the main command, repairing to the elevated locality of the Lewis house to direct and hurry forward the re-enforcements.

Beauregard brought up a part of Cocke's brigade, and by this time some additional Confederate artillery had also come upon the field. His preparations being complete, he awaited the shock, his line being on the southern part of the plateau. He did not have to wait long. The Federal array came pouring over the slope, accompanied by its rifled artillery, which at once went

into battery. The Confederates greeted them with a deadly fire. Stuart watched his opportunity, and, by a well-timed charge in flank, created considerable confusion. Beauregard, at the critical moment, ordered a charge of the entire line, and the enemy was swept from the plateau. But they were not content with their repulse. They reformed, bringing Howard's fresh troops into action, and again pressed the Confederates back to the southern edge. Here, re-enforced by an additional regiment of Johnston's army (the Sixth North Carolina), which had just arrived by train from Piedmont and had been sent to the spot by Johnston, and by another of Cocke's regiments, Beauregard once more hurled his entire array forward, with the result of again repulsing the enemy and capturing their batteries. But it was at the cost of two of Johnston's brigadiers, Bee and Bartow, who fell in the charge. Soon after this Cash's and Kershaw's South Carolinians and Preston's Twenty-eighth Virginia came up, as also Elzey's brigade, under the command of General E. Kirby Smith, which had just arrived from the valley. Closely following them came Early from down the stream, all having been urged forward by Johnston. Early was arranged to flank the Federals, who had again rallied and were advancing to another assault. But, attacked in front by Beauregard and in flank by Early, they at last gave up the contest and abandoned the field in utter rout. Many fled by the long detour of Sudley ford, others by the Stone Bridge and fords just above. Both the Confederate armies were very weak in cavalry, but such as were on hand were at once sent forward in pursuit, with the result of capturing many prisoners. Johnston at once sent orders to Bonham to take his own troops and Longstreet's, and, crossing Bull Run, to seize the turnpike at some convenient point and cut off the Federal retreat. Owing to a

false rumor that a hostile force was advancing on Manassas—which might have been Patterson's—Ewell and Holmes were sent in that direction. Bonham, on crossing Bull Run and seeing the apparently unshaken condition of Richardson and Davies, did not venture to attack. By this time it was dark, and the wearied troops, of whom some had fought through that entire summer day, and others had been not less fatigued by marching and countermarching, were ordered to encamp.

When the victory was seen to be complete, Colonel Thomas L. Preston, of his staff, rode up to General Johnston and congratulated him upon his triumph. Johnston braced himself in his seat, deliberately raised his hat, and said, in tones of the deepest reverence, "The credit is due to God and our brave Southern soldiers, not to me." *

The aggregate loss of the Confederates in the battle was eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, of which twelve hundred and sixty-seven fell upon Johnston's army. Of his brigade commanders two were killed, and the other two were wounded. The total force of Johnston's army engaged was about eighty-three hundred and thirty-four.

The loss of the Federal army, according to their returns, was twenty-eight hundred and ninety-six. In addition, they abandoned in their retreat twenty-eight pieces of artillery, five thousand muskets, and immense quantities of ammunition and army supplies—acquisitions which were invaluable to the poorly armed and equipped forces of the South, and worth far more than long files of prisoners. The captured artillery, from its quantity and yet more from its quality, was a specially valuable prize. Not less so were the captured muskets, for every

* From Captain T. L. Preston's manuscript account of the battle.

one meant an additional soldier to the armies of the South, whose strength at that period of the war was only limited by the number of arms to put into their hands.

It is difficult to ascertain the exact numbers actually engaged on each side. According to McDowell's report, he crossed Bull Run with about eighteen thousand men of all arms. This corresponds nearly with the official report heretofore quoted, which would make the divisions of Hunter, Heintzelman, and Tyler (excluding Richardson) aggregate about 19,925.

Beauregard's army contributed to the battle ninety-nine hundred and seventy-seven men, which includes eleven hundred and forty-seven cavalry, of which latter force only five hundred were engaged. Therefore Beauregard's strength in the fight was ninety-three hundred and thirty. The troops of Johnston's army engaged, according to Beauregard's official report, were, as has been seen, eighty-three hundred and thirty-four in number. This made a grand aggregate on the Southern side of 17,664. But, of these, more than half came up near the close of the day, while the Federal troops were throughout massed in easy supporting distance of each other.

An analysis of the Confederate casualties shows that Johnston's army lost fifteen per cent of those actually engaged, while Beauregard's army lost seven per cent. This fact tells which general fought the battle. With Johnston still at Winchester and Beauregard ranged as he was on the 18th, before he knew positively that a junction was feasible—and as his force continued to be ranged on the 21st—having his "strongest brigades" on the right, facing fords across which no foe was destined to advance, having nothing but a demi-brigade to guard the line actually selected by his adversary, where would

he and his army have been on the night of the 21st? In other words, what would have been the story of Manassas without Bee, Bartow, and Jackson to illumine its page? It is a historical fact that all of Johnston's troops who reached Manassas, except one regiment, took part in the battle; and equally true that less than one half of Beauregard's were in position to be available.

CHAPTER VI.

IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON.

THE failure of the Confederate army to pursue after the battle of Manassas has been much criticised, and has caused much acrimonious discussion. General Johnston, however, never hesitated to assume his share of the responsibility for the action taken, though insisting that the course pursued was proper, and the only practicable one under the circumstances.

Mr. Davis arrived upon the field just as the battle ended. Before his arrival Bonham had been ordered to pursue, with the result mentioned in the preceding chapter. Ewell and Holmes had been sent to meet a rumored advance of another Federal force. The troops who had been actually engaged all day, in the hot summer season, were in no condition to follow up the enemy. But the great obstacle to any effective pursuit was the weakness of the cavalry arm in the Southern army. Its entire strength was considerably under two thousand men, and a large proportion of these were not in call. Many of those within reach had been fighting for hours, and were in little better condition than the infantry. All who were available were sent off in immediate pursuit, with the result of greatly swelling the number of prisoners and captured guns. But by the time the captors turned their prizes over to proper guards, the Northern army had covered a sufficient distance to be out of danger, being protected in their retreat by large bodies of troops

that had not been engaged. This was all that could be accomplished; for it is a well-known fact that infantry can not overtake flying infantry. If Napoleon, when short of cavalry, could not convert a Lutzen into an Austerlitz, it is a hard requirement to impose on other commanders. When the reader is convinced that men in orderly array, handicapped with heavy muskets and necessary ammunition, can outrun scattered individuals shedding their accoutrements as they flee, he can wonder at the lack of larger bodies of captives at Manassas.

+ The fact that the condition of the Confederate troops put any active pursuit out of the question is established by the official reports. General Johnston's report says: "Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be. An adequate force of cavalry would have made it decisive." General Beauregard says in his report: "It is proper, and doubtless expected, that through this report my countrymen should be made acquainted with some of the causes that prevented the advance of our forces, and prolonged vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac. The War Department has been fully advised long since of all those causes, some of which only are proper here to be communicated. An army which had fought as ours on that day against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without food, except a hastily snatched scanty meal at dawn, was not in condition for the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle. On the following day an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain intervened to obstruct our advance with reasonable prospect of fruitful results. Added to this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility." These views are confirmed by the reports of the subordinate generals,

which show beyond controversy the condition of the troops.

The same reasons apply with equal force to any attempted advance during the few days succeeding the battle. The army was not in a condition to make the movement, being itself much demoralized by the engagement. Many thought the war over and went home; many accompanied wounded comrades to their homes; for the ties of discipline were not as strong then as in a veteran army. But a yet stronger obstacle to an advance was the lack of necessary transportation. In a letter written by General Beauregard on July 29, 1861, published in vol. i, page 121, of Roman's work, the former says, "The want of food and transportation has made us lose all the fruits of our victory." In another letter, published on page 208 of the same work, Beauregard says: "The necessary transportation even for the ammunition essential to such a movement had not been provided for my forces, notwithstanding my application for it more than a month beforehand; nor was there twenty-four hours' food at Manassas for the troops brought together for that battle." On July 28, 1861, General Johnston had written General Cooper as follows: "This army—both General Beauregard's troops and mine—is without adequate means of transportation. It would be impossible to manœuvre for want of it. . . . This need is urgent."

But even if the Southern army had been in perfect condition and amply provided with all things needful, it must be remembered that the Federal army was not entirely dissolved. Though the troops which had been actually engaged were, with a few exceptions, little better than a mob, and McDowell, judging from his telegrams, was almost as demoralized as they, there were plenty of Northern troops which had not been in action,

and still presented a firm front. Runyon's division, 5,752 strong; Miles's division, 6,207 strong; and Richardson's brigade of Tyler's division, probably 2,500 strong, were fresh, and protected the retreat. In addition to these, Mansfield had at least as many more in Washington, so that superior numbers would have met the Confederates on the advance, or in the intrenchments with which Washington was covered. The officials at the capital anticipated no danger. On the day after the battle Secretary Cameron telegraphed to New York, "The capital is safe." And again, "A number of regiments have arrived since last evening. There is no danger of the capital or of the republic."

The additional fact that McClellan brought no troops from his army, and that it was not thought necessary to bring up Patterson's command, which might easily and rapidly have been done by rail, is conclusive proof that no danger was apprehended.

Even if the Confederates had advanced and captured the intrenchments opposite Washington, they could have accomplished nothing. They could not have crossed the river on the bridge under the fire of the Federal vessels of war. They had no artillery of sufficient range to bombard Washington from the southern side, even if they had been disposed to wage war in that manner. They had no sufficient supply of ammunition. The movement would necessarily have resulted in a fiasco, and the *morale* of the victory would have been lost. General Early, in a communication to the New Orleans Times-Democrat of April 13, 1884, places this matter in a very clear light. He says:

"A large river—the Potomac—intervened, and there was no ford on it practicable for infantry nearer than White's ford, more than forty miles above Washington and sixty miles from Manassas. That ford was but an

obscure crossing in a farm. It was at all times a very deep ford, and before we could have reached it, if we had moved early on the morning of the 22d of July, 1861, the heavy rains had rendered the Potomac unfordable at all points. . . . There was another ford lower down, at or about Seneca Falls, at which Stuart crossed in 1863, but that was too deep for infantry at all times. . . . The bridges on the upper Potomac, at Harper's Ferry, above and below, had been burned; and in the vicinity of Washington there were three modes of crossing, the one being the Long Bridge, which had two draws in it, both opening toward Washington; another, the aqueduct of the Baltimore and Ohio Canal, with the water running in from the north side, the only passway being a narrow towpath; and the other the chain bridge at Georgetown, which is a wooden structure. The hoisting of the draws on the Long Bridge, and a torch applied to the chain bridge, would have rendered a crossing over them impossible; while one piece of artillery could have effectually defended the towpath of the aqueduct, which is more than a mile and a half long, against any force, even if a span or two of the aqueduct had not been blown up. The Potomac in front of Washington is more than a mile wide, and we had no artillery at the time of the battle which would have reached across that river into Washington. We had no pontoons at that point, and no means of making them. Moreover, there were then two or three war vessels, notably the Pawnee, at the navy yard near Washington, with long-range guns. If, therefore, we had advanced to the Potomac, we could have accomplished nothing, even if all the enemy on the south bank had retreated into Washington. . . . If all the citizens and politicians had been frightened out of their wits, and incontinently fled on the approach of our army, Generals Scott and

Mansfield, who were old soldiers, would have retained presence of mind enough to take the necessary steps to prevent our crossing. In fact, on the 23d of July, 1861, in a note to an officer who had command of the chain bridge, General Mansfield said, 'We are amply able to whip the enemy if he will give us a chance here.'

President Davis has contended since the war that on the night of the battle he ordered a pursuit and dictated an order to that effect. He sets out the order, which is as follows :

"I. General Bonham will send as early as practicable in the morning a command of two of his regiments of infantry, a strong force of cavalry, and one field battery, to scour the country and roads to his front toward Centreville. He will carry with him abundant means of transportation for the collection of our wounded ; all the arms, ammunition, and abandoned hospital stores, subsistence and baggage, which will be sent immediately to these headquarters. General Bonham will advance with caution, throwing out an advanced guard and skirmishers on his right and left, and the utmost caution must be taken to prevent firing into our own men."

Then follows a similar direction to Colonel Cocke.

This shows on its face that it was a mere order for the collection of the wounded and the spoils of victory. It was no order for pursuit. How rapid would have been a pursuit which paused to pick up wounded and hospital stores and send them back to headquarters !

That President Davis did not then approve of pursuit is evident from his letter of August 10, 1861, to General Beauregard (published in vol. i, page 122, of Roman's work), in which he says : "So far from knowing that the enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you in the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack on our right, and that the next day's oper-

ations did not fully reveal what has since been reported of the enemy's panic. Enough was done for glory, and the measure of duty was full."

The day after the battle the troops were assigned new positions, partly to remove them from the unpleasant proximity of the battlefield and partly to give them better encampments. The advance, consisting of Bonham's troops, was at Centreville. Soon afterward the army was advanced still farther, and distributed in positions around Fairfax Court House, with strong outposts at Mason's and Munson's Hills, from which the Confederate flag, as it floated in the breeze, could be seen in Washington, and from which they could gaze upon the capital as the Mecca of their aspirations.

The effect of the victory upon the contending sections was very different. About the only thing done by the Confederate Government was to pass the following handsome resolution of thanks to the officers and troops engaged :

"Resolutions of thanks to Generals Joseph E. Johnston and Gustave T. Beauregard, and the officers and troops under their command at the battle of Manassas.

"Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, That the thanks of Congress are eminently due, and are hereby cordially given, to Generals Joseph E. Johnston and Gustave T. Beauregard, and to the officers and troops under their command, for the great and signal victory obtained by them over forces of the United States far exceeding them in number, in the battle of the 21st of July at Manassas; and for the gallantry, courage, and endurance evinced by them in a protracted and continuous struggle of more than ten hours—a victory the great results of which will be realized in the future successes of the war, and which,

in the judgment of Congress, entitles all who contributed to it to the gratitude of their country.

"*Resolved, further,* That the foregoing resolution be made known in appropriate general orders by the generals in command to the officers and troops to whom they are addressed."

But it did not have the effect of materially increasing the numbers or equipment of the army, except so far as the spoils of victory themselves brought about this result. These had been specially valuable in the artillery. In this arm the North at the outset of the war had a very great advantage, having had all the regular artillery as a nucleus; and this was not only heavier, but more modern than the antiquated pieces which the Confederacy had secured, mainly by capture. The intelligent efforts of Colonel Pendleton went far toward increasing the efficiency of this branch of the service, and of his success its subsequent history is the best evidence.

The effect at the North was only to make that section more earnest in its determination to conquer. McClellan, then flushed with his successes in the Northwest, and commonly reputed their ablest leader, had taken charge at Washington, in response to a summons sent him the day after the battle. He at once set about organizing a new army of invasion. He found over fifty thousand men on his arrival, and new troops were pouring in every day. With his marvelous talents for organization, backed by the limitless resources of the North, he patiently went to work to discipline them and restore their confidence. Every week his army grew stronger by thousands, and its efficiency in like proportion. By November 12, 1861, he had under his orders and in call of Washington an army of over 130,000 men. At the same date the effective total of the Confederate army was 44,131.

The time allowed the Southern commander by the comparative cessation of active operations was also improved in organization and instruction. The two great wants which had been painfully emphasized by the experience of the battle were additional cavalry and a divisional organization. From weakness in the former, the victory had been comparatively barren of fruits on the field. From lack of a grouping of the army into divisions, and the consequent necessity of delivering orders to each brigadier, the instructions of the Confederate chiefs had either arrived too late for the success of their plans, or had not arrived at all. Not the least of Johnston's qualities as a commander was his talent in recognizing the merits of those who served under him. It was he who first recognized and urged for promotion the gifted subordinates whose names have become so linked to the Army of Northern Virginia. In the valley he had recommended Jackson for promotion to brigadier, and Stuart for promotion to colonel. The efficient services of the latter on outpost duty in the meanwhile had gained still more General Johnston's admiration, and induced him on August 10th to write the President as follows :

" May I remind you that I have more than once mentioned our deficiency in cavalry? We have not half enough for mere outpost duty. If it had been greater, our results on the 21st of July would have been better. . . . For the last two months I have had one regiment of Virginia cavalry under Stuart, in the presence of superior forces of regular cavalry, who have never appeared in front of their infantry. Our men are good horsemen, well mounted. We can find thousands more like them. Can you not give them to us, and with Stuart to command them? He is a rare man, wonderfully endowed by Nature with the qualities necessary for an officer of

light cavalry. Calm, firm, acute, and enterprising, I know no one more competent than he to estimate the occurrences before him at their true value. If you add to this army a real brigade of cavalry, you can find no better brigadier general to command it."

Soon afterward occurred the affair of Lewinsville, in which Stuart, with a regiment of infantry three hundred and five strong, a company of cavalry, and a section of Rosser's battery, attacked a Federal detachment eighteen hundred strong, which had advanced to Lewinsville, and caused it to return to its intrenchments. The Confederates suffered no loss whatever, and that of the Federals was slight. In his report of the affair, Johnston repeated his recommendation that Stuart should be promoted, and also spoke of another rising young officer of cavalry, Captain Fitzhugh Lee, in the following handsome terms: "For the lieutenant colonelcy I recommend Captain Fitzhugh Lee. He belongs to a family in which military genius seems an heirloom. He is an officer of rare merit, capacity, and courage."

At this time occurred the first serious estrangement between Mr. Davis and General Johnston. Under the enactments of the Confederate Congress a distinct pledge was given that in the case of officers of the old army who "have resigned, or who may within six months tender their resignations from the army of the United States, and who have been or may be appointed to original vacancies in the army of the Confederate States, the commissions issued shall bear one and the same date, so that the relative rank of officers of each grade shall be determined by their former commissions in the United States army, held anterior to the secession of these Confederate States." The relations between Mr. Davis and General A. S. Johnston were most intimate. Immediately after the arrival of the latter in the Confederacy,

Mr. Davis sent in the nominations of five generals: 1st, S. Cooper, to rank from May 16th; 2d, A. S. Johnston, to rank from May 28th; 3d, R. E. Lee, to rank from June 14th; 4th, J. E. Johnston, to rank from July 4th; and 5th, G. T. Beauregard, to rank from July 21st. Their relative rank in the old army had been: 1st, J. E. Johnston, brigadier general; 2d, S. Cooper, colonel; 3d, A. S. Johnston, colonel; 4th, R. E. Lee, lieutenant colonel; and 5th, G. T. Beauregard, major. The effect of this nomination was, by the legerdemain of giving different dates to the commissions—positively forbidden by the express terms of the law—to transpose General Johnston from the first to the fourth place. On hearing of this action he wrote President Davis the following letter:

“HEADQUARTERS, MANASSAS, *September 12, 1861.*

“SIR: I have had the honor to receive through the War Department a copy of the proceedings of Congress on August 31, 1861, confirming the nominations made by the President of the Confederate States of five generals of the Confederate army, and fixing their relative rank. I will not affect to disguise the surprise and mortification produced in my mind by the action taken in this matter by the President and by Congress. I beg to state further, with the most profound respect for both branches of the Government, that these proceedings are in violation of my rights as an officer, of the plighted faith of the Confederacy, and of the Constitution and laws of the land. Such being my views, lest my silence should be deemed significant of acquiescence, it is a duty as well as a right on my part at once to enter my earnest protest against the wrong which I conceive has been done me. I now and here declare my claim that, notwithstanding the nominations made by the President, and their confirmation by Congress, I still rightfully hold

the rank of first general in the armies of the Southern Confederacy. I will proceed briefly to state the grounds upon which I rest this claim.

"The act of the Confederate Congress of March 6, 1861, section 8, amended by that of March 14, 1861, section 2, creates the grade of brigadier general as the highest rank in their service, and provides that there shall be five officers of that grade. The fifth section of the last-named act enacts 'that in all cases of officers who have resigned, or who may within six months tender their resignation from the army of the United States, and who have been or may be appointed to original vacancies in the army of the Confederate States, the commissions issued shall bear one and the same date, so that the relative rank of officers shall be determined by their former commissions in the United States army, held anterior to the secession of the Confederate States from the United States.'

"Under these laws, on May 13, 1861, R. E. Lee and myself were nominated as brigadier generals in the Confederate States army. Samuel Cooper had been nominated to the same grade and confirmed a few weeks previously. The nominations of myself and R. E. Lee were confirmed by Congress promptly. Each of the three had resigned his commission in the United States army in accordance with the terms of the law. The other two had resigned colonelcies, but the commission which I had resigned was that of a brigadier general. It is plain, then, that under these laws I was the officer first in rank in the Confederate army. Two or three days afterward, on May 16th, Congress, by the second section of its act of that date enacted, 'that the five general officers provided by existing laws for the Confederate States shall have the rank and denomination of "general" instead of "brigadier general," which shall

be the highest military grade known to the Confederate States. They shall be assigned to such commands and duties as the President may specially direct, and shall be entitled to the same pay, etc.'

"I conceive, and I submit to the careful consideration of the Government, that this section of the act last cited operated in two ways: 1. It abolished the grade of brigadier general in the Confederate army. 2. It at once, by the mere force of law, raised the three officers already named to the rank and denomination of general in the army of the Confederate States. The right, therefore, which I claim to my rank is founded on this act. Congress by its act, the President by his approval, at once made us generals. It is clear that such, likewise, was the construction of both branches of the Government, else why were not nominations made then? It was a time of flagrant war. Either we were generals, or the country and army were left without such officers. Our former grade had been abolished. We were not brigadier generals; we were nothing, and could perform no military duty, exercise no command. I think it clear that I was a general by the plain terms of the law. It is plain, from the action of the President and Congress, that such was their construction, as I was at once ordered to Harper's Ferry to take command in the Valley of Virginia, and the President soon after placed three brigadier generals under my orders. In hurrying to assume the command in the Valley of Virginia, I did not wait for my commission to be sent to me. I did not doubt that it would be made out, for I was persuaded that it was my right, and had no idea that there was any purpose of withholding it. I remained two months in the valley, too earnestly engaged in the public service to busy myself particularly in my personal interests. But when the emergencies of the campaign required me to march to Manassas, and to

act with another general officer, I appreciated the importance and the indispensable necessity of not leaving the question of rank open or doubtful between us. With this view I transmitted a telegraphic dispatch to the President on July 20th, inquiring in the simplest and most direct terms what my rank was. He replied that I was a general. The battle of Manassas ensued on the next day. The President came in person to participate in it, but reached the scene of action soon after the close of the struggle. The morning after the battle he announced his purpose to elevate General Beauregard to the rank of general. He returned to Richmond the ensuing day. The nomination was made immediately after his return, and was promptly confirmed by Congress. General Beauregard then became a general, and ranked me unless I was such by virtue of the act of Congress on May 16th, already referred to. Yet from the time of General Beauregard's appointment to the day of the renewed nominations I continued to act as the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, under the authority of the President and the Department of War. Thus it appears that I have the sanction of the President to my claim of rank under the act of Congress. In addition to this, my rank was expressly recognized by Congress also, in the resolutions adopted by that body returning the thanks of Congress to General Johnston, to General Beauregard, and to the officers and soldiers of the army for the victory of Manassas.

“Thus stood matters when the recent nominations were made. But one additional name was offered—that of A. S. Johnston. His commission in the army of the United States had been that of colonel. I, as resigning the higher rank in that army, was, by the provisions of the act of Congress of March 14, 1861, and the plighted faith of the Government of the Confederate States, the

general first in rank in their armies. By that act and that of May 16, 1861, the rank would stand thus: J. E. Johnston, S. Cooper, A. S. Johnston, R. E. Lee, G. T. Beauregard.

"I held and claim to hold my rank as general under the act of May 16, 1861. I was a general thenceforth or never. I had the full authority of the constitutional Government of the Confederate States to sustain me. Heretofore those who disputed my authority as general have done so because they denied the existence of the Government whose officer I claimed to be. Now that Government joins the hostile power in denying my authority. When I sent back the missives of the Government of the United States, because they ignored the Government which I served and acknowledged, I little thought that one of the acts of that Government would be to ignore me as its officer by trampling upon its own solemn legislative and executive action. The nomination seeks to annul the irrevocable part, and to make me such only from the 4th day of July. The present, and, so far as human legislation may operate, the future, may be controlled by Congress. Human power can not affect the past. Congress may vacate my commission and reduce me to the ranks. It can not make it true that I was not a general before July 4, 1861.

"The effect of the course pursued is this: It transfers me from the position first in rank to that of fourth. The relative rank of the others, among themselves, is unaltered. It is plain that this is a blow aimed at me only. It reduces my rank in the grade I hold. This has never been done heretofore in the regular service in America but by the sentence of a court-martial as a punishment and as a disgrace for some military offense. It seeks to tarnish my fair fame as a soldier and as a man, earned by more than thirty years of laborious and peril-

ous service. I had but this—the scars of many wounds, all honestly taken in my front and in the front of battle, and my father's revolutionary sword. It was delivered to me from his venerable hand without a stain of dishonor. Its blade is still unblemished as when it passed from his hand to mine. I drew it in the war not for rank or fame, but to defend the sacred soil, the homes and hearths, the women and children, aye, and the men of my mother, Virginia—my native South. It may hereafter be the sword of a general leading armies or of a private volunteer. But while I live and have an arm to wield it, it shall never be sheathed until the freedom, independence, and full rights of the South are achieved. When that is done, it may well be a matter of small concern to the Government, to Congress, or to the country, what my rank or lot may be.

“I shall be satisfied if my country stands among the powers of the world free, powerful, and victorious, and that I, as a general, a lieutenant, or a volunteer soldier, have borne my part in the glorious strife, and contributed to the final blessed consummation.

“What has the aspect of a studied indignity is offered me. My noble associate with me in the battle has his preferment connected with the victory won by our common trials and dangers. His commission bears the date of July 21, 1861, but care seems to be taken to exclude the idea that I had any part in winning our triumph.

“My commission is made to bear such a date that my once inferiors in the service of the United States and of the Confederate States shall be above me. But it must not be dated as of July 21st, nor be suggestive of the victory of Manassas.

“I return to my first position. I repeat that my rank as general is established by the acts of Congress of March 14, 1861, and May 16, 1861. To deprive me

of that rank, it was necessary for Congress to repeal those laws. That could be done by express legislative act alone. It was not done, it could not be done, by a mere vote in secret session upon a list of nominations.

"If the action against which I have protested is legal, it is not for me to question the expediency of degrading one who has served laboriously from the commencement of the war on this frontier, and borne a prominent part in the only great event of that war, for the benefit of persons neither of whom has yet struck a blow for the Confederacy.

"These views and the freedom with which they are presented may be unusual; so likewise is the occasion which calls them forth. I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

"J. E. JOHNSTON, *General.*"

The terms in which this letter is expressed show how deeply General Johnston felt this action of the President. His compositions, as a rule, were the extreme of simplicity, rarely indulging in sentiment. He would never have shown so much feeling as is evinced in this letter had he not considered himself deeply wronged.

The letter is itself the best statement possible of his position. It would be idle to attempt to add to it. Whether he was right or wrong in his contention, his statement of it was certainly entirely respectful. There was nothing in it to which just exception could be taken, unless the mere fact of differing with the President was an offense. Not a line was couched in words of disrespect or insult. After writing it and before mailing it he laid it aside for two days, in order to allow himself an opportunity to review it calmly and dispassionately. He did not write for the purpose of giving offense, and it did not occur to him that it would have that effect.

When he heard through friends at Richmond that the President, instead of treating it as a legitimate protest of an officer who deemed himself illegally deprived of his rank, resented it as a personal insult, he was greatly grieved at the information; not that he regretted writing the letter, for he looked upon it as his right and duty, but he was concerned that it should be so misconstrued.

President Davis did not attempt to answer the reasoning of the letter. He merely sent the following curt reply :

"RICHMOND, VA., *September 14, 1861.*

"*General J. E. JOHNSTON.*

"SIR: I have received and read your letter of the 12th instant. Its language is, as you say, unusual; its arguments and statements utterly one-sided, and its insinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming.

"I am, etc., JEFFERSON DAVIS."

The only explanation ever vouchsafed by any one authorized to speak for President Davis is contained in a note to volume ii, page 150, of the Memoir of President Davis lately published by his widow, and also in the few pages of the same work immediately succeeding it. The note contains a quotation from a private letter of Mr. Davis to his wife, as follows :

"General Johnston does not remember that he did not leave the United States army to enter the Confederate States army, but that he entered the Army of Virginia, and when Virginia joined the Confederacy he came to the Confederate States; also, that in the Virginia army he was the subordinate of Lee, and that they were nominated to our Provisional Congress at the same time and with the same relative rank they had in Virginia. The quartermaster general had only assimilated or protective rank, and from it derived no right to com-

mand, but by law was prohibited from exercising command of troops."

The reason assigned in this letter is evidently not a sufficient reply to General Johnston's position. The fact that he was for a short time in the Virginia service, and that Lee's commission in that service antedated his by three days, is entirely immaterial. The sole question is one of statutory construction. The language of the Confederate law did not require that the resignation from the old service should be with the intent to enter the Confederate service. Nor did it put upon those who resigned the election whether at once to enter the Confederate service or the service of their respective States. If this was the meaning of the law, and the reason which really actuated Mr. Davis at the time, Beauregard, whose entry into the Confederate army preceded both that of Lee and Johnston, should have been made to rank them both. Under the terms of the statute, any one who within six months after its date resigned from the old service and was appointed to an original vacancy in the Confederate service, came within its provisions, and ranked as he had ranked in the old army, no matter what temporary State service he had performed in the meanwhile. This reason is a mere excuse. It is insufficient to explain the direct infraction of the positive terms of the law, which required that the commissions should bear one and the same date, and therefore forbade any such indirect means as antedating commissions for the purpose of affecting the relative rank prescribed by law.

Mrs. Davis, in her Memoir, also states that another reason for the President's action in the matter was this: "Near the close of President Buchanan's administration, in 1860, died General Jesup, Quartermaster General of the United States army, and J. E. Johnston,

then lieutenant colonel of cavalry, was appointed to the vacancy. Now, the quartermaster general had the rank, pay, and emoluments of the brigadier general; but the rank was staff, and by law this officer could not exercise command over the troops unless by special assignment. When, in the spring of 1861, the officers in question entered the service of the Confederacy, Cooper had been adjutant general of the United States army, with the rank of colonel; Albert Sidney Johnston, colonel and brigadier general by brevet, and on duty as such; Lee, lieutenant colonel of cavalry, senior to J. E. Johnston in the line before the latter's appointment above mentioned; Beauregard, major of engineers."

This ground for his action is taken by Mrs. Davis from General Richard Taylor's work on the war, entitled *Destruction and Reconstruction*. It is merely saying in other language that Mr. Davis, in making these nominations, chose to ignore Johnston's recent appointment as quartermaster general, which he had opposed, and treated him as if it had not been conferred. This was in direct contravention of the terms of the law, which expressly said that the relative rank should be preserved, and drew no distinction between staff and line rank. The right of the quartermaster general to command troops is entirely irrelevant. General Johnston was entitled to his rank whether the President chose to assign him to active command or not. He did not lose it in later periods of the war, when the President chose to leave him unemployed, and gave to acknowledged juniors the armies which he had led. It was the President's right to assign him to armies or not, as he chose. That was a matter in the province of the Executive. It was not the President's right to violate the express language of a legislative act, and degrade him in rank by the fiction of antedating the commissions

of others. This distinction between staff and line rank, drawn by General Taylor in his anxiety to excuse the President's partiality, is *felo de se*, and inconsistent with the order of nominations as made. If it was the President's real reason, why was General Cooper put at the head of the list instead of at the foot? His grade of "adjutant general with the rank of colonel" was exclusively a staff rank. He had never commanded any troops, either by special assignment or otherwise. He was never assigned to active duty during the war. Even admitting the justice of this distinction between staff and line, Johnston certainly ranked him. The fact that Cooper was made to head the list shows that no such idea actuated the President at the time of his action, and that it is the afterthought of an admirer attempting to justify unfairness to an officer who deserved better treatment.

The real reason of President Davis was never avowed. It was not so much an intention to slight J. E. Johnston as to advance A. S. Johnston. The latter and President Davis had during all their lives been on terms of the closest intimacy. He was one of those whose names had been urged for appointment as quartermaster general, as has been seen, and Mr. Davis was his earnest advocate. The appointment of the Confederate generals was delayed till his arrival within the lines, and was then made immediately. Mr. Davis here saw an opportunity to effect what he had failed to accomplish when he urged his friend for the place of quartermaster general. He thought he had the power, and he availed himself of it. It is notorious that throughout the war he had his favorites. Happy had it been for the Confederacy if his other favorites had been men of the character and talents of A. S. Johnston. His action in the matter was prompted by friendship—a very commend-

able trait where another's rights are not infringed. It is clear that in this matter Mr. Davis wronged General Johnston. The latter always felt it, and to the day of his death looked upon it as second only to the greater wrong inflicted by his removal in front of Atlanta, at the very juncture when he was preparing to reap the fruits of his strategy.

Soon after this correspondence the improvement and increase of the Federal army became so patent that the outposts at Mason's and Munson's Hills were thought to be exposed to too much hazard, and they were withdrawn.

CHAPTER VII.

ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

JOHNSTON's attention was now devoted to the numerous matters connected with the improvement of the army and the increase of its efficiency. The difficulties with which it had to struggle in the matter of food and transportation were apparently chronic with the Government. It was evidently useless to waste time in discussing this subject with the Richmond authorities. The subject of the organization of the army into larger units, so as to facilitate its handling in battle, was then taken up. Johnston, with the concurrence of Beauregard, recommended its formation into divisions and corps, and the appointment of proper general officers to command them. Van Dorn and G. W. Smith had just been made major generals and sent to the army, and the Secretary of War called upon Johnston and Beauregard for additional recommendations. On the 28th of September a list was made out and sent to the Department, in accordance with this request. Among the recommendations for the grade of major general were Jackson and Longstreet; among those recommended for brigadier general were Evans, the break-water of the flood-tide of enemies at Manassas, Cocke, A. P. Hill, and Wilcox. The Department did not adopt all the recommendations, but appointed one major general for each of the two bodies which had been united

at Manassas, selecting Jackson from Johnston's army, and Longstreet from that of Beauregard. The troops at this time were exceptionally well officered, even the colonels being men who made a name in later periods of the conflict; indeed, some of them, like A. P. Hill and Evans, had already made their mark.

In order to annoy the enemy as much as possible, the establishment of batteries at Evansport, to command the navigation of the Potomac, was now begun, causing a partial blockade of Washington, which was a great mortification to the Federal Government.

At this time the Confederate lines covered a front of about six miles—from Flint Hill to Sangster's Cross Roads, with outposts from Falls Church by Munson's and Mason's Hills to Springfield Station. This was not selected as a good position for defense, since it was easily turned, but in order that the army might be in position for offensive operations. If these were to be undertaken, the quicker the better; for McClellan was daily growing in strength, and might be expected to continue to do so, while on the other hand the reinforcements at the disposal of the Confederates were limited by the difficulty of procuring arms. The constantly growing numbers of the Federal army made it necessary to decide this question at once; and accordingly, on September 26th, Johnston wrote to the Secretary of War explaining the situation, and suggesting that either he, the President, or some one authorized to act for them, should come to the army and confer on this important subject. He received a reply stating that the President himself would visit the army as soon as possible for the purpose of conference. President Davis arrived about the 1st of October, and held a council of war, at which Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith were present. A memorandum of this council

was made by the latter, and best explains the plans discussed. Its material parts are as follows:

“Finally I said: ‘Mr. President, is it not possible to put this army in condition to assume the active offensive?’ adding that this was a question of vital importance, upon which the success or failure of our cause might depend. . . . There seemed to be little difference of opinion among us in regard to general views and principles. It was clearly stated and agreed to that the military force of the Confederate States was at the highest point it could attain without arms from abroad; that the portion of this particular army present for duty was in the finest fighting condition; that if kept inactive it must retrograde in every respect during the winter, the effect of which was foreseen and dreaded by us all. The enemy were daily increasing in number, arms, discipline, and efficiency. We looked forward to a sad state of things at the opening of a spring campaign.

“These and other points being agreed upon without argument, it was again asked: ‘Mr. President, is it not possible to increase the effective strength of this army and put us in condition to cross the Potomac and carry the war into the enemy’s country? Can you not, by stripping other points to the last they will bear, and even risking defeat at all other places, put us in condition to move forward? Success here at this time saves everything; defeat here loses all.’ In explanation and as an illustration of this, the unqualified opinion was advanced that if, for want of adequate strength on our part in Kentucky, the Federal forces should take military possession of that whole State, and even enter and occupy a portion of Tennessee, a victory gained by this army beyond the Potomac would, by threatening the heart of the Northern States, compel their armies to fall back, free Kentucky, and give us the line of the Ohio within ten

days thereafter. On the other hand, should our forces in Tennessee and southern Kentucky be strengthened, so as to enable us to take and hold the Ohio River as a boundary, a disastrous defeat of this army would at once be followed by an overwhelming wave of Northern invaders that would sweep over Kentucky and Tennessee, extending to the northern part of the cotton States, if not to New Orleans. . . . It seemed to be conceded by all that our force at that time here was not sufficient for assuming the offensive beyond the Potomac, and that even with a much larger force an attack upon their army under the guns of their fortifications on this side of the river was out of the question.

“The President asked me what number of men were necessary, in my opinion, to warrant an offensive campaign to cross the Potomac, cut off the communications of the enemy with their fortified capital, and carry the war into their country. I answered, ‘Fifty thousand effective seasoned soldiers,’ explaining that by seasoned soldiers I meant such men as we had there present for duty, and added that they would have to be drawn from the Peninsula, about Yorktown, Norfolk, from western Virginia, Pensacola, or wherever might be most expedient.

“General Johnston and General Beauregard both thought that a force of sixty thousand men would be necessary, and that this force would require large additional transportation and munitions of war, the supplies here being entirely inadequate for an active campaign in the enemy’s country, even with our present force. . . . The President, I think, gave no definite opinion in regard to the number of men necessary for the purpose, and I am sure that no one present considered this a question to be finally decided by any other person than the commanding general of this army. . . . The Presi-

dent expressed surprise and regret that the number of surplus arms was so small. He then stated that at that time no re-enforcements could be furnished to this army of the character asked for, and that the most that could be done would be to furnish recruits to take the surplus arms in store here (say twenty-five hundred stand). . . . He expressed regret, and seemed to feel deeply, as did every one present. . . . It was felt that there was no other course left but to take a defensive position and await the enemy. If they did not advance, we had but to await the winter and its results. . . ."

The effect of drill and re-enforcements upon the spirits of McClellan's army was such that they resolved to attempt an offensive movement, and a large body crossed the Potomac with the intention of attacking the Confederate force at Leesburg. Four regiments crossed at Edwards Ferry, and were held in check by Barksdale's Mississippi regiment. Five others crossed at Ball's Bluff, commanded by Colonel Baker, of Oregon. But they made an unfortunate selection of an antagonist upon whom to experiment. They were met by Evans with his force of about seventeen hundred men, and after a sharp fight were driven pell-mell into the river. General Evans reported their loss at thirteen hundred killed, drowned, and wounded, and seven hundred and ten prisoners. The Confederate loss was one hundred and fifty-five.* The Northern troops also lost fifteen hundred stand of arms, three pieces of artillery, and various other military property.

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 353. The same volume, on p. 308, gives the Federal loss at nine hundred and twenty-one; but this is evidently incomplete, as it reports no loss in the Nineteenth Massachusetts, the Second Massachusetts, or the California battalion. The latter alone lost two hundred and sixty men (p. 329 of the same volume).

This success had an important result beyond the mere loss inflicted. McClellan's army by this time had become so strong that an advance by him was daily expected. His own Government was urging it on him, impelled by the political pressure, the increasing strain on the finances, and the desire to utilize the fine autumn weather. The effect of the Ball's Bluff engagement was to carry to an extreme his natural caution, and bring him to the decision to attempt nothing that season. To quote from one of his admirers: "This disaster, of comparatively little moment by itself, led to the most acrimonious recriminations. It proved, above all, how slight and imperfect were the connections between the head of the army and the parts he was called on to manœuvre. On that day a fatal hesitation took possession of McClellan. If he did not then decide to postpone the campaign till the following spring, his conduct of affairs was soon to leave him no alternative but recourse to this lamentable necessity." *

As the position about Fairfax Court House had been held only as a point from which to inaugurate an advance, the result of the council of war rendered its retention unnecessary, and the forces were drawn back to Centreville, which, being farther from the Potomac, rendered it less liable to be turned. Here the army, about forty-four thousand strong, continued to show a defiant front to McClellan's mighty host of one hundred and thirty thousand, which was daily increasing.†

* The Comte de Paris, in vol. ii, p. 114, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.

† Those who persist in the assertion that the battle of Manassas was barren of results seem to overlook the fact that without the prestige of that victory, re-enforced by that of Ball's Bluff, it would never have been possible for this comparatively small body to have held its position so long in the near presence of so superior an antagonist. The

On October 22d, under General Orders No. 15, the Department of Northern Virginia was established, being composed of three districts—the Valley district, the Potomac district, and the Aquia district. Jackson was placed in command of the first, Beauregard of the second, and Holmes of the third. Johnston was placed in command of the Department, thus enlarging his powers from those of mere commander of an army to that of general of a department. But as the point of greatest danger was the vicinity of McClellan's grand army, Johnston remained with the Army of the Potomac.

The order founding this Department directed the brigading of the troops by States as soon as, in the judgment of the commander, it could be safely done. Johnston was in favor of this mode of brigading as an abstract proposition, having adopted it in the Valley before the march to Manassas; but the exigencies of the service had heretofore rendered it impracticable at Centreville. Regiments, on arrival, had necessarily been attached to brigades which then had most need of them, so as to equalize their strength. By this time the sentiment of fraternity in arms had rendered them fond of the brigade to which they belonged, and proud of its glories. The Southern lines were many miles in length, and a vastly superior force, whose advance was momentarily expected, was in its immediate vicinity—nearer, in fact, to its center than were its two wings. The regiments from different States were scattered along this entire front, and Johnston considered it hazardous in the extreme to attempt such a reorganization with its

fact that Johnston did this is also a complete refutation of the charge that he was always on the retreat. The Army of Northern Virginia never at any later period of the war passed the winter in a position so near Washington; and yet it was never afterward so weak numerically, compared to its adversary, as during this winter at Centreville.

consequent shifting of positions, for fear that a forward movement of the enemy might occur just as it was in progress. He therefore postponed the step from time to time, though not without constant letters of censure from Richmond.

One effect of this division into districts was to deprive him of Jackson and his brigade. The assignment of the latter to the Valley district was eminently agreeable to him, as Jackson possessed his full confidence and relieved him of anxiety in that quarter; but he thought that the troops for this district should be drawn from Loring's command and other bodies in western Virginia, and not from the outnumbered Army of the Potomac. Thus early was he taught that he was department commander only in name, without the power to control the troops in his department. How he felt this interference of the Secretary of War with his prerogative appears by an unofficial letter to General Whiting, in which he says: "I am mourning over the loss of Jackson's brigade, ordered to Winchester against my remonstrance. The Secretary of War will probably establish his headquarters within this Department soon."

To this arrangement of districts the Federal Government at once replied by an order placing McClellan in command not merely of the forces around Washington, but of all the armies of the United States, in place of Scott, who was retired at his own request. It had not occurred to President Davis that it would be advantageous to make a similar arrangement; and it was not till the close of the war that the Confederate Congress passed the law under which Lee became the general officer in charge of military operations.

On December 20th occurred the affair of Dranesville. Stuart had been sent with a mixed force of twelve hundred men to protect a foraging party which had been

sent to Loudoun. He encountered Ord's brigade, re-enforced by the First Pennsylvania Reserve Rifles. In order to save the wagons, Stuart attacked, but was driven off. His loss was one hundred and ninety-four, while the Northern loss was sixty-eight.

Meanwhile Jackson had proceeded to the Valley, arriving at Winchester on November 5th, and busied himself in recruiting his force. He came to the conclusion that it would be better to occupy his troops in an expedition against Romney than to put them into winter quarters. Though Johnston expected no great results from the expedition, he did not interfere.* Jackson made the expedition, but with inconsiderable results and with great suffering and discontent to the troops.

Nothing noteworthy occurred in the other districts during the remainder of the year. At its close the total force in the Department was 62,112, of which 44,563 were with the Army of the Potomac. McClellan's strength at the same time was 183,507. Thus the close of 1861 found Johnston's forces facing near the frontier a foe of triple numbers.

Jackson's troops, after his fruitless expedition, went into winter quarters, Loring's command being placed at Romney. This command was in a state of discontent bordering almost on insubordination, and complaints against Jackson were poured into Richmond. They had for their object the removal of the malcontents from Romney, and took the shape not merely of grumbling at their discomfort, but also the propagation of rumors that a body stationed there was liable to be cut off. The War Department, without taking the

* This is evident from his letter of November 22d to Cooper, in which he says: "It seems to me that he [General Jackson] proposes more than can well be accomplished in that high mountainous country at this season."

trouble to consult either Johnston, the Department commander, or Jackson, their immediate chief, sent an unqualified instruction to the latter to move them back to Winchester. The order was at once obeyed; but Jackson was so aggrieved that he sent to Johnston a letter directed to the Secretary of War tendering his resignation, with a request that he be ordered to report for duty to the Superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute. Johnston indorsed on the letter: "Respectfully forwarded, with great regret. I don't know how the loss of this officer can be supplied. General officers are much wanted in this Department." He did not forward the letter until he wrote Jackson as follows:

"MY DEAR FRIEND: I have just read, and with profound regret, your letter to the Secretary of War asking to be relieved from your present command, either by an order to the Virginia Military Institute or the acceptance of your resignation. Let me beg you to reconsider this matter. Under ordinary circumstances a due sense of one's own dignity, as well as care for professional character and official rights, would demand such a course as yours; but the character of this war, the great energy exhibited by the Government of the United States, the danger in which our very existence as an independent people lies, requires sacrifices from us all who have been educated as soldiers. I receive my information of the order of which you have cause to complain from your letter. Is not that as great an official wrong to me as the order itself to you? Let us dispassionately reason with the Government on this subject of command, and if we fail to influence its practice, then ask to be relieved from positions the authority of which is exercised by the War Department while the responsibilities are left to us. I have taken the liberty to detain your letter to make this appeal to your patriotism, not merely

from warm feelings of personal regard, but from the official opinion which makes me regard you as necessary to the service of the country in your present position."

The result of this letter, re-enforced by the entreaties of Governor Letcher, was, that the services of Jackson were saved to the Confederacy.

While the army was in winter quarters Johnston found it frequently necessary to remonstrate with the War Department on the subject of interference in its internal administration. Secretary Benjamin did not scruple to grant furloughs direct from Richmond on the most lavish scale; and the first information which the commander would receive of such action would be their arrival in the mail. In addition, authority was granted to almost any applicant to raise companies of other arms out of the infantry, usually with the result of turning veteran infantry into raw artillerymen. The effect of such intermeddling on the discipline and numbers of the army may well be imagined. Johnston protested repeatedly against these practices, and pointed out their inevitable result.

The Department even ordered him to send to Richmond six thousand muskets reported as not in use. They belonged to the men who were absent on account of sickness, and of course could not be obtained to put in their hands on their recovery. The forces in the Department, so far from being increased, suffered a diminution, partly from the above causes and partly by detachments. As late as February the total effective strength of the Department was only 47,617, as against 62,112 at the end of 1861. During January the Department also lost the services of Beauregard and Van Dorn, who were transferred to the West.

This period is notable for the effort made by Johnston, under the sanction of the Confederate Government,

to arrange a cartel of exchange. Such a proposition was made to McClellan on February 2d, but was not noticed.

During the first part of 1862 the state of the roads rendered military operations utterly impracticable, and enabled the weak Southern army to hold its ground at Centreville in the near front of McClellan's mighty force. But it was thoroughly realized by the Southern commander that this could not continue, after the fine weather of spring should restore mobility to the masses now floundering in the mud, and firmness to the highways which they were to follow. The opposing generals, therefore, were now revolving in their minds their best course for the coming campaign. In view of the large odds against them, and the fact that they were resisting invasion, the Confederate plan necessarily depended largely upon the schemes in contemplation by the enemy. It was important to divine these schemes as nearly as possible, and to so place the defending army as to be in position to meet an advance from any quarter. Johnston had no intention of remaining at Centreville until his foe, protected by the trend of the Potomac, and rich in facilities for water transportation, should steal a march on him, as he himself had done on Patterson, and disembark far south of his right flank, in a position to interpose between him and Richmond. His suppositions were as follows :

"We had to regard four routes to Richmond as practicable for the Federal army : that chosen in the previous July ; another, east of the Potomac to the mouth of Potomac Creek, and thence by Fredericksburg ; the third and fourth by water, the one to the lower Rappahannock, the other to Fort Monroe ; and from those points respectively by direct roads. As the Confederate troops in Virginia were distributed, it seemed to me that

invasion by the second route would be the most difficult to meet; for, as the march in Maryland would be covered by the Potomac, the Federal general might hope to conceal it from us until the passage of the river was begun, and so place himself at least two days' march nearer to Richmond than the Army of Northern Virginia on Bull Run. I did not doubt, therefore, that this route would be taken by General McClellan. The opinion was first suggested by the location of a division of the United States army on it opposite to Dumfries."*

It is now important to ascertain how nearly these surmises were correct. McClellan, from the time of his assumption of command, had not been reposing on a bed of roses. The Federal rulers and people had borne with restlessness the loss of the fall season. Their admiration for him, born of his successes in West Virginia, had enabled him to draw thus largely on their faith; but they had now become sated with his reviews and parades, and looked with impatience to the time when this holiday soldiering would give way to the stern realities of war. President Lincoln was specially eager to inaugurate a forward movement on the earliest day possible, and many were the interviews between McClellan and himself as to its practicability and the best line by which it should be conducted. Lincoln favored an advance straight on Centreville, and so by the overland route to Richmond. But this was not at all to McClellan's taste. With that propensity to exaggerate the difficulties in his way, which was a prominent trait, he had come to the conclusion that the numbers opposed to him were equal to his own. Proposing to make the active army which he was to take with him on an advance number from 110,000 to 140,000 men, he esti-

* Johnston's Narrative, pp. 101, 102.

mated the Confederate strength at 115,500. He was "by no means certain" that he could beat the Confederates at Centreville, and it was his aim to adopt some plan by which he could land his army near Richmond and transfer to that vicinity the theatre of the war. The plan upon which he at last settled as the most promising was a move by water to Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock, and thence by a rapid march to West Point, at the head of York River, whence he could operate against Richmond, his hope being to throw himself in this manner between Richmond and the Southern army at Centreville. Lincoln, whose impatience had become extreme, on January 31st issued a special order directing all the disposable force of the Federal Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, to move forward, in order to seize and occupy a point on the railroad southwestward of Manassas Junction, and fixing the following 22d of February as the day for the commencement of the expedition, as also for a general advance of all the armies of the United States. Thereupon McClellan, after first securing a suspension of this order, submitted in writing his views to the President in favor of a movement by the lower Chesapeake to Urbana. After many conferences the President agreed to McClellan's plan, but annexed the condition among others that a sufficient force should be left to render Washington entirely secure. His nervousness for the safety of Washington was the main reason for his personal preference for the overland route, and was so great that the Confederates were able during the war, on more than one occasion, to relieve the pressure on Richmond by menaces against the capital.

This consent of the President to the adoption of McClellan's plan was not given till the 8th of March, and did not require its execution to commence till the 18th,

thus granting an extension of near a month on the engagement to advance. And thus at last the Federal general had his own way, and was at liberty to move upon Urbana and cut Johnston off at Centreville.

The latter was alive to the possibility of such an event, and had intended from the outset to evacuate Centreville as soon as the condition of the roads would permit. On February 20th he had attended a council of war in Richmond, at which it had been resolved to withdraw as soon as feasible, and he had at once inaugurated the removal of stores of all sorts by rail as fast as the poor service of Confederate railways rendered it possible. In this task he was much impeded by the action of the Commissary Department, which had persisted against his expressed wishes in accumulating an unnecessary amount of provisions at Manassas, and had even established a large meat-curing plant at Thoroughfare Gap and filled it with meat cured or in process of curing. Such activity just after the battle of Manassas, when want of supplies was a potent factor in preventing an advance, would have been commendable. But it was always a feast or a famine with the commissary general, though it seemed to be his idea that the famine should occur just after a victory had paved the way for an advance; and the feast, just at the moment when the growing strength of the enemy rendered it obvious that a retrograde movement was a mere question of time. The plan of locating a large meat-curing establishment in time of war so near the hostile frontier, instead of selecting the interior of the country, was certainly unique. This had been done without consulting Johnston, and indeed without his knowledge; and its necessary consequence was the loss of large quantities of the meat there collected—a consequence unavoidable, unless it is a principle of war that an army is organized to pro-

tect commissary stores, and should make such object the prime aim of its strategy; and not that commissary stores are for the benefit of the army.

In addition to the measures taken to remove the stores, which had commenced promptly after the decision to retire farther south had been reached, orders had been given to fortify the line of the Rappahannock, and a stock of provisions had been collected at Culpeper Court House for the supply of the army when occupying that line. Everything being ready, the movement commenced on the 7th of March, and the last troops left Centreville on the 9th. In the march Smith's and Longstreet's divisions followed the Warrenton turnpike, and Ewell's and Early's the railroad and the road by Brentsville. Whiting, with his brigades and those of Hampton and Wigfall, moved to Fredericksburg; and D. H. Hill was ordered to withdraw the troops commanded by him (formerly Evans's) to the south bank of the Rappahannock. In two days the army was in its new position, Ewell and Early being on each side of the railroad, and Smith and Longstreet at Culpeper Court House. This was the first occupation of this line, subsequently a favorite one with the Confederates. Near its banks were fought the greatest battles of the war, as waged in Virginia.

This movement, successfully consummated just at the time when McClellan, after great difficulty, had obtained the consent of his constitutional superiors to the Urbana project, over which he had so long been incubating, was in results equivalent to a victory. It placed the Confederate army in a position from which it could easily meet an advance by Centreville or Fredericksburg, while it was also sufficiently near Richmond to throw itself in front of an invader approaching by Urbana or the Peninsula. In other words, it effectually

frustrated the Urbana move; or, to adopt McClellan's mild way of expressing the same idea: "The Urbana movement lost much of its promise, as the enemy was now in position to reach Richmond before we could do so." *

The line of the Rappahannock had been occupied under the conjecture that the Federal advance would most probably be by Fredericksburg, the second route enumerated by Johnston. But the inactivity of the Federal division opposite Dumfries satisfied him that the

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. ii, p. 167. The effect of this move upon McClellan's plans is well described by the Comte de Paris, in his article commencing at page 112 of the same volume. On page 121 he says:

"At the very moment when all seemed ready for the realization of his grand design, two unforeseen circumstances arose to thwart the calculations of McClellan. The first was the sudden evacuation of Manassas by the Confederates. I do not believe that this could be attributed to indiscretions following the councils of war at Washington. I prefer rather to ascribe it to the military sagacity of the great soldier who then commanded the Army of Northern Virginia. His positions at Manassas were protected only by the snow and ice, which paralyzed the Federals. With the opening of the season he would be obliged to withdraw behind the Rappahannock. This movement brought the Southern army nearer to Richmond, at the same time placing it on the Urbana route, thus making a landing there impossible for us, and permitting Lee to anticipate McClellan on the Virginia Peninsula."

The Comte is right in attributing this move to the sagacity of the Southern commander. General McClellan claimed, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the Confederate withdrawal had been caused by secret intelligence of the order issued by President Lincoln on March 8th. The fact is that the withdrawal had been determined on at the council held February 20th, that the removal of stores had commenced at once, and that the march of the troops themselves began on March 7th, the day before the President's order. It was dictated, not by the untrustworthy reports of spies, but by that power of divination of an adversary's plans which is the chief trait of a great general.

real purpose was to select one of the routes by the lower Chesapeake; and therefore, about a week after the march from Centreville, the army was withdrawn behind the Rapidan to the neighborhood of Orange Court House, except Ewell's division, which, with Stuart's cavalry, was left in observation near the Rappahannock, and in easier position to unite with Jackson in the Valley, if expedient. This manœuvre gave a still better situation from which to protect Richmond and meet an invasion from the Peninsula.

What were McClellan's movements to be now? With his favorite scheme thwarted, what was to be done "which would give the out-generaled army a chance to gain either reputation or increase of spirit?"*

The first thing which occurred to McClellan was to go out and "shut the stable door after the horse had gone." On receiving information of the Confederate retreat, he at once assembled his troops and marched them out on a grand excursion to Manassas. He did not have any definite military object in view in making this march. According to his official report, its object was to enable "the troops to gain some experience on the march and bivouac preparatory to the campaign, and to get rid of the superfluous baggage and other *impedimenta* which accumulates so easily around an army encamped for a long time in one locality."

Not having had time, since the previous July, to practice his troops in marching, he started out on this important military movement, gave his troops a look at the Confederate intrenchments, allowed them to examine the Quaker guns which peered out formidably from the embrasures, and then, like the King of France on a similar occasion, marched back again.

* Webb's Peninsula: McClellan's Campaign of 1862, p. 27.

While at Fairfax Court House, on this picnic, a council of war assembled to take into consideration the next best plan of campaign, now that the first had been practically disposed of by the Confederate withdrawal. It was composed of the corps commanders Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, and McDowell.

McClellan, in his communication to the Secretary of War advocating the Urbana scheme as against the overland route, had said: "Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mobjack Bay; or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base and operate with complete security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula."

Driven from his Urbana project, and unalterably opposed to the overland line, he submitted to this council the proposition of a campaign up the Peninsula from Fort Monroe, forced to this *dernier ressort* at the very outset by the strategy of his opponent, though he had only contemplated it in the first instance "the worst coming to the worst." The council recommended its adoption upon certain conditions, the principal of which were that a naval force should co-operate, and that Washington be made perfectly safe, three of them naming a force of twenty-five thousand men as a sufficient protection, the other (Sumner) naming forty thousand. This plan was submitted to President Lincoln, who approved it, with a reiteration of the condition as to Washington, at the same time evincing his chagrin at the uninterrupted retreat of Johnston and the long inaction of McClellan, by adding: "Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route."

Thus it was settled that the line by which the Southern capital was to be approached was by that portion of Virginia lying between the James and York Rivers, and known as the Peninsula—a territory already historic as having witnessed the heated discussions which gave rise to the American Revolution, and the final triumph of the patriot cause.

During these operations Jackson was in the Valley district recruiting his little force, and in correspondence with Johnston, who impressed on him the importance of so manœuvring as not to permit the communications between the two to be interrupted, indicating that the general plan soon to be brilliantly executed by Jackson, of so operating in the Valley as to cause the largest possible force of the enemy to be assembled there, and then for Jackson to elude them and take part in the crisis of the campaign at Richmond, was in Johnston's mind from the outset. As early as January 28th he had written from Centreville to Jackson: "The enemy might not only prevent your concentrating, but interpose himself between us, which we must never permit."

His letter of May 17th to Jackson and Ewell also indicates that the Valley operations should have in view the prevention of a junction of the different Federal forces there, and that all troops who were not "employing a greatly superior force of the enemy" should be gathered at Richmond.*

It may indeed be safely asserted that, though the matchless execution of this famous campaign is due to Jackson alone, Johnston, his chief, may justly claim some of its glories—at least that of its conception. In pursu-

* This is also evident from Jackson's letter of June 6th to Johnston, in which he outlines a certain line of march, "should my command be required at Richmond."

ance of this design, Jackson determined to attack Shields at Kernstown, in order to prevent detachments to McClellan. With a force three thousand strong he attacked Shields's command of seven thousand on March 26th, but was repulsed with a loss of seven hundred and eighteen, the Federal loss being five hundred and ninety.

CHAPTER VIII. •

YORKTOWN.

THE Peninsula is that portion of Virginia lying between the James and York Rivers, Fortress Monroe being at its eastern extremity. From the fort to Richmond the distance is a little less than one hundred miles. The width of the Peninsula varies greatly, its narrowest point being just east of Williamsburg, where it is about seven miles. A prominent feature is its abundance of swamps, which make up from the rivers on either side, or from the creeks or estuaries emptying into them. These swamps are practically impassable, except at occasional points, where corduroyed roads or embankments of earth for mill ponds form a crossing. The region is so level that such an embankment will make a mill pond miles in length, while every cove or hollow • that drains into it will become a swamp more difficult of passage than the pond itself, as it is at once too soft for the pedestrian and too solid for the boatman. Streams of small volume, but with marshes of great extent on either side, take their rise and flow into one or the other of these rivers. The ebb and flow of the tide make these tributaries for long distances above their mouth quite deep and extensive, while the swamps and ponds nearer their heads are equally difficult of passage. This region, therefore, is very defensible, provided the defenders have command of the rivers and are equipped with artillery of sufficient caliber and range to cope with

the artillery of the invading force. Without this the Peninsula is a mere trap; for the invader, having obtained command of the rivers, can by means of transports land far in rear of the defending army and easily cut it off. This danger is enhanced by the fact that without a co-operating naval force it is difficult to command the rivers by guns on shore. The channel of the York is nearest its northern bank, the only point where it approaches the southern side being at Yorktown itself, where the river is less than a mile in width, and is commanded by guns on the bluff at Yorktown, supported by batteries at Gloucester Point, directly opposite on the northern bank. As long as these could hold their own, the control of the York, at least as against the passage of transports, would be complete.

The control of the James by shore batteries was more problematical. This river is very wide, and there is no commanding point on it to correspond to Yorktown. The nearest approach to such a requisite was Mulberry Point, or possibly Jamestown Island; but even at those points the channel was too wide to be closed by such guns as were then possessed by the Confederates, and there was no Gloucester Point on the other side to cross its fire with Mulberry Point or Jamestown in defending the water way. The Confederate reliance for the defense of the James was the ironclad Virginia (or Merrimac, as she is termed by Northern writers), which had just electrified the world by her exploits in Hampton Roads. Formidable as she was, her great draught confined her to a narrow channel and to a few hours of flood tide each day; and the imperfections of her machinery rendered her movements snail-like and cumbrous.

Assuming that she could be trusted with the defense of the Confederate right against a turning movement by

the James, the critical point was evidently Yorktown. As long as the navigation of the York was sealed there, an army of sufficient strength could not be driven from the Peninsula, even by greatly superior forces. As soon as it fell, the defending army would necessarily fall back or be cut off by enemies debarking far in its rear, between it and Richmond; and this would necessarily compel the evacuation of Norfolk, as a body landing on the south of the James would be in position to isolate and capture any troops who might attempt to hold it. It would involve also the destruction of the Virginia, as her draught was too great for her to ascend the James any considerable distance. This latter fact, however, was not known till the time for action came, it being supposed that she could be lightened.

The Peninsula had been held by the Confederates with a small force from the outbreak of hostilities. The first action of any moment in the struggle had taken place at Bethel, in its eastern portion, and had resulted in the repulse of the Federals under Butler by the Confederates under Magruder. The latter was still in command of the little army stationed there. He had improved the time which the inaction of the previous year had given him by intelligently mastering the details of the topography, and by strengthening as far as possible with his slender means the natural features of his lines of defense. That line which he preferred extended from Young's to Harwood's Mills, with fortifications on the two rivers to protect the flanks. He estimated, however, that it would require at least twenty thousand men to hold this line, and, as he had nothing like that number, he decided to make his stand behind Warwick River. This stream rises not far from Yorktown, and flows across the Peninsula into the James east of Mulberry Island. By making dams along its course, and

fortifications along the space intervening between its head and Yorktown, it was greatly strengthened. At the beginning of April his force was only eleven thousand men, which left him but five thousand with which to hold this line, since garrisons were necessary at Gloucester Point, Mulberry Island, and Yorktown. He also had a third line farther up the Peninsula near Williamsburg, which will come into prominence in the next chapter.

After the abandonment of the Urbana scheme and the decision in favor of the Peninsula route, the Federal authorities, with marvelous energy, collected their transports and shipped their mammoth host to Fort Monroe. This occupied the latter part of March and the first few days of April. By the 7th, McClellan had under his command on the Peninsula an army of over one hundred thousand men.*

* Wool's letter to Stanton, Official War Records, vol. xi, pt. 3, p. 76. This tallies well with the return of his strength for April 13th (p. 97 of the same volume), which shows the force present for duty to be 100,970, and this is evidently exclusive of Franklin, whose strength was 11,392; and the return of April 30th, which includes his division, shows 112,392. In addition to this, Wool's command, over 12,000 strong, was practically part of his army; for, in the language of Wool himself, it "occupied the stations abandoned by the rebels as the general advanced, thereby protecting his left flank and rear" (p. 66 of the same volume); or, in the language of President Lincoln in his letter to McClellan of April 9th, "It is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away."

McClellan was always better at counting his foes than his own army. In spite of the official returns given above, he stated then, and has reiterated the statement frequently since the war, that his strength was 85,000; and even this he figures down to 68,000 by deducting camp, depot and train guards, escorts and noncombatants, as if this were a deduction specially peculiar to him. No wonder that President Lincoln, who had kept account of the troops as shipped and found them to amount to 108,000, should have said in the same letter,

Of this number, fifty-eight thousand men and one hundred guns were ready to move on April 3d, adopting the figures of McClellan's official report, which was exclusive of the troops on hand for whom transportation had not yet been provided. With these he determined to push on up the Peninsula at once, and commenced his march on the morning of the 4th, his army moving in two columns, of which one was directed to the right upon Yorktown by Howard's Bridge and Cockletown, and the other by Young's Mill and in the direction of Lee's Mill. They made some progress that day, and the next morning the Yorktown column was ordered to continue its march to a point about three miles from Yorktown, while Keyes, in command of the other column, was ordered to march to the Halfway House, on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, midway between the two places, and to hold the ridge at that point, thus hemming in the garrison. The Yorktown column arrived at its destination without serious opposition; but rather too large a task had been assigned to Keyes. His column, after a journey of a few miles, reached Lee's Mill, and there found itself confronted with the alternative of halting or of making an assault upon the formidable works which there barred their way. The former was chosen, and thus McClellan found himself stopped by the Confederate line and its resolute defenders.

Until this forward movement of McClellan, the Confederate Government was in the dark as to his intentions. The published correspondence of Lee with Magruder and Huger shows that the Government was undecided whether Richmond or Norfolk was the Federal

"There is a curious mystery about your figures." Not understanding how there could be much opportunity for desertion in coming down the Bay, and having heard of no foundering of so large a body, he naturally was inquisitive as to the other 23,000.

objective. But this put the matter at rest, and brought about the decision to re-enforce Magruder with the Army of Northern Virginia. In anticipation of this, all practicable arrangements had been made to transfer the divisions of that army to join Magruder, and by the 5th four of them were already on the way. Ewell was left on the Rappahannock, with instructions to obey Jackson, and a small force was left in front of Fredericksburg. By the 10th the remainder of the army was either with Magruder or on the march to join him. Johnston repaired to Richmond for conference, and by an order of the 12th his department was enlarged so as to include the old departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula, thus placing him in command of the expected theatre of operations.

Before assuming command, he went to Yorktown and made a thorough examination of the position and of its means of defense. The quantity of the Federal artillery and its very superior range were well known to the Confederates, and he at once penetrated McClellan's design. He saw that the fall of Yorktown was but a question of time, and that he could make no successful resistance; for McClellan, with his rifled pieces placed in easy range for them but beyond the reach of the Southern smooth-bores, could batter their defenses and slaughter their defenders with perfect impunity to himself, after which he could turn the army defending the Peninsula, if it attempted to make a stand, by pushing a force up York River. Johnston at once returned to Richmond and had an interview with the Confederate President, in which he recommended that a large army be formed, by drawing all available forces from Norfolk and the South and concentrating them in front of Richmond, to be joined by Magruder's troops and that part of the Army of Northern Virginia which had not then reached the

Peninsula ; the army so formed to fall on McClellan as soon as he reached the vicinity of Richmond in his pursuit of Magruder, in which event he would probably be defeated, and, being so far from his base, he might be destroyed. The President called a council of war to consider the matter, at which, in addition to himself and Johnston, Secretary Randolph and Generals Lee, G. W. Smith, and Longstreet were present. The plan was opposed by Secretary Randolph because it involved the abandonment of Norfolk and the navy yard, and by Lee because he feared that to take any troops in considerable numbers from the Southern States would result in the capture of their important seaports. To these objections Johnston replied that the destruction of McClellan would be so decisive in its consequences as to insure the prompt recovery of everything abandoned to win it, thus illustrating his settled views of the policy of concentration for great results, even at the risk of some points. After a lengthy conference, lasting, with a brief interval, far into the night, the President decided against Johnston's plan and in favor of defending the Peninsula. The course of subsequent events, the necessary evacuation of Yorktown, and the fact that such a concentration was forced on the Confederacy, but not till McClellan had arranged a safe refuge for his army when beaten, are the best vindication of the plan. His trouble was that he was too far-sighted. Had the Executive done for him what he recommended at the time he urged it, instead of putting it off till driven to it, the Seven Days might have been unnecessary, and the change of base impracticable.

Johnston, confident that his plan would soon be a necessity, acquiesced in the decision and repaired to Yorktown, where he assumed command, firmly resolved not to expose his men to the terrific fire of artillery

which was being prepared for them. He issued an order placing Magruder in charge of the right, Longstreet of the center, D. H. Hill of the left, including Yorktown, and G. W. Smith of the reserve. This order was issued on the 18th. The army had been gradually arriving until it was all on hand, and, adopting its figures of April 30th, was about fifty-five thousand strong.

When the Federal army first felt the Confederate lines it was on April 5th, at which time they were manned by only eleven thousand men, including the garrisons. Magruder presented a dauntless front, and skirmishing ensued along their entire extent; but McClellan, instead of picking out the weakest point and carrying it by a rush, which he could easily have done with his numbers, resorted to siege operations. The only semblance of an assault was made on April 16th, at a point near the center of the Confederate position opposite Dam No. 1. On that day General W. F. Smith advanced with Brooks's Vermont brigade, well supported by artillery, and pushed a part across the stream for the purpose of making a lodgment. The assailants attempted to seize the rifle pits occupied by the Fifteenth North Carolina, who happened at the time to be a few hundred yards in the rear fortifying their camp. This regiment, supported by two Georgia regiments and a portion of the Second Louisiana, soon recovered the lost ground and drove the Federals back. Later in the day Smith advanced again with three regiments, but the Confederates were now on their guard and quickly repulsed this second attempt. The Federal loss in the action was one hundred and sixty-five, and that of the Confederates seventy-five.*

* McClellan could not have intended this as an attempt to break through, judging from the instructions to General Smith, as set out in the report of the latter. In it Smith says: "The moment I found re-

Johnston, on the 20th, again advised the Government of the weakness of Yorktown, and on the 22d repeated his suggestion to concentrate a large army near Richmond and fight McClellan before McDowell, whose advance was daily expected, should join him. Meanwhile McClellan was erecting his batteries, out of range of the Yorktown guns, and the Confederates could see them growing daily under their eyes without the power to prevent or interrupt their erection. By the 27th they were so far advanced that it was evidently a question of a few days only, and Johnston wrote to Lee stating that his guns would soon be dismounted and York River open to the enemy, and that it would then be necessary to evacuate Norfolk and transfer the troops there to Richmond. On the 29th he again wrote, saying: "Should the attack on Yorktown be made earnestly, we can not prevent its fall, nor can it hold out more than a few hours. We must abandon the Peninsula soon. . . . Should the enemy approach Richmond in this manner, I apprehend we should have there concentrated the largest force you can collect."

By the 3d of May it was evident that McClellan's

sistance serious and the numbers opposed great, I acted in obedience to the warning instructions of the general in chief, and withdrew the troops from under fire."

McClellan telegraphed to Stanton after this affair: "Smith has gained an important position, which will, I hope, enable us to control a passage of the Warwick. I am re-enforcing the position, and will to-night erect batteries which will give us full control." To which Stanton exultantly replied: "Good for the first lick. Hurrah for Smith and the one-gun battery. Let us have Yorktown with Magruder and his gang before the 1st of May, and the job will be over."

The job was not over quite so soon. The Federal army did not cross the Warwick at that point the next morning and resume its march to Richmond, with "Magruder and his gang" following in chains.

batteries were ready to open. Three days before, one of them, near the Moore house, had been completed, and had shown by experiment that it was in easy range. He flattered himself with the expectation of pouring on Yorktown such a fire as had never been known in warfare. But he made the mistake of assuming that his enemy would remain quiescent till the toils were spread. Johnston, who had only looked on the tenure of Yorktown as a means of gaining time, rightly judging that the batteries were about to open, withdrew in the night, indefinitely postponing McClellan's pyrotechnics. Nothing of consequence was left except the heavy guns. Their abandonment was a necessity, as they could not be transported up the Peninsula. Their capture was a poor solace to McClellan for his disappointment at being cheated out of a scientific bombardment, and to Stanton at the failure to catch "Magruder and his gang."

Information of the evacuation was sent to Huger at Norfolk, and he was ordered to march to Richmond. This was successfully accomplished, and as much of the valuable property at the navy yard was removed as possible.

The evacuation of Norfolk sounded the knell of the Virginia. After the withdrawal from Norfolk she had no base from which to obtain fuel and ammunition. Her commander had been led by the pilots to suppose that she could be taken up James River by lightening her draught, which was twenty-three feet. On this supposition he threw overboard the pig iron which was her ballast, until, by thus raising her, the wooden hull where it was unprotected by her armor arose out of the water. Thereupon the pilots stated that on account of the low water, due to the westerly winds, she could not be taken above Jamestown flats. But she was now an unarmored vessel, and up to that point the river banks were in posses-

sion of the enemy. Her crew was therefore marched to Richmond, and the ship which had revolutionized the navies of the world and guarded the James River avenue to the Southern capital was committed to the flames near Crany Island. Thus the Confederacy was deprived of its "iron diadem."

CHAPTER IX.

WILLIAMSBURG.

THE withdrawal from Yorktown opened the York to McClellan as an avenue of approach to Richmond, for there was no other point above it where batteries on the southern shore could command the river. It was important that the army should move up the Peninsula as rapidly as possible, since there was danger that the Northern commander might endeavor, by means of transports, to interpose his army between the Confederates and Richmond. This was, in fact, McClellan's intention. To further it he had kept Franklin's division on transports for the purpose of celerity in moving it, and when he occupied Yorktown he himself remained there to expedite this operation, which he regarded as of the first importance, intrusting the pursuit by land to his lieutenants. The dreadful state of the roads rendered his plan easier of execution, as it retarded the overland retreat of the Southern army, while it did not affect the Federal journey by water. It was, on this account, against the interest of the Southern commander to allow himself to be delayed in his retreat by demonstrations; and it was not his intention to be drawn into an engagement of magnitude unless it became necessary to gain time for the onward progress of the trains.

The breaking up of camp incident to the discovery of the retreat and the preparations for pursuit gave the Confederates a start of several hours, so that it was not

until the evening of May 4th that the pursuers came in sight. This was at Fort Magruder, which was about a mile east of Williamsburg, and formed part of Magruder's third line of defense. At this point the Peninsula narrows greatly, and the firm land is still further contracted by two creeks which make up from the rivers—namely, Queen's or Capital Creek from the York, and Archer's Hope or College Creek from the James. From Queen's Creek lateral swamps or ravines extend toward the center of the Peninsula, the lower part of these ravines being so marshy as to be impassable, and the upper part being grown up so thickly with timber and undergrowth as to be almost as great an obstacle as a swamp. One of these ravines is the course of Cub Dam Creek, which runs from Queen's Creek almost to the Yorktown road, at a point just east of Fort Magruder. West of this is a table-land extending from the creek immediately to Fort Magruder, and west of this table-land is another ravine making up from Queen's Creek and heavily grown up with brush. The fort itself is situated very near the junction of the road from Yorktown and that from Warwick Court House, which here come together, making a single road up the Peninsula. It completely commands this junction. To the right of the fort was a redoubt which commanded the narrow strip of land between the fort and the head of Tutter's Neck, a large pond which gives source to one of the branches of Halfway Creek, a tributary of College Creek. At the lower end of this pond the road from Allen's wharf on the James River and from King's Mill crosses this stream on a dam-head, and this crossing was defended by a strong redoubt. Except at this point the stream can not be crossed. This road, unlike the road from the table-land on the left, joins the main road at least half a mile in rear of the fort.

This description shows how admirably Fort Magruder was located to resist an advancing army. The fort itself commanded any approach by the left, unless the advancing force, after crossing the plateau in sight of the fort, had taken to an unexplored and difficult jungle. To the right the redoubts prevented any flanking movement. If McClellan could have been induced to agree to use the overland route alone and throw away the advantage of his shipping, no better spot for arresting his progress could have been found.

The Confederate army was concentrated at Williamsburg about midday of the 4th. That evening it moved on, with Magruder's division in the lead, followed by G. W. Smith. Next to these came the trains, and Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions were to follow. Thus it was prepared to protect its trains, either from a column thrown forward between the advance and Richmond, or from an enemy in pursuit. In the afternoon Stoneman's cavalry was reported as approaching, whereupon Johnston ordered McLaws to reoccupy the fort and redoubts and to resist any eager pressure from the enemy. He at once proceeded to execute the order, taking with him Semmes's and Kershaw's brigades, and reoccupied the fort and the redoubts on each side. Skirmishing ensued, and continued for the balance of the day. At first the only force engaged was Stoneman on the Federal side, but by evening Hooker's and Smith's divisions had come up and taken position in front, with the woods intervening between the combatants. It was too late to attempt anything that day, so that, after a fruitless endeavor of Smith to advance, the troops went into bivouac. That night the command of McLaws moved on, and was replaced by Longstreet's division.

On the morning of the 5th the battle began. It was

opened by an attack from the impatient Hooker, who was opposite the fort and the redoubts on its right. He advanced Grover's brigade, with Webber's and Bramhall's batteries. The Confederates, who were acting simply as a rear guard and were not desirous of bringing on an unnecessary engagement, stood during the first part of the day strictly on the defensive. The attack by Hooker was not sufficiently positive to indicate more than a mere intention to delay the retreat; so that Johnston, under this idea, had ridden forward to join the main body. This left Longstreet in command, who, finding that the progress of the trains was so slow as to put his withdrawal out of the question for the day, resolved about midday to assume the offensive. He ordered Anderson, with the brigades of Wilcox and A. P. Hill, to attack. The order was executed and the enemy driven back. Here the main battle raged between Hooker and Longstreet, but Hooker was re-enforced about one o'clock by Kearney and by Peck's brigade of Couch's division, which did not prevent him from losing his artillery, though from want of horses the Confederates could only bring off five pieces. Later in the day this part of the Federal line was re-enforced by the Second Rhode Island and Seventh Massachusetts of Devens's brigade, the Ninety-second and Ninety-third New York of Palmer, and the Eighty-fifth, One Hundred and First, and One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania of Keim. But these re-enforcements did not alter the aspect of that portion of the battle, nor prevent the Confederates from holding their ground, with the prisoners and cannon captured and brought off. This accomplished the object for which the battle was fought, by giving the trains a day's start, so that nothing remained to the Confederates but to withdraw under cover of darkness and rejoin their trains.

The delight at the very positive success which was achieved on the right was, however, marred by a reverse on the left, which, though it had no consequences beyond an increase in the Confederate loss, was on that account saddening. Cub Dam Creek contained in its course a large mill pond known as Saunders's Pond. There was a crossing over this pond which was a mere path, and which came out opposite a redoubt placed to command it about a mile and a half from the fort. This redoubt was situated on the plateau which stretched from the fort between the two ravines northward to Queen's Creek. The road or path which crossed the pond at this point came into the main road within a few yards of the fort, and was commanded by its guns. No road led from that redoubt into Williamsburg far in rear of the fort, as some writers have asserted. While a body of troops unopposed might have worked their way through the ravine and undergrowth and come out on another table-land which would have led them to the road in rear of the fort, it would have been a hazardous undertaking in a strange country without intelligent guides, and, unless it was a strong column, might have resulted in its destruction, as retreat through such a jungle would have been more difficult than advance. Hence the only effect of the occupation of this redoubt by a hostile force was to give an enfilading though distant fire on the fort. Such a force could easily be held in check, or, if they evinced any eagerness to advance through the woods in a flanking movement, might have been met with an attack as they emerged in disorder. While it might perhaps have been prudent to occupy that redoubt in case the line had been held by an army, it would have been unnecessary and perilous in a weak rear guard to endeavor to hold it. A force there might have been cut off in case the line had been broken

nearer the fort, as its only retreat was through the thicket. Probably for this reason the redoubt was not occupied by Longstreet when he distributed his men for the battle. He needed all his available troops to meet the Federals at the point where the main fighting took place, and he could not afford to scatter them.

While Hooker was hammering away at the Confederate right, Sumner, who commanded in McClellan's absence, and who was at Whittaker's house on the Yorktown road with the main Federal army, was informed that this redoubt which commanded the crossing was not occupied. He sent a reconnoitering party, and as early as ten o'clock in the morning received a report from them that it was empty of defenders. He thereupon sent Hancock, with his brigade and one regiment of Davidson's, to occupy it, which was done by twelve o'clock. Hancock also advanced to seize another redoubt nearer to the fort, but, not receiving the re-enforcements which he had asked, and seeing that it was manned (by Bratten's regiment), he withdrew to the first redoubt, whence he opened an artillery fire on the fort. This demonstration caused Longstreet to ask that the division of D. H. Hill be sent back to re-enforce him, which was done by Johnston, he himself riding back to the field at the same time. These troops were directed to Longstreet's left, so as to hold in check the threatened movement of Hancock. This object was really accomplished by merely taking position, as Hancock had already been there for hours without advancing or doing any other damage, and it was then too late for him to accomplish anything even if he had advanced. But Early, who was not of a nature to be a mere spectator while others were fighting, coveted Hancock's fine battery, and sent to Longstreet asking permission to attempt its capture, which was given. Early

and Hill at once formed a line of four regiments, consisting of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, Thirty-eighth Virginia, Twenty-third North Carolina, and Fifth North Carolina, and moved through the woods to attack the battery. Not knowing exactly where it was, the Twenty-fourth Virginia, or extreme left, came out opposite to it, instead of the center, and advanced upon it so closely that it and its infantry support fell back to the redoubt. The two center regiments did not emerge from the woods, but the Fifth North Carolina gallantly moved forward to the support of the Virginians, and secured a position equally near the enemy. Not being supported by the other regiments, they could make no impression on the six regiments of Hancock, and, Early having been severely wounded, they were ordered by Hill to withdraw, which they did, though with great loss. Thus the only result of this unnecessary attack was to cause a grievous sacrifice of life and to reflect undying fame upon the two regiments who had so gallantly attacked triple numbers. Hancock made no attempt to follow up his success or to get into the rear of the Confederates. Night found the latter in possession of the main battlefield, captors of five pieces of artillery, eight flags, and four hundred prisoners. According to Longstreet's report, the total Confederate loss was fifteen hundred and sixty. The Federal loss as given in the official reports was twenty-two hundred and thirty-nine. The numbers engaged on the Confederate side amounted to about nine thousand, consisting of the brigades of Anderson, Wilcox, A. P. Hill, Pickett, Colston, Early, and a small portion of Pryor. Counting the seven hundred men of the latter as one regiment, and including only the two regiments of Early which were engaged, this made twenty-two regiments. On the Federal side were Hooker's division, five regiments of Kearney's di-

vision, Peck's brigade and a part of Devens's, of Couch's division, Hancock and one regiment of Davidson, of Smith's division, two of Palmer's regiments, and three of Keim's, of Casey's division, or thirty-six regiments in all. This excludes all troops not actually engaged. On the Federal side there were in easy reach the divisions of Couch, Casey, and Richardson, and the portions of the other divisions that had not been engaged. On the Confederate side there was the balance of D. H. Hill's division.

Heintzelman in his report stated that Hooker carried nine thousand men of his division into action, and Hancock in his report states that the strength of his command was twenty-five hundred and forty-seven. A like proportion for the five regiments of Kearney, the seven of Couch, and the five of Casey would make their total numbers at least twenty thousand, which is probably an underestimate. Late that night the Confederates withdrew from their breastworks, unmolested and unpursued.

McClellan did not hesitate to claim Williamsburg as a victory, just as he had claimed an important success at Dam No. 1. It was not a general action, but a mere affair of the rear guard, intended to check pursuit; and this object was accomplished. The Confederates were not driven from a single position, but, on the contrary, assumed the offensive, at times held possession of all of Hooker's artillery, being only prevented from bringing it off by want of horses, and actually bringing off five pieces. They did not lose a single piece of artillery in the action. In addition to this, they captured a large number of prisoners, losing few themselves, unless the wounded who were left in Williamsburg from want of ambulances are counted. The poverty of the Southern equipment was the cause of their loss. With the ex-

ception of the attack on Hancock, the fighting was all in favor of the Confederates. That reverse had no effect beyond the increase in the butcher's bill. It left Hancock exactly where he was before he was assaulted, in a position where he could not have advanced without marching right by the fort, or scrambling through a thicket, to emerge in disorder at a point where the unengaged brigades of Hill, burning to avenge the defeat of their comrades, might have overwhelmed him.

The failure to occupy and hold this redoubt which Hancock seized has been made the subject of criticism by some writers on this engagement. If the battle had been intended as a general action, the criticism would be just. If a fair one, it would fall primarily on Longstreet, who placed the troops in position, and was in command until late in the evening and until long after Hancock had taken the redoubt. But it is not a just criticism, for the reason that the engagement was not general. Johnston was aware of the fact that McClellan was hurrying troops up York River. It was not his policy to allow the remainder of McClellan's army to detain and amuse him while this attempt to intercept him by water was in progress. As McClellan was at Yorktown superintending this water movement which he regarded as the most important, so Johnston was in the van expediting the march of his army to meet it. He did not intend to fight at Williamsburg until he was forced into it, and when forced into it he only detained as much of his army as was necessary. He was using a mere rear guard, and to have spread it out over a line intended for an army would have made it too weak at all points. His force was properly held well in hand at the fort, which was the decisive point, and the mistake, if any, was in attacking Hancock at all. When he was attacked it was late in the evening, and he could

do no damage. The Confederate evacuation was not caused by his possession of this fortification, for they held their position for twelve hours after he secured this supposed vantage ground, and they finally retreated, not because he was there, but because they had no reason for remaining longer. If not a Federal soldier had crossed Saunders's Pond, the Confederates would have done the same thing. To speak of this as the key to the battlefield, is to show an ignorance of the ground and to overlook the lesson of the actual occurrences.

This was, in fact, not the really weak flank of the Southern line. If the Northern generals had been acquainted with the ground and had had competent guides, they would have attempted to turn the Confederate right. By moving from the Warwick road, along the road to Allen's wharf, until they reached the road leading from that wharf to Williamsburg, and forcing a passage at Tutter's Neck, they could either have followed that road to its junction with the Yorktown road, a good half mile to the rear of the fort, or they could have turned still farther west and come into the main road by way of the lunatic asylum, near the center of the town, with the result of completely cutting off the defenders of the fort. Such a manœuvre would have been entirely masked by woods, and, if undertaken with a sufficiently strong force, much more decisive in results than an attempt to flank the Confederate left. Emery, in fact, was sent in this direction, but with a force which he did not regard as sufficiently strong, and the official reports would seem to indicate that he was ignorant of the course of this road and not aware of its importance. According to Heintzelman's report, Averill at one time of the day had possession of the redoubt commanding the crossing at Tutter's Neck, and Emery had three thousand men under him. Such a demon-

stration would have compelled the immediate evacuation of the fort, though such was the spirit of the Southern troops, and so well in hand were they, that it is not probable that either it or Hancock's demonstration would have done more.

However much McClellan's admirers may strive to swell his meager list of victories by adding Williamsburg to the number, it is not so classed by the fairest of the Northern writers. Swinton, in his *Army of the Potomac*, speaks of it as "very unfortunate"; and Webb, in his admirable monograph on the *Peninsular Campaign*, says that "the battle was fought by piecemeal, and ended in disappointment." No pursuit was ordered, and the retreat up the Peninsula was leisurely and uninterrupted. It was Franklin's move upon Eltham, not McClellan's on Williamsburg, which made retreat necessary.*

While this action was in progress the remainder of the army was pursuing its course up the Peninsula, with Magruder's division in the lead. By night it had reached Diascund Bridge, and the division of G. W. Smith, the next behind, had reached Barhamsville. The day after

* The reader, in following the *Peninsular campaign*, will derive much assistance from the map in vol. ii, p. 188, of the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. It indicates very well the situation on the Confederate right, but is inaccurate in representing Hancock as on a road passing Queen's Creek and leading into Williamsburg. There was no such road. Queen's Creek is marshy and impassable, with the tide ebbing and flowing in it, to a point due north of Williamsburg. Nor does the map show the woods and ravines. The author is personally well acquainted with the battlefield of Williamsburg, having in his youth been a student of William and Mary College, and having frequently hunted over it. No one, who has not had a similar experience, can appreciate the obstacles which are offered by the woods and marshes. The former are almost impenetrable, and even a dog can not cross the latter, much less a man.

the battle the men of Hill and Longstreet marched twelve miles west from Williamsburg, which apparently indicated no very hot pursuit. They encamped at Burnt Ordinary, the commander in chief being with these troops. The next day they also marched to Barhamsville, which had the effect of uniting the army. The object of this was to be prepared for the flanking movement of Franklin, who, during these operations, had reached West Point with his division, and had debarked at Eltham's Landing on the south bank, ready to move across and to create havoc among the trains. The duty of holding him in check until they had passed was intrusted to G. W. Smith. Taking Hood's brigade, together with the Hampton Legion and the Nineteenth Georgia of Hampton's brigade, Whiting, who was in immediate charge, moved upon the enemy and fell upon him, with the result of causing him to seek the shelter of his gunboats. The brunt of the fight fell on Hood's brigade. Later in the day Anderson's Tennessee brigade was so placed as to support the Texans. The Confederate loss was forty-eight, while the Federal loss was one hundred and eighty-six. In this affair the Southern troops engaged were the brigades of Hood and Anderson and a part of Hampton's brigade; while the Federals had the brigades of Newton, Taylor, Dana, and Slocum, in addition to their strong artillery force and their gunboats. The result of the fight was that the Southern army pursued its way without further interruption from Franklin's flanking movement. It resumed the march with Smith and Magruder following the road by New Kent Court House, and Longstreet and D. H. Hill taking the road by the Long Bridge. When the two former divisions reached the Baltimore Cross-roads and the two latter the Long Bridge, they halted and took position to resist any further hostile

advance, for the Southern army now possessed, in the York River Railroad, the means of supplying its wants; and it was at length so placed that it could not be turned by way of the York.

Meanwhile events on the James showed that the army must be in position to protect Richmond against a menace from that direction. The evacuation of Norfolk had been quickly followed by its surrender to Wool, who took possession on the 11th of May, which resulted in the destruction of the Virginia, whereupon the Federal naval officers sent the Galena, Monitor, Naugatuck, Port Royal, and Aroostook up James River, which at that time had not been strongly fortified. They came as far as Drury's Bluff, where they encountered obstructions in the river, and were repulsed by artillery supported by riflemen, who, from their commanding position, could fire almost down upon the vessels. In this action the Galena showed special gallantry on the Northern side, and suffered most. This demonstration was far around the Confederate right at Long Bridge, and proved the necessity of guarding any approach by the James. Johnston thereupon ordered the army to cross the Chickahominy and to take a position nearer Richmond, so selected as to enable it to meet a hostile approach, whether by the James or the York. By the 17th this position had been occupied, Longstreet being on the right and covering the river road—that is, the road nearest the James; Hill in the center, covering the Williamsburg road; and Magruder on the left, covering the Nine Miles road, with Smith in reserve. Here it awaited the approach of its adversary. These manoeuvres show that thus early in the campaign Johnston had divined McClellan's scheme of a possible change of base, and was prepared to meet him on either line.

CHAPTER X.

SEVEN PINES.

THE near approach of the adversaries showed a great battle to be now imminent. Johnston, already confronting the double numbers of McClellan, and threatened from the direction of Fredericksburg by McDowell with an army of nearly forty thousand men, and by other large bodies in the Valley converging on Jackson's weak force, incessantly urged on the Confederate Government the necessity of a concentration of all available troops at Richmond, as the decisive theatre of the struggle. In this he was zealously and ably supported by Lee; but the near advent of McClellan was, after all, the most potent argument, and the Government, at length awaking to the necessity, gave orders in all directions to hurry forward re-enforcements from other parts of the South. This was but carrying out at last the views of Johnston, expressed on his first trip to the Peninsula, with the difference that their tardy action gave McClellan time to intrench and arrange for his change of base, thus causing the final attack upon him to have the result of merely repulsing instead of crushing him. Only a portion of the re-enforcements arrived in time for the battle. The major portion re-enforced the army under Lee, not the army under Johnston. At this time the strength of the latter (according to his memorandum of May 21, 1862) was 53,688 effectives, in addition to which Huger's division of seven thousand

men joined from Norfolk. Anderson's division, about ten thousand strong, which was watching McDowell, and Branch's brigade, about five thousand strong, which was at Gordonsville, were also under his orders. McClellan's strength (according to his report of May 20, 1862) was 102,236. The most threatening of the other forces operating against Richmond was McDowell, upon whom McClellan had constantly reckoned, and who hung like a cloud upon the Southern left, necessitating a large detachment from their meager array to observe him. Apparently arranging his movements in concert with the Federal forces in the Valley, it looked as if Richmond was doomed to fall, if not by the hand of McClellan, then under the attack of a body scarcely less numerous than his army, to be made up of these various auxiliary forces. Johnston, alive to this danger, had determined to attack, even with his inferior numbers, at the first opportunity, so as to settle the campaign before the arrival of McDowell.

But it was from the scene of these collateral operations that the first good fortune of the Southern cause was to come. It was Jackson who was, by his genius in executing the design for which Johnston had first sent him to the Valley, to derange the plans of McClellan, and neutralize the various armies of Banks, Shields, Milroy, and McDowell.

It is not within the purview of this biography to describe the wonderful Valley campaign by which Jackson accomplished this result. Though he was still a department commander under Johnston and subject to his orders, the distance which separated them was such as to render possible only the most general suggestions; and such was the confidence of the superior in his subordinate that even these were rarely given. The masterly way in which Jackson attacked Milroy at Mc-

Dowell, sending him off on a double-quick, and Banks at Winchester, hurling him across the Potomac at a speed well illustrating the law of accelerated motion, and causing terror in Washington itself; the manner in which he interposed himself between Shields and Fremont, defeating each in sight of the other, and drawing toward him in a bootless chase the main body of McDowell's corps, must be told by his biographer, if any other account of that immortal campaign is needed. When the head of McDowell's column turned to the west instead of the south, the commander of the Confederate army at Richmond could breathe more freely, and think that his able lieutenant had relieved him of half his work.

But before this result was fully known, the opposing leaders were planning, the one to prevent and the other to insure the junction of McDowell with the Army of the Potomac. McClellan, to facilitate it and clear the way for McDowell, gradually extended his right, and at length sent Porter with a mixed force (stated by Webb, in his *Peninsula*, to have been twelve thousand strong) in the direction of Hanover Court House. The brigade of Branch had been brought down to this vicinity from Gordonsville by the Confederates. Its strength was five thousand—not twelve thousand, as stated by Webb. Porter attacked this force, and after a severe fight drove it back in disorder, inflicting a loss of nearly three hundred men, though losing three hundred and fifty-five himself. Immediately after this affair the force of Anderson was brought up and united to this brigade, forming a new division, under the command of the knightly A. P. Hill, who had just received his richly earned promotion to the grade of major general.

The next few days passed with nothing but armed reconnoissances to vary their monotony. These re-

sulted on the part of the Federals in the establishment of the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman on the right bank of the Chickahominy, in a position near Seven Pines and to the west of it, while the remainder of the Federal army was on the other side. Johnston did not seriously contest the advance of these corps to this point, for he had decided upon the plan of falling upon them and crushing them at the first opportunity, and he wished them to place as wide an interval as possible between themselves and their companions across the stream. At this point the Federals were within five miles of Richmond—almost near enough to enable McClellan to carry out Lincoln's desire to "throw shells into the city." *

While the Federal chief was, in his dispatches to his Government, representing his foe as possessed of fabulous strength, far outnumbering his army, and was daily begging re-enforcements, on the plea that he would have a great battle to fight, his recently published letters to his wife would seem to indicate that he was not anticipating an attack. Thus, on May 23d, he writes:

"The intentions of the enemy are still doubtful. I go on prepared to fight a hard battle, but I confess that the indications are not now that he will fight. Unless he has some deep-laid scheme that I do not fathom, he is giving up great advantages in not opposing me on the line of the Chickahominy." And again on the 27th: "We are getting on splendidly. I am quietly clearing out everything that could threaten my rear and communications, providing against the contingency of disaster, and so arranging as to make my whole force available in the approaching battle. The only fear is that Joe's heart may fail him."

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 368.

Evidently he had not penetrated Johnston's design of using the Chickahominy, not as a wet ditch in front of his own position, but as an ally in insuring the destruction of the two corps which had crossed it, and which would have to withdraw over it in case of disaster; in pursuance of which Johnston, so far from opposing their advance, was enticing them on. If he thought that "Joe's heart would fail him," he was quickly undeceived. Johnston had expected to fight at this juncture from the very outset of the campaign, and from the time of the Federal advance by Bottom's Bridge he had formed the purpose of assailing the troops who might cross and place themselves in a position sufficiently isolated. From this he was only diverted for a time by news of McDowell's advance, on account of which he at one time entertained the thought of attacking the Federal right, and made his dispositions for the manœuvre, but on information from Stuart that McDowell had retrograded, he reverted to his original plan and awaited the advance of Heintzelman and Keyes.

On the 30th of May he sent out military reconnoissances under D. H. Hill—one on the Charles City road under Rodes, and one on the Williamsburg road under Garland. The former discovered no foe, but Garland found pickets about two miles west of Seven Pines which were strong enough to indicate the presence of a large force. On this information Johnston determined to attack the next morning. His general plan was a concentration of the bulk of his army against Keyes and Heintzelman. Leaving six brigades to watch the Chickahominy from Meadow Bridge down to New Bridge, he collected the others in positions for attack. D. H. Hill was to lead the advance along the Williamsburg road with his division; Huger, with his division,

was to move by the Charles City road and turn the Federal left; and Longstreet's division was to support Hill. Longstreet, as ranking officer, had command of the entire force on that side. G. W. Smith's division was to move to the junction of the New Bridge and Nine-Mile roads and to keep the remainder of the Federal army off Longstreet, if it attempted to take a hand, and, if not, to attack the Federal right. The Federal corps were in positions peculiarly favorable for assault. Casey's division of Keyes was about a mile west of Seven Pines, with a picket line half a mile still farther west; Couch's division of the same corps extended from Seven Pines to Fair Oaks station, being thus separated from Casey by an interval of a mile. Kearney's division of Heintzelman was near Savage's station, and Hooker's division of the same corps was still farther east, nearer the river, and so placed as to guard a crossing of White Oak swamp. During the night an extremely heavy rain-storm came up, converting the streams into torrents. While its effect was necessarily to impede the advance of the Confederates, it rendered their success more probable by swelling the river and increasing the difficulty of communication between the two fractions of the Northern army. This dangerous arrangement of his forces so that two fifths might be crushed by a united foe could only have been made by McClellan on the theory that "Joe's heart would fail him." Johnston determined to accompany the division of G. W. Smith, as he would thus be better enabled to detect the approach of re-enforcements across the river, and to handle the army so as to head them off. He left the management of the main attack to Longstreet, confident that he would be able to defeat the enemy at Seven Pines and vicinity when formed with intervals just too far for effective support, and just close enough for

the contagion of a panic in the first division to spread to the next.

Vexatious delays in the arrival of the troops at the stations assigned them occurred when the movement commenced. Huger did not make the attack on the Federal left, and it was not until more than half the day had passed that Longstreet decided to begin the affray without waiting for him any longer. About one o'clock he moved to a direct front attack with Hill's division along the Williamsburg road, Rodes's brigade being on the right of the road, supported by Rains, and Garland on the left, supported by G. B. Anderson. Wet weather had made the roads and country so soft that the Confederates brought but few pieces of artillery into action, and in this respect were greatly overmatched. The first enemy encountered was Casey's picket line, which he had re-enforced with a regiment almost as the combat opened. These were soon swept away, and his main line, partly protected by intrenchments, was encountered. Here the resistance was more obstinate, for this division, though maligned by McClellan in his official report, held its ground with tenacity, and only yielded when attacked in front by Garland, Anderson, and Rodes, and threatened in flank by Rains. This, with the gallant handling of Carter's and Bondurant's batteries, started them on the run, and resulted in the capture of their artillery, which was turned upon them to quicken their speed. By this time Couch had sent from his line as many re-enforcements as he thought he could spare, and vigorous efforts were made to recapture their position, but without success. In this contest Hill's division, re-enforced by R. H. Anderson's brigade from Longstreet, successively met and defeated Casey's, Couch's, and Kearney's divisions, and drove them back, until at nightfall they were in their third line of defense

near Savage's station. A portion of Couch's division retired in a northerly direction, being cut off from this third line by the advance of the Confederates across the Nine-Mile road. Another portion of the Federals retreated toward White Oak swamp. Thus the only troops employed by Longstreet in this operation were the four brigades of Hill and one of his own. By night-fall he had at hand his other four brigades and Huger's division, all of whom were fresh.

Meanwhile Johnston, from his position with Smith's division, which was under the immediate command of Whiting, had been awaiting impatiently the sounds of battle. It was not until late in the evening that a staff officer sent to ascertain the cause of the delay returned and informed him that he was not hearing merely an artillery duel, but that Longstreet was engaged and driving the enemy. As his scouts and pickets reported no advance of re-enforcements across the river, he decided, about four o'clock, to attack the right flank of Longstreet's enemies, regardless of any re-enforcements that might approach. Holding Magruder's division in reserve, he moved along the Nine-Mile road with this object in view. The leading troops soon became engaged, Johnston supposing that merely a small body of a few regiments whose camps he had just seen were opposing him. With this idea he ordered Hood's brigade to move to the support of Longstreet, reasoning that the remainder of Smith's division would be able to take care of this force. It was, however, no small brigade that he was attacking, but Sumner's corps, which had crossed and formed a junction with the part of Couch's division that had retired in this direction. Sumner, at the outbreak of the battle, had been lying, with his corps of two divisions, on the left bank of the river, with a bridge opposite each one of his divisions. Receiving from McClellan

orders to hold himself in readiness to move at a moment's notice, and construing the order liberally, like the true fighter that he was, he not only placed his men under arms, but marched them down to the bridges with the heads of his two columns almost on them. Consequently, when marching orders came, he had nothing to delay him in immediately commencing the passage of the bridges. This was a difficult and dangerous undertaking of itself, for the flood in the river was running over them, and they were apparently impassable. But, nothing daunted, he made the attempt, and succeeded in crossing with his corps, accompanied by Kirby's battery. It was Richardson's division and Kirby's battery upon whom the Confederates had fallen in the march to join Longstreet. Richardson held his ground against all attacks until near dark and until Johnston saw that, in spite of the success on the right, it would take another day to complete the work, and issued orders that each regiment should sleep in the position it occupied at dark, ready to renew the fight on the morrow. Thus on the right the Confederates had driven their enemy to the field works near the river, and on the left near Fair Oaks the fight had been indecisive, each side holding its own. About the close of the fight at Fair Oaks, Johnston was wounded by a musket shot in the shoulder, and almost immediately thereafter was struck on the breast by a large fragment of shell with such violence as to be unhorsed and to incapacitate him for further command. He was borne from the field to the house of a friend in Richmond; and thus ended his connection with the battle of Seven Pines and the Army of Northern Virginia. After Johnston's wound the chief command devolved on G. W. Smith, who made no serious attempt the next day to follow up the fight of the first day. The Federals, re-enforced by the troops which

had not been actually engaged, attacked Pickett's brigade, but without success; and the Confederates were so unmolested as to be able to pick up from the extensive field over which the fight had raged sixty-seven hundred muskets and large quantities of camp equipage and other property. In the fight of the first day they had captured and secured ten pieces of artillery. As there were no wagons available, these small arms were carried away by cavalry on their horses, which indicates the leisurely manner in which it was done. The Southern troops withdrew to their camps, not by reason of any pressure from the enemy, but because there was no reason for remaining longer after the omission of G. W. Smith to renew the battle and the collection of their trophies. The contemporaneous report of Pickett shows the deliberate manner in which they withdrew. He says:

"General Hill gave me special orders to cover the withdrawal of the troops with my brigade, which, by the way, proved a much easier task than I anticipated. I had formed my line of battle—two regiments on each side of the road—some little distance in our rear of the redoubt. The whole of our force filed past by half an hour after sunrise. I then leisurely moved off, not a Yankee in sight, or even a puff of smoke."

This is corroborated by the statement of General Casey. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War he says: "The enemy retained possession of my works until Monday morning, and then evacuated them and retreated. No one drove them out."

General Johnston always firmly believed that, if he had not been wounded, he would have been able on the next day to make Seven Pines a decisive victory. On his right, but five of the thirteen brigades of Hill, Huger, and Longstreet had been engaged, and these had driven

three Federal divisions to their third line. On the left, but four of the ten brigades of Smith and Magruder had been in action. In addition, the Confederates had advanced so far under Longstreet that they had separated the troops of Sumner from those of Keyes and Heintzelman, so that they were in position to hold the former in check and fall upon the latter, or *vice versa*, as was thought best. Though the Federals on the Confederate right had not all been engaged, those who had been in action had gotten enough of it. Casey was completely used up, and the testimony of Heintzelman before the Committee on the Conduct of the War indicates that the division of Couch was not to be trusted. He says (page 352):

“That day, after the enemy gave way, I gave orders to pursue them. Casey’s division was utterly broken up. Some of the regiments behaved very gallantly, but after they gave way none of them could be rallied; and Couch’s division was a little shaky. When Kearney found out that I had ordered the troops to advance he came to me and begged me to stop. He asked me where my supports were, and I pointed to them. He asked me if I had full confidence in them. I said ‘No.’ He said I had better let well enough alone.”

An advance against these troops by the fresh brigades of Johnston would in all probability have been successful. That they were not in communication with Sumner is shown by the following extract from the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War (page 22): “There was no communication (on June 1st) between the forces under General Sumner and those under General Heintzelman (Hooker’s), but each fought as he deemed best under the circumstances.”

General Sumner testifies (as to June 1st) on page 363: “There was fighting on the same day on my left

by a portion of General Heintzelman's troops; but that was at such a distance that I have myself no knowledge of the circumstances. There was no communication at that time between us."

General G. W. Smith, who occupies toward Seven Pines the same position which General Beauregard holds to Shiloh—being responsible for the failure to reap the legitimate fruits of the first day's operations—has in various late writings contended that nothing more could have been done on the second day if Johnston had been in command; and that the Northern forces were united on the morning of June 1st, instead of being divided, as claimed by Johnston. The above quotations from Northern authorities ought to settle this latter question, and it needs but little fancy to predict how such an advantage would have resulted if properly utilized. General Pickett says in his official report, speaking of June 1st:

"About this time I learned that General Pryor's brigade was being withdrawn from my right. I had in the meantime sent all my staff and couriers back to General Hill, the last message being that if he would send more troops and some ammunition to me we would drive the enemy across the Chickahominy; and I have always believed this would have been done but for the misfortune which happened to our general on the previous evening. Had he not been wounded and been on the field with us, the result would have been entirely different. I do not mean to cast any blame on the brave and heroic Hill, for after the fall of the master spirit there seemed to be no head, and Hill, I know, was bothered and amazed with countermanding orders."

Johnston, in his official report, criticised Huger for not making the flank attack on the left. This was based on the official report of Longstreet, who was in immediate command, and whose report the commander in chief

would naturally adopt unless shown to be incorrect. Huger, thinking that injustice had been done him, took exception to this statement, and the result was a correspondence which is printed in full in vol. xi, part 1, page 935 *et seq.* of the Official War Records. Huger contends that if his division did not go into action it was because Longstreet, who was in chief command there, did not order them forward. Whatever the merits of this issue may be as between Huger and Longstreet, the orders of Johnston to Huger, published in this correspondence, show that his wishes were plain enough. The first, after designating the route which Huger was to take—the Charles City road—concludes :

“Be ready, if an action should be begun on your left, to fall upon the enemy’s right flank.”

The second, evidently dictated by the idea that perhaps the first had not allowed as much discretion as a division commander might expect, simply modified the first to the extent of saying that this movement against the Federal left should not be undertaken in the face of too strong an opposing force. It concluded :

“If you find no strong body in your front, it will be well to aid General Hill; but then a strong reserve should be retained to cover our right.”

These orders indicate that it was Johnston’s intention that Huger should turn the Federal left, taking all proper precautions against being turned himself. If it was not done, whether Longstreet or Huger was the party in fault, Johnston’s plan was certainly not carried out. In this battle the entire Confederate army, engaged and unengaged, numbered, according to Johnston’s estimate, 73,928.*

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. ii, p. 209. The Northern army on the same date numbered 98,008.

The three Federal corps engaged numbered, according to their return of May 31, 1862, 51,543 present for duty. The four Confederate divisions engaged were those of Smith, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Huger. According to the return of May 21, 1862, the strength of Smith was 10,592, that of Longstreet 13,816, and that of D. H. Hill (deducting Crump's brigade and Ward's command detached) was 9,474. The strength of Huger, according to Johnston's estimate, was about 7,000. Hence the combined strength of the Confederate troops engaged was 40,882.

According to the tables in the Official War Records, the Confederate loss in the battle was 6,134, and the Northern loss was 5,031. But there has always been something peculiar about the losses in this battle. Since the war the Confederate loss has been constantly growing and the Federal loss diminishing. Although the latter has now been reduced to 5,031, McClellan originally reported it at 5,739. On June 4th he wrote to the President:

"I have to be very cautious now. Our loss in the late battle will probably exceed five thousand. I have not yet full returns. On account of the effect it might have on our own men and the enemy, I request that you will regard this information as confidential for a few days."*

On the same day he wrote to the Secretary of War:

"The losses in the battle of the 31st and 1st will amount to seven thousand. Regard this as confidential for the present."†

On the other hand, there has been some mystery about the Confederate returns of loss. In the original report of Longstreet, as made to Johnston, the loss of

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 386.

† Ibid., p. 386.

the troops under him is stated at about three thousand, which was after the report of Dr. Cullen, his surgeon in chief, had been filed, for that report is mentioned in Longstreet's report. After the original was sent to Johnston a summary of the loss seems to have been added to the copy retained, it nowhere appears by whom. The loss on the left was twelve hundred and eighty-three.*

Even if the Confederate loss was the greater, it was not as much greater as in the Seven Days' battles, which McClellan alone considers a Northern triumph. The contemporaneous telegrams to Sumner, allaying his fears of an attack, and the testimony of Heintzelman, showing that Sumner, the leader of the relief force, was himself calling for aid, do not indicate any very great elation. The elation was only manifested when the Southern troops had withdrawn to their camps in consequence of the wounding of the commander, and free from pursuit. It is true that General Hooker in his report graphically describes a bayonet charge by his troops, when "the enemy were thrown into wild confusion, throwing away their arms, hats, and coats, and broke through the forest in the direction of Richmond." It is also true that General Sickles in his report claims to have picked up Enfield rifles marked "Tower, 1862," and muskets marked "Virginia," and other stores. But when the reports of these two officers are read, the Chancellorsville campaign and their dispatches then irresistibly rise to the mind. After that great disaster Hooker did not hesitate to issue an address to his army congratulating it on a victory; and during the operations

* On the subject of this alteration of the original report of Longstreet, see General Johnston's letter, published in vol. iv, p. 42, of the Southern Historical Society Papers.

he telegraphed to Sedgwick that the Confederates were "flying, trying to save their trains," and on that occasion also it was Sickles who was "among them."*

The experience of these officers at Seven Pines no more justifies such statements than their exploits at Chancellorsville. If Sickles picked up any small arms at Seven Pines, they must have been inferior arms exchanged during the fight by the Confederates for the better muskets of their foes, and could not have been very numerous, for D. H. Hill had already gleaned the field. Sickles, at all events, did not pick up ten pieces of artillery and four regimental colors.

The mere loss of men is no indication of the result of a battle. The victors may lose the greater number and still be entitled to the palm of victory. When Marlborough gained the fight at Malplaquet, capturing the French intrenchments, no one denied him the honors of success because his loss was greater. Those are the victors who capture the field and hold it till they retire of their own volition. A defending army is the victor when it stops the advance of its foe. After Seven Pines McClellan did not once jeopardize Richmond by any forward movement. After it few additional troops of his ever crossed the Chickahominy. Seven Pines made the Seven Days possible.

Seven Pines and Shiloh may well be considered counterparts. The one was the first great contest in the East, the other in the West. In each a Johnston boldly changed to the offensive and moved forward to drive his foe back upon a difficult river. In each the Southern chief was struck down at the head of his men, and their successors failed to follow up the plans of their predecessors. In each the fighting on both sides was worthy

* Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*, p. 284.

of veterans, and the losses such as even veterans are not supposed to be capable of enduring. In each the result, was to restore confidence to the Confederates and to convince them of their final triumph, despite the disasters of Donelson and New Orleans. The young nation, buoyant with hope, could again look the world in the face, confiding in the prowess of her troops and the gallantry of generals who led the van and taught their undisciplined soldiery by personal example how to charge, and, if need be, how to die.

CHAPTER XI.

TENNESSEE.

WHEN Johnston was struck by the shell, the severity of the blow deprived him of consciousness, which did not return till he was placed upon a stretcher; and the first thing he observed was that his sword and pistols were missing. It was his father's Revolutionary sword, which he greatly prized, and he valued the pistols scarcely less, for they had been a present to him from Colonel Colt, their inventor. On his expressing deep regret at their loss, several of his soldiers volunteered to hunt them up on the field. They were found by Drury L. Armistead, one of his couriers, at much personal risk. In appreciation of such devotion one of the pistols was presented to him.

The day after his injury Johnston was borne to the house of Mr. Crenshaw, on Church Hill, in Richmond, followed by the anxious prayers of his army and the entire South. His wound was exceptionally painful, the fragment of shell having broken several ribs, inducing a constant tendency of his lungs to adhere to his side, and continually threatening pleurisy. During the exciting period of the Seven Days' battles he was within hearing of the sound of the conflict, chafing, a second *Ivanhoe* in the besieged castle, at lying like a bedridden monk, while the game that gave him freedom or death was being played by the hand of others. The many kind

messages and visits of his friends and admirers, and the cheering news of the advantages each day won by the gallant army to whose formation he had devoted so much of his wonderful genius for organization, and which he hoped in no distant future to lead again to victory, enabled him to endure his sufferings with even more than the constancy to which previous experiences of the same nature had educated him. To friends who bore intelligence of re-enforcements which the Government was at length hurrying to Richmond, he expressed gratification at being wounded; for, said he, Lee had been enabled to make them do what they would not do for him. Only in that providential way did it seem possible to carry out the policy of concentration which he himself had so often and so strenuously urged.

Among the many kind expressions of concern at his wound, the following, couched in the terms of modesty which the great leader of the Army of Northern Virginia invariably used in underestimating his own talents, was specially gratifying:

“NEAR RICHMOND, *June 2, 1862.*

“MY DEAR MRS. JOHNSTON: I am so grieved at the general's wound, on his account, yours, and the country's. I heard of it on the field, but he was carried from it before I could get to him. I called at his quarters on my way back to the city at night, afterward sent to the Spottswood, but I could hear nothing of him. I was very glad yesterday to hear Dr. Gibson's report of him, and trust he may only suffer temporary inconvenience. You must soon cure him. In the meantime the President has thought it necessary that I should take his place. I wish I was able, or that his mantle had fallen on an abler man. Remember me kindly to him, and tell him he has

my sincere sympathy. Please, when you can, let me know how he recovers.

“Very truly and faithfully yours,

“R. E. LEE.”*

The convalescence was very gradual. He was not able to ride on horseback until November. In a private letter written on November 7th he says: “For the past week I have been taking regular exercise on horseback. My other occupation is blistering myself, to which habit hasn’t yet reconciled me.”

As soon as he reached this stage of improvement he reported again for duty, though scarcely fit for service. His natural desire was to be placed again at the head of the old army, to which he was greatly attached, and where he might carry out his original plans for the pro-

* The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, by Jefferson Davis, quotations from his writings in the Memoir recently published by his widow, and indeed all of his productions since the war, have abounded in criticisms of General Johnston. Every operation with which the latter was connected, from the evacuation of Harper’s Ferry to the end of the war, is either directly criticised or “damned with faint praise.” That this unfavorable estimate is due to prejudices arising from subsequent differences, and was not the real opinion of the President at the time, is manifest from a private letter to his wife written June 23, 1862, and published in vol. ii, p. 314, of her Memoir. In it Mr. Davis says: “General J. E. Johnston is steadily and rapidly improving. I wish he were able to take the field. Despite the critics, who know military affairs by instinct, he is a good soldier, never brags of what he did do, and could at this time render most valuable service.”

If he had then thought that Johnston was in fault for not pursuing after Manassas, or for abandoning stores in the retreat from Centreville, or for loss of supplies at Yorktown, or for bad manœuvring previous to and at Seven Pines, or for numerous other matters censured in these late productions, he would not have written thus. That contemporaneous letter gives his real private opinion of Johnston, and is an effectual reply to his subsequent strictures.

tection of his native State from invasion. This he was encouraged to expect from the language of Lee's first assignment to the command of that army, which was expressly spoken of as temporary. Nor did it occur to him that the reward of a leader's gallantry for being felled by hostile shot at the head of his advancing forces would be a deprivation of command. That Lee himself expected Johnston's restoration to the command in Virginia, and would have been the last man in the South to oppose it, or to stand between him and his old army if the Government had contemplated such a restoration, is evident from the letter of June 2d, given *supra*, and also from the following, written when Johnston had so far recovered that it was known he would soon be ready for duty :

"CAMP NEAR CULPEPER COURT HOUSE, *November 11, 1862.*

"MY DEAR GENERAL : I have regretted so much my inability to visit you when in Richmond that I can not refrain from expressing it. I wished to see you on many accounts ; first, in the hope of satisfying myself of your comfort and improvement in health, and next to consult with you as to the condition of this army and its operations for the winter. I wish you were again able to take the field, for I do not think it could be in better hands than yours. . . .

"With high esteem and respect, I remain, dear General, very truly yours,

R. E. LEE."

But during his retirement the army, whose *personnel* had been largely changed by the heavy re-enforcements brought up to repair its losses and to swell its numbers, had under Lee emblazoned on its banners the victories of the Seven Days and second Manassas, had invaded Maryland, held in check its old Peninsular antagonists,

and still faced them in northern Virginia ; and the sentiment of the country was unfavorable to the change ; but from the West and South the universal cry was that the Valley of the Mississippi should be defended by Joseph E. Johnston. What might have been the historical result if he had been retained in Virginia, and if Lee had been sent to the West, each sustained by the Government, as Lee was always sustained and as Johnston never was, it is idle now to speculate. It does not detract from General Lee's great renown to assert that the career of that gallant army under Johnston would not have been less brilliant, and that its noble rank and file would have followed him as devotedly as it followed Lee. It is yet more certain that with Lee in charge of the Western armies, supported by the moral power of the Government, the inferior men who under Johnston were sustained and encouraged in their insubordination would have been influenced to do their duty, and the disasters which sundered and eventually overthrew the Confederacy might have been averted. With Johnston in Virginia, there might have been no Gettysburg ; with Lee in Mississippi, there might have been no Vicksburg.

General Johnston was assigned to the Western command by Special Order No. 275, dated November 24, 1862. Its material portions are as follows :

“General J. E. Johnston, C. S. Army, is hereby assigned to the following geographical command, to wit : Commencing with the Blue Ridge range of mountains running through the western portion of North Carolina, and following the line of said mountains through the northern part of Georgia to the railroad south from Chattanooga ; thence by that road to West Point, and down the west or right bank of the Chattahoochee River to the boundary of Alabama and Florida ; following that boundary west to the Choctawhatchee River, and down

that river to Choctawhatchee Bay (including the waters of that bay) to the Gulf of Mexico.

"General Johnston will, for the purpose of correspondence and reports, establish his headquarters at Chattanooga, or such other place as in his judgment will best secure facilities for ready communication with the troops within the limits of his command, and will repair in person to any part of said command whenever his presence may for the time be necessary or desirable."

A perusal of this order indicates that it was well termed a "geographical command." It did not assign him to the leadership of any specific army, but to an immense domain, containing different armies with different objects, his only power being to detach troops from one to the other—a useless authority, since each was outnumbered by its own foe, and all were too far separated to render it practicable to detach thus in time to afford mutual succor. Nor could he take command of one of these armies without the unpleasantness of superseding its immediate commander—an act which generosity to his subordinates forbade. The two largest of these armies were commanded by Generals Bragg and Pemberton, both well-known *protégés* of the President, the former always quarreling with his inferior generals, the latter a man who had been raised to the next highest grade in the Confederate service without having participated in any signal achievement, and without having made any impression at any place to which his previous assignments had called him. Johnston's position, in brief, was simply that of a scapegoat, on whom the delinquencies of the President's favorites might be placed in case of disaster.*

* That Pemberton had not won the confidence of the people is evident from the letter of Hon. James Phelan to Mr. Davis, dated

His own opinion of the difficulties of the situation was well expressed in a letter to a near relative, written at the time, in which he says: "Never was a general in a more unsatisfactory position than that assigned to me. A sort of supervisory command of three departments, each too weak to take care of itself; of course, therefore, they can not help each other, being all pressed or threatened by greatly superior numbers. Each department has its peculiar commander. The object of the Government was to have some one at hand to unite the forces in Mississippi and Tennessee, in whichever might be first attacked. To transfer any body of troops of useful number would require at least a month; yet the Government seems to have intended to operate in Napoleon's manner without considering the difference between the extent of front upon which he manœuvred and the distance from Tullahoma to Vicksburg. Yet the President had a lesson in December which should have taught something. When Pemberton was falling

December 9, 1862, and published in vol. xvii, pt. 2, p. 788, of the Official War Records. In it he says:

"Pemberton has not impressed himself either upon the people or the army; while the flank movement from Friar's Point, by which his retreat was forced, and which, it is declared, might have been prevented, has dealt a staggering blow upon those who desired to brace him with the public confidence."

He was so conscious of the secret support of the President against his superior that he never treated Johnston with the consideration which was his due. As late as April, Colonel W. P. Johnston, in his written report to the President of the result of a tour of inspection, says: "General Johnston wished your attention called to the fact that the limits of his department embraced two armies that could not co-operate; and that he receives no intelligence from General Pemberton, who ignores his authority, is mortified at his command over him, and receives his suggestions with coldness or opposition. The distance prevents his giving orders."—Official War Records, vol. xxiii, pt. 2, p. 761.

back in Mississippi, he transferred three brigades to his army from Bragg's. They arrived in Mississippi after Grant had been compelled to fall back by our cavalry operating in his rear. But, while they were on the way, Rosecrans attacked Bragg at Murfreesboro. So these troops left Tennessee too soon, and reached Mississippi too late—a sort of thing that may always happen when it is expected that armies a month apart shall re-enforce each other on emergencies.”

Johnston had been informed of his proposed assignment before the actual issue of the order. Being invited to a conference with the Secretary of War, Mr. Randolph, he proposed that, as the defense of the Mississippi Valley was an object common to the Southern armies on both sides of the river, they ought to be under the same direction. The army under Holmes, in Arkansas, was represented as very numerous, and then was threatened with no foe. He suggested that these troops be transferred to the East and joined to those of Pemberton, thus forming an army superior to Grant. This junction might enable them to destroy the latter, and then, uniting with Bragg, in Tennessee, overwhelm Rosecrans. The Secretary, in response to this, showed him a letter to Holmes, giving these identical orders, and then a letter from the President countermanding them. Mr. Randolph resigned a few days afterward, and Mr. Seddon succeeded him. Receiving the order of assignment on the day of its date, Johnston repeated the suggestion in the following letter, which thus early in the campaign sounded a warning note of the peril to Vicksburg:

“SIR: I had the honor this afternoon to receive Special Orders No. 275, of this date.

“If I have been correctly informed, the forces which it places under my command are greatly inferior in number to those of the enemy opposed to them, while

in the Trans-Mississippi Department our army is very much larger than that of the United States. Our two armies on this side of the Mississippi have the further disadvantage of being separated by the Tennessee, and a Federal army (that of Major-General Grant) larger probably than either of them. Under such circumstances it seems to me that our best course would be to fall upon Major-General Grant with the troops of Lieutenant-Generals Holmes and Pemberton, united for the purpose, those of General Bragg co-operating if practicable.

“The defeat of Major-General Grant would enable us to hold the Mississippi, and permit Lieutenant-General Holmes to move into Missouri. As our troops are now distributed Vicksburg is in danger.”

This idea of combining the action of the forces in the river valley for the attainment of their common object is repeatedly referred to during the winter and spring by Johnston; it resulted in nothing but suggestions to Holmes, never in positive orders. The Government could not be induced to order any forces across the Mississippi, the acme of its strategy being to detach troops from Bragg and send them to Pemberton, or *vice versa*, in spite of their distance apart and the impossibility of acting together.

Johnston started at once for his new department, but on account of the poor management of Southern railroads he did not reach Chattanooga till December 4th. There he found a telegram from General Cooper informing him that the enemy had begun to move upon Pemberton, who was falling back before them, and suggesting that Bragg should be ordered to re-enforce Pemberton. To this he replied that the retrograde of Pemberton was daily facilitating a junction with Holmes and impeding one with Bragg, the latter being, more-

over, separated from Pemberton by the enemy, and that, of the two, Holmes could be more certainly counted upon. It would seem very clear that if Grant could not overtake Pemberton, Bragg, far behind him, could not. On the following day, having reached Bragg's headquarters and received information as to forces, position, and plans, as to which he was till then ignorant, he again wrote, advising that the effect of any large detachment from Bragg would be to give up Tennessee and possibly disorganize his army, enabling Rosecrans to move into Virginia or to join Grant.

While at Bragg's headquarters he was called by telegram to Chattanooga to meet the President, who had decided that nothing would set matters straight in the West but his own presence. On his consulting Johnston as to the expediency of withdrawing troops from the Army of Tennessee, the latter repeated his advice against it; but the President, not satisfied with this, proceeded to Bragg's headquarters and ordered the detachment to Mississippi of about nine thousand men, consisting of Stevenson's division and a part of McCown's. Long before that detachment reached its destination the movement of Grant, which it was to aid in repelling, had come to grief. Van Dorn had reached the Federal rear and destroyed all their supplies at Holly Springs, necessitating an expeditious retreat.

The President and Johnston proceeded together to Mississippi, visiting Jackson and then Vicksburg. After an inspection of the fortifications and the delivery of an oration or two, the President returned to Richmond, but not before Johnston had again, both orally and in writing, urged him to unite Holmes and Pemberton, and not to weaken Bragg.

The result of the President's strategy was soon apparent. It has been seen that the detachment from

Bragg did not reach Pemberton in time to assist in repelling Grant. It had taken three weeks to reach Mississippi even without its stores and artillery, and by that time the need for it had passed. But its departure at once brought on a crisis in Tennessee, for Rosecrans had no sooner heard of it than he advanced upon Bragg, and the result was the battle of Murfreesboro, or Stone River.

This battle was fought on the first two days of the year 1863. The Federal strength was about forty-three thousand actually engaged, and that of the Confederates about thirty-seven thousand. In the outset the latter were successful, overwhelming the Federal right and capturing many prisoners and trophies.

On the second day the attempt to follow up the success by the assault of Breckinridge, though splendid in its gallantry, was met with equal valor and repulsed with heavy loss. The Confederates held their ground all the third day, when Bragg, having reason to believe that Rosecrans was receiving large re-enforcements, withdrew to Tullahoma. The total Confederate loss, according to the official returns, was 9,865, and the total Federal loss 13,249.

The Confederates captured thirty pieces of artillery, losing three of their own in Breckinridge's repulse, and many thousand small arms, in addition to large numbers of wagons and other military stores. Thus, even with their diminished forces, they at least were not defeated. Had the troops sent to Mississippi been retained with Bragg, as Johnston advised, their presence on the field might have insured a decisive victory. The only effect of this act of the President in transferring this large body from Bragg to Pemberton, despite the remonstrances of Johnston, was eventually to swell the number of the Vicksburg prisoners.

This act of the President in weakening Bragg's army when it needed aid, and in strengthening Pemberton's when strengthening was unnecessary, was not only in the teeth of Johnston's protest, but of Bragg's as well. In a letter to Johnston, dated January 11, 1863, and published in volume xx, part 2, pages 492, 493, of the Official War Records, Bragg says, *inter alia* :

"The unfortunate withdrawal of my troops when they were not absolutely necessary elsewhere has saved Rosecrans from destruction. Five thousand fresh troops as a reserve on the first day's battle would have finished the glorious work. I told the President, Grant's campaign would be broken up by our cavalry expeditions in his rear before Stevenson's command could meet him in front; but he was inexorable, and reduced me to the defensive, or, as he expressed it, 'Fight if you can, and fall back beyond the Tennessee.'"

After the battle of Murfreesboro, Bragg, who had heard of the feeling of his subordinates toward him, addressed them a circular letter which elicited replies from Breckinridge, Hardee, Polk, and Cleburne, all frankly and unequivocally telling him that in their judgment he had lost the confidence of the army. These letters were forwarded to Richmond, and Polk added a private letter to the President, advising him to transfer Bragg to some other field, which concluded thus :

"I think, too, that the best thing to be done in supplying his place would be to give his command to General Joseph E. Johnston. He will cure all discontent, and inspire the army with new life and confidence. He is here on the spot, and I am sure will be content to take it. If General Lee can command the principal army in his department in person, there is no reason why General Johnston should not. I have therefore, as a general officer of this army speaking in behalf of my associates, to ask

respectfully that this appointment be made ; and I beg to be permitted to do this urgently. The state of this army demands immediate attention, and its position before the enemy, as well as the mind of its troops and commanders, could find relief in no way so readily as by the appointment of General Joseph E. Johnston."

On hearing of this discontent Mr. Davis telegraphed to Johnston, who was then at Mobile inspecting its defenses, to proceed to Bragg's headquarters, where he would find a letter of explanation. On arrival there he found a letter from the President, dated January 22d, informing him of this feeling against Bragg, but expressing unabated confidence in that officer, and desiring him to decide what the best interests of the service required, and say what was best to be done. Without directly ordering or requesting him to assume command, but apparently intending to throw on Johnston himself the responsibility for such a step if taken, the letter concluded by reminding him that he had the right under his original assignment to direct its operations.

The President could not have adopted a more effectual method of preventing Johnston from taking command of the Army of Tennessee, and of indefinitely securing his favorite's retention. Such a suggestion implied that Johnston was capable of removing a commander from the head of his army in order to make a place for himself. It assumed that he would be willing to act as a judge, and to render judgment in his own favor. It had the further effect of placing Johnston in a situation where he would be practically compelled to sustain Bragg ; for, though every one knew that he was above electing himself to the command of an army, and that he would never assume it of his own motion, the whole country was loudly demanding of the Government that he should be assigned to that army ; and the army

itself desired it. To have reported adversely to Bragg would have exposed himself to the charge of indirectly encouraging this feeling, with the hope of rising on the ruined reputation of a brother soldier. General Johnston was incapable of such a motive. His first letter to the President, after having made inquiries as to the condition and spirits of the troops, commended Bragg for his recent operations in generous terms, and concluded:

"After seeing all the troops I shall write again. I respectfully suggest that, should it then appear to you necessary to remove General Bragg, no one in this army or engaged in this investigation ought to be his successor."

About a week after this letter, having heard that Polk and Hardee had advised the President to place him in immediate charge of Bragg's army, he writes again:

"I have been told by Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hardee that they have advised you to remove General Bragg and place me in command of this army. I am sure that you will agree with me that the part that I have borne in this investigation would render it inconsistent with my personal honor to occupy that position."

He bestowed nearly a month on this inquiry, and concluded it by advising against the removal of Bragg, and by crediting to him the fine condition in which he found the army. At the time his action in the matter was highly appreciated by Bragg, who expressed his obligations in grateful terms. In a letter to Colonel B. S. Ewell, of General Johnston's staff, written from Tulahoma on February 27, 1863, Bragg attributed the feeling against him to a "few disappointed generals," and added: "They have failed, mainly owing to the discrimination and just conception of your noble chief, who saw at a glance the whole bearing."

After the close of this inquiry into the condition of

the army and the capacity of its commander, Johnston resumed the supervision of his extensive department, having failed in the request to be assigned to different duty.*

The only military operations of note during this period

* Nothing can better illustrate Johnston's generosity toward his subordinates than the following letter written to Davis just after the return of the latter from his Mississippi trip to Richmond, in which he endeavors to secure an assignment of a different character from that under which he was then chafing:

"You were so beset while in Jackson that I had no opportunity to speak to you fully of my military position.

"The distance between the two theatres of operation, and the different objects of the two armies in my command, make it impossible for me to exercise any general control. I must either take the immediate direction of one of these armies, thus for a time superseding its proper commander—which, I believe, was not intended—or be idle, except on the rare occasions when it might be expedient to transfer troops from one army to the other. In the first contingency I should deprive an officer in whom you have confidence of the command for which you have selected him, which I believe was not intended, which would produce a discontent that would interfere with the cordial co-operation so necessary with probability of corresponding. In the second, I should generally be a distant spectator of the services of my comrades—a position which would inevitably disgrace me. I have already lost much time from service, and therefore can ill afford to be inactive at any time during the remainder of the war. I am anxious to earn by labor at least some part of the confidence you and the people of Mississippi repose in me.

"With these views I respectfully and earnestly beg some other position which may give me better opportunity to render such service as I may be capable of.

"Lieutenant-General Pemberton certainly conducted operations at Vicksburg with skill and vigor—the enemy was repulsed with four times our loss. Prisoners report that F. P. Blair's brigade suffered specially.

"This might be attended with greater injustice—it might give me the fruits due to the capacity of the local commanders."

In a letter to the President, written March 2, 1863, in reply to one

were cavalry affairs. The most remarkable of these was Wheeler's raid, in February, which played havoc with the Federal communications and supplies near Nashville. This expedition even surrounded and captured a gun-boat, thus surpassing the exploits of the French cavalry

from the President of February 19, 1863 (the President's letter is published in vol. xxiii, pt. 2, p. 640, O. W. R., but Johnston's reply does not seem to be), on the subject of superseding Bragg, he says:

"I fear that it would be difficult to find a successor to General Bragg equal to him in all respects—especially now, when the season for active operations is so near that the successor might not be allowed time to learn well the theatre of operations before the enemy's attack, and therefore regret very much that you think that the impaired confidence of the superior officers in his fitness to command makes his removal necessary. I can not think that troops who seem so full of spirit, and who, their superior officers say, are full of confidence, can much doubt the capacity of their general. Besides a strong belief in his capacity, the injustice he endures from the country impels me to wish that you may find it expedient not to remove General Bragg. Should you do so, however, he will confirm the opinion you express of his disinterested patriotism.

"I apprehend from some passages of your letter that I have not fully understood my position here. I thought that it was not intended that I should assume immediate command at any time of either of the three departments; and having so expressed myself in writing to you early in January without being corrected, I was thus confirmed in my belief. It seems to me that the exercise of such authority, except in rare cases, would operate badly, unless the officer exercising it should be greatly superior to those commanding the departments. Those officers, having studied and kept up with all the military circumstances, would be more competent to command at an important juncture than one just arrived. They could not be expected to serve with full zeal or interest if liable to be deprived, by my arrival at the last moment, of the fruits of long labor. The injustice to the department commanders was suggested to me by your objection to the bill creating the office of General in Chief, which empowered that officer to take command of any of our armies whenever he thought proper. This you thought would be unjust to the officer so superseded. The distance between these armies is so great, and each so near the enemy, that we can not

in capturing the Dutch fleet in 1795; for the French had firm ice on which to approach their prey—an advantage which was denied to Wheeler.

On March 9th, while Johnston was at Mobile completing the labors which had been interrupted by his long sojourn with Bragg's army, he received the following telegram from the Secretary of War:

"Order General Bragg to report to the War Department here for conference. Assume yourself direct charge of the army in middle Tennessee."

Replying from Mobile, he again advised against attempting to transfer troops from Mississippi to Tennessee on account of the time required, adding very forcibly that these departments were more distant from each other in time than eastern Virginia and middle Tennessee; and reiterated his views against detaching from Bragg's army, which was then too weak to confidently oppose its adversary, and might be compromised by further detachments. He at once repaired to Tennessee, arriving at Tullahoma on the 18th, and found Bragg closely occupied with his wife, who was critically ill; whereupon he telegraphed the fact to the Secretary of War, and stated that on that account he would not at once communicate the Secretary's order to him, or announce himself as in direct command. But he assumed the duties of commander during the time that Bragg was

learn where the need is greatest until it is past. I could not have reached Murfreesboro in time for the battle if I had attempted to do so after the enemy advanced; but if I had, it would have been a great hazard for me to have taken the command from General Bragg, who had studied and learned the situation."

A perusal of the official correspondence, as now published, will show that during this entire campaign Johnston never mentioned either Bragg or Pemberton except in terms of compliment, and never superseded either of his own motion.

kept at the bedside of his wife, though in that interregnum no active operations were in progress.

At this time his own health became very precarious, rendering it necessary that he should put himself in charge of a surgeon, for his wound was again troubling him; and it was almost impossible to bear the motion of a horse, the only manner in which generals could attend to their duties in the South. History tells of a Saxe campaigning in a carriage, and of a Massena directing the movements of the French left at Wagram from a coach; but if they had attempted such locomotion over a Southern road in winter and early spring, their campaigns would soon have come to an abrupt termination.

On account of continued ill-health he found it necessary, on April 10th, to write to Richmond reporting his disability and requesting that Bragg be allowed to remain in Tennessee.

As Pemberton's telegrams up to this time had rather indicated that Grant's operations against Vicksburg were not meeting with much success, and that the latter was even about to re-enforce Rosecrans, Johnston remained in Tennessee, as the most probable scene of important operations, and repeatedly urged that Bragg should be strengthened as much as possible. In fact, the positive orders of the Government sending him in the first instance to investigate Bragg, and in the next place to temporarily supersede him, left him no choice but to remain in Tennessee, if he had desired to go to Mississippi. But in the latter part of April Grant made the transfer to the south of Vicksburg, from which he subsequently operated, fought the battle of Fort Gibson, and commenced his manœuvres for surrounding Pemberton. The latter at once began calling for re-enforcements, and Johnston reported his calls to the War Department, with repeated

warnings that they could not be sent from Bragg without giving up Tennessee.

The Government, moved by Pemberton's alarming dispatches, and justly considering that the crisis was now transferred from Tennessee to Mississippi, wired Johnston (May 9th) to proceed at once to Mississippi and assume the chief command, taking with him three thousand good troops of Bragg's army. In the same telegram he was informed that re-enforcements from Beauregard's department had already been ordered, and that more might be expected. Johnston at once replied that he would go immediately, though unfit for field service. Till then he had remained in Tennessee for the reasons above mentioned; though in his anomalous position it was in any event a mere choice of evils whether to remain there or in Mississippi, for he did not claim to be able to command two remote armies. Under this order he repaired at once to Mississippi.

CHAPTER XII.

INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG.

GRANT's operations against Vicksburg may be said to have commenced on November 2, 1862, when he telegraphed to his Government that he had commenced a movement on Grand Junction with troops from Corinth and Bolivar, and that, if practicable, he would go to Holly Springs, and possibly to Grenada. At that time his force was distributed along the Mobile and Ohio, Mississippi Central, and Memphis and Charleston Railroads in northern Mississippi and southwestern Tennessee, and Pemberton was facing him along the line of the Tallahatchee. He soon reached Holly Springs, which he made his base of supplies. His Government, sustaining him with all its resources and doing for him what the Southern Government would not do for Johnston, organized an expedition from the Federal troops in Arkansas to co-operate with him, which reached the railroad in Pemberton's rear, doing it some damage, and causing Pemberton to fall back to the line of the Yalabusha. These manœuvres consumed the month of November, which was before Johnston had reached the West.

As part of his scheme, Grant organized an expedition under Sherman to descend the Mississippi and endeavor to slip into Vicksburg while he himself detained Pemberton on the Yalabusha. It was not his intention to drive Pemberton back if he could help it, since that would have defeated the object of Sherman's journey.

This plan was frustrated by Van Dorn, who succeeded in reaching Grant's rear, destroyed his supplies at Holly Springs, captured its garrison, and cut off all communication between him and the North for several days, which necessitated a retrograde movement. Owing to the break in his communications, Grant was unable to countermand Sherman's orders, and the latter went forward with a force of over thirty thousand men and landed at Chickasaw Bluffs on the Yazoo. Meanwhile Pemberton had been able to strengthen the small Confederate force at Vicksburg, so that the brigades of S. D. Lee, Vaughn, Barton, and Gregg held the very strong position which Sherman would be obliged to carry before he could attain his object. These four brigades aggregated about eight thousand men, but their formidable position multiplied their strength.*

On December 29th Sherman assaulted, but was repulsed with a loss of seventeen hundred and seventy-six, the Confederates losing only two hundred and seven. Thus ended this threatening move upon Vicksburg.

The result of the failure was that Grant took personal charge of the river operations, and decided to adopt that line for his future approaches. He secured the formal assignment to his command of the troops on the west side of the river, thus utilizing against Vicks-

* The strength of Vaughn, Gregg, and Barton, taken from the return of January 2, 1863, given in vol. xvii, pt. 2, p. 824, of the Official War Records, with that of Lee taken from the return of January 9, 1863, and published on p. 831 of the same volume, will aggregate not quite eight thousand men. It is difficult to get the strength of Lee from the return on p. 825, it not being clear which organizations belonged to his brigade. If everything is included as belonging to his brigade down to the name of General Gregg, it was over five thousand strong—nearly double the strength given on January 9th, only a week afterward.

burg the forces opposing those which Johnston so often and vainly tried to have sent to aid in its defense.

Grant arrived at Young's Point, above Vicksburg, about the end of January, and transferred his army to encampments along the river north of the city and as near together as the condition of the country would admit. He then resorted to the spade, endeavoring to cut a canal across the bend in the river, so as to run by the guns of Vicksburg. Thereupon the Confederates established a battery so placed as to sweep the canal; and this, with a freshet, which broke his dams, caused a failure of this project.

During this experiment he sent McPherson to open, if possible, a navigable route by way of Lake Providence and connecting bayous to the Red River, hoping thus to dispense with that portion of the Mississippi near Vicksburg; but this attempt was also abandoned. He undertook, in addition, to approach Vicksburg by Moon Lake down the Tallahatchee and Yazoo, endeavoring to establish a base of supplies on the Yazoo that might be safe from Van Dorn and his troublesome dragoons; and he sent a strong force down the Tallahatchee for this purpose, which reached Fort Pemberton, located where the Tallahatchee and Yalabusha unite to form the Yazoo; but there its progress was arrested.

Nothing daunted by his failures, he next attempted to render navigable a route from the Mississippi, by way of Steel's bayou, into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton, but found too many Confederate sharpshooters along its course, and its channel too narrow and tortuous to render it practicable; and thus ended the attempt, as great a *fiasco* as the others. These geographical explorations occupied him until April. Their only result was to enable him to kill time and avoid the demoralization con-

sequent upon a withdrawal. They also demonstrated that he could not evade the difficulties inherent to his task; so he was compelled to act upon the maxim of Sir Boyle Roche, that "the only way to avoid danger is to meet it plump." In fact, General Grant states in his Memoirs that he did not expect these attempts to be successful, and that they were mainly undertaken "to consume time and to divert the attention of the enemy, the troops, and the public generally."

Convinced of this at last, and rendered but the more tenacious of purpose, he concentrated his troops at Milliken's Bend, prepared to inaugurate the transfer of operations to a point on the river below Vicksburg. For this purpose he would be forced to march his army down the river on the west side opposite the nearest practicable landing, and then to ferry it across. To accomplish this he would require the co-operation of the navy, which, with his transports, would be obliged to run the long gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries before reaching this point. He easily persuaded Admiral Porter, whose support of Grant was cordial and effective, to attempt this perilous voyage. On the night of April 16th the fleet got under way and succeeded in passing without serious damage. By the 27th of April two of his three corps—McClermand's and McPherson's—were in the neighborhood of Hard Times, not far from Grand Gulf. On the 22d another successful attempt to run the batteries had been devised and executed. On the 29th the Federal army endeavored to reduce the batteries at Grand Gulf, but without success, and a landing there became impracticable. Navy, transports, and barges then waited till night, ran the Grand Gulf batteries without injury, and on the morning of April 30th assisted in ferrying McClermand's corps and part of McPherson's across the river at Bruinsburg, and at last

established the Federal army on the same side of the river as Vicksburg.

While Grant himself was operating thus with two thirds of his army, he ordered Sherman, whose corps was still up the river, to make a demonstration on the Yazoo, his object being, as he says in his Memoirs, to induce Pemberton to keep as much force as possible about Vicksburg, and not to interfere with his landing. Sherman carried out these orders with intelligence, and with such success that Grant's debarkation was unopposed. In spite of the passage of a large fleet under his eyes, which could have but one object; in spite of the fact that Grant for a month had been gradually working southward along the west side of the river, which, with the hazardous attempt of the fleet, indicated beyond question what was the real design—Pemberton held his force in the immediate vicinity of Vicksburg, instead of meeting Grant with a concentrated army at the landing and driving him into the river. At first Grant had only twenty thousand men across, so that the story of Ball's Bluff might have been repeated on a grand scale had an Evans commanded the Southern troops. This undisturbed landing of Grant was the inauguration of the movement which crowned the Federal campaign against Vicksburg with success.

During the entire period Johnston was in Tennessee, occupied and necessarily kept there by the various duties imposed upon him by the Department, vainly protesting that he could not command two armies so far apart, and led to suppose from Pemberton's meager dispatches that Grant's operations, one after another, were proving failures, and that troops were to be sent from Mississippi to Rosecrans. From the time of his first assignment he had been communicating with Pemberton frequently, urging him to furnish full information

as to contemplated plans, but not with much success, judging from his letter of January, 1863, to Pemberton, and that of February 12, 1863, to Davis, in which he complains that "General Pemberton is not communicative." The absence of exciting reports from Pemberton, the critical appearance of affairs in Tennessee, and the necessity of placing himself under the care of a surgeon, rendered it impossible to repair to Mississippi, even if it had not apparently been useless.

The first care of Grant after landing was to compel the evacuation of Grand Gulf. With this view he advanced upon Port Gibson, which commanded the bridges across the Bayou Pierre, having with him McClernand's corps and part of McPherson's—in all probably twenty thousand men. Bowen met him about five miles west of Port Gibson, with a force slightly in excess of five thousand men, and on May 1st the battle of Port Gibson was fought. Bowen, though short of ammunition, resisted this strong force all day long, frequently repulsing their onslaughts and occasionally attacking himself, but was driven back about sundown, destroying the bridges. The Federal loss, according to official returns, was eight hundred and seventy-five, and the Confederate loss amounted to eight hundred and thirty-two; still the result of the action was to cause the evacuation of Grand Gulf, and to give Grant a secure point at which to land and debouch.

While this action was in progress Pemberton telegraphed Johnston: "A furious battle has been going on since daylight just below Port Gibson. . . . Enemy can cross all his army from Hard Times to Bruinsburg. . . . Enemy's success in passing our batteries has completely changed character of defense."

Johnston immediately replied: "If General Grant's army lands on this side of the river the safety of the

Mississippi depends on beating it. For that object you should unite your whole force." And again on the next day he telegraphed : " If Grant's army crosses, unite all your troops here to beat him ; success will give you back what was abandoned to win it."

These two telegrams are models of military correspondence, and express in a word Johnston's entire theory of war—the theory of concentration for decisive blows, regardless of temporary danger to fixed points. In this case the operation recommended was so palpable that the only wonder is why Pemberton had not adopted it without waiting for suggestions. It is manifest, from Bowen's official report of the fight at Port Gibson, that as early as April 20th (four days after the passage of the batteries by the boats) Grant's plan was patent to him, and that he had communicated it to Pemberton. When Grant landed his original twenty thousand men they were on low ground at Bruinsburg, two miles from the bluff, which they would be forced to carry before they could debouch. If Pemberton had acted on Bowen's warning and met this fraction of Grant's army at Port Gibson with his entire force, leaving but a small garrison at Vicksburg, he would have outnumbered it, and the destruction of this body would have been decisive of the fate of the others. But Pemberton's only strategy seemed to consist in hugging the immediate vicinity of Vicksburg, motionless and passive, while his foe was hemming him in. Grant, thus unmolested, transferred his base to Grand Gulf, which he occupied on May 3d, and commenced his march to the interior, practically without any base at all, as his troops lived on the country, and the trains took with them little besides ammunition. According to his return of April 30th, his total force then operating against Vicksburg was 2,730 officers and 44,422 men present for duty, and consisted of the

Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Corps; but of these only the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Corps were on the east side of the river. They were not joined by Sherman with his corps until the 8th. Grant's object was now to move around Vicksburg, to isolate it from the rest of the Confederacy, and to open a base for his future operations on the Yazoo, using the subsistence of the neighborhood in the meanwhile. He advanced up the east side of the Big Black by parallel roads. McPherson moved on the road to Raymond, and Sherman and McClernand moved to the north, nearer the Big Black and nearer the railroad. These operations extended over several days, during which Pemberton did nothing to interfere with them, and did not even report them by telegraph or otherwise to Johnston. In that way he kept his chief in the dark as to the size and intentions of the Northern force.

Johnston went to Mississippi on the first train after the receipt of the telegram ordering him there. He did not reach Jackson till the 13th. That day, while *en route*, he received a dispatch from Pemberton informing him that the enemy was moving in heavy force on Edwards' Depot, where the battlefield would be, and that he was hurrying forward his troops to that point, leaving heavy detachments to secure Vicksburg and its flanks. The previous day Gregg's Brigade had fought with Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson the battle of Raymond, each side losing about five hundred men. As it was a fight of one brigade against two divisions, its necessary result was the retreat of Gregg. While falling back, the latter was joined by Walker's Brigade, which had just arrived from Beauregard's department, and the two withdrew to Jackson, where Johnston found them on his arrival. They aggregated about six thousand men. Maxey's brigade from Port


Hudson, and Gist's from South Carolina, were expected on the following day. Upon arrival, Johnston telegraphed to Richmond: "I arrived this evening, finding the enemy in force between this place and General Pemberton. I am too late."

He at once set about solving the problem of uniting his troops and those of Pemberton, which was the first great object to accomplish. The obstacle to this was the corps of McPherson, which by this time had seized Clinton, on the railroad between Jackson and Vicksburg, and now held it, effectually destroying communication with Vicksburg. Promptly after arriving at Jackson, Johnston sent a dispatch to Pemberton to the effect that a Federal corps of four divisions was between them at Clinton, that it was important to restore communication at once, and he ordered Pemberton to come up on the rear of this corps. He concluded:

"To beat such a detachment would be of immense value; the troops here could co-operate. All the strength you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important."

This dispatch was received by Pemberton on the morning of the 14th, at which time his forces were at Edwards' Depot and his headquarters at Bovina. His first impulse was to obey, and he replied as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication. I move at once with whole available force (about sixteen thousand) from Edwards' Depot, leaving Vaughn's Brigade (about fifteen hundred) at Big Black Bridge. Tilghman's Brigade (fifteen hundred), now at Baldwin's Ferry, I have ordered to bring up the rear of my column; he will be, however, from fifteen to twenty miles behind it. Baldwin's Ferry will be left necessarily unprotected. To hold Vicksburg are Smith's and Forney's divisions, extending from Snyder's Mill to



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Warrenton, numbering seventy-five hundred effective men. The men have been marching several days, are much fatigued, and, I fear, will straggle very much. In directing this move I do not think you fully comprehend the position that Vicksburg will be left in, but I comply at once with your order." *

But by the time he reached his army at Edwards' Depot his purpose to obey this order was changed. Reflection had raised up multitudes of foes threatening his flank and rear, all ready to march behind him into Vicksburg. Therefore he called a council of war composed of his general officers, laid his orders from Johnston before them, and asked them to help him solve his difficulty. A majority expressed themselves favorable to the march ordered by Johnston. Others suggested a movement by which the Federal supplies might be cut off from the river—a veritable wild-goose chase, as Grant had abandoned his communications and was living on the country. Pemberton himself did not approve either of these plans. His idea of preventing the beleaguering of Vicksburg was not to strike at isolated bodies of his adversary as they stretched their line around him, but to back up against its fortifications, and there supinely await the completion of the investment and the inevitable result of a blockade. He might be surrounded and eventually starved out, it is true, but he would at least have the consolation of knowing that his flanks would not be turned and his rear would be safe. Had he followed the example of his illustrious opponent, and thought less about his base and more about

* This dispatch shows that Pemberton, even after the losses at Port Gibson and any straggling incident to his previous aimless marching, had in hand twenty-six thousand five hundred effectives who could have been "united to beat" Grant at Port Gibson. Instead of this, Bowen fought that battle with five thousand men.

manœuvring to protect it, the story of Vicksburg might have been different. Both these schemes were disapproved by him because he thought they took him too far from the ramparts of Vicksburg; but the last appeared the best, as it contemplated no very distant march. Forgetting that the first duty of the soldier is obedience to the orders of a superior, disregarding the views of a majority of his council, and distrustful even of his own opinion, he set aside the movement directed by Johnston, and decided to threaten Grant's imaginary communications with the expectation of forcing the latter to attack him. Accordingly he sent the following communication to Johnston:

"EDWARDS' DEPOT, *May 14, 1863.*

"I shall move as early to-morrow morning as practicable with a column of seventeen thousand men to Dillon's, situated on the main road leading from Raymond to Port Gibson, seven and a half miles below Raymond and nine and a half miles from Edwards' Depot. The object is to cut the enemy's communications and to force him to attack me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position, or to attempt to cut my way into Jackson. At this point your nearest communication would be through Raymond. I wish very much I could join my re-enforcements. Whether it will be most practicable for the re-enforcements to come by Raymond (leaving it to the right if the march can not be made through Raymond), or to move them west along the line of railroad (leaving it to the left and south of the line of march) to Bolton Depot or some other point west of it, you must determine. In either movement I should be advised as to the time and road, so that co-operation may be had to enable the re-enforcements to come through. . . ."

While Pemberton and his advisers were evolving this plan, Grant decided to expel the Confederates from Jackson, hoping to render their junction more difficult. On the morning of the 14th he directed McPherson with his corps from Clinton, and Sherman with his corps from Raymond, to march upon Jackson. Then he sent one division of his other corps—McClernand's—to Clinton, one to the neighborhood of Mississippi Springs, and the third to Raymond. Thus Pemberton would have found a division instead of a corps at Clinton had he obeyed his orders.

It was idle for the two weak brigades under Johnston to attempt to fight two corps of Grant's army. Jackson was therefore held only until everything of value that was portable was removed, when the Confederates retired skirmishing. The loss was trifling on each side, being, according to the official returns, three hundred on the Northern side and one hundred and ninety-eight on the Southern. The direction of retreat was the Canton road to the north, since that was the best situation from which to join Pemberton if he had moved to Clinton, and Johnston did not then know that his orders had been ignored. Obedience to those orders by Pemberton might have brought about a junction on the field of battle, and the greeting of the generals might have been amid the flying squadrons of the enemy, like Ney and Richepanse at Hohenlinden.

But Pemberton was neither Ney nor Richepanse. All day of the 14th, despite Johnston's admonition that "time is all-important," his army was motionless at Edwards' Depot, and so remained until the morning of the 15th, when it started on its march against Grant's supposed communications. Johnston's order contemplated a march to the east, and he himself, on being pressed by Grant, had marched to the north, so as to be in the best position to

march westwardly around Grant for the all-important junction; but this plan of Pemberton took him away from Johnston, on a march to the south—nearly an opposite direction—and put a union of their forces out of the question.

While Johnston was at Calhoun Station, to the north of Jackson, he received Pemberton's dispatch announcing the disobedience of orders and the march to Dillon's. He did not receive the first dispatch agreeing to obey the order till the next day, and then he knew, from having received the second, that this intention had been changed. On the receipt of the second dispatch he replied as follows:

"CANTON ROAD, TEN MILES FROM JACKSON,
May 15, 1863, 8.30 A. M.

"Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, informing me, that we may move to that point with about six thousand troops. I have no means of estimating enemy's force at Jackson. The principal officers here differ very widely, and I fear he will fortify if time is left him. Let me hear from you immediately. General Maxey was ordered back to Brookhaven. You probably have time to make him join you. Do so before he has time to move away."

This dispatch was received by Pemberton about 6.30 A. M. of the 16th, when he was about four miles south of Edwards' Depot on his march to Dillon's. He ordered a countermarch, and sent Johnston the following reply:

"... It [the order] found the army on the middle road to Raymond. The order of countermarch has been issued. Owing to the destruction of a bridge on Baker's Creek, which runs for some distance parallel with the

railroad and south of it, our march will be on the road leading from Edwards' Depot in the direction of Brownsville. This road runs nearly parallel with the railroad. In going to Clinton, we shall leave Bolton Depot four miles to the right. I am thus particular, so that you may be able to make a junction with this army. Heavy skirmishing is now going on in my front."

Meanwhile the Dillon excursion had given Grant sufficient time to return from Jackson and advance upon Pemberton. He directed his army upon Bolton's Depot, and by the night of the 15th McClernand's and McPherson's Corps were in motion for the battlefield. If the object of Pemberton's move toward Dillon's was a fight, he was soon to be accommodated. There was one slight difference between his chances in this fight and the one which Johnston advised; it was simply this: that his plan brought an army down on him, while Johnston's plan contemplated a joint attack on a single corps. On the morning of the 16th skirmishing commenced between him and the Federal van, whereupon, instead of continuing his march under the protection of a strong rear guard, he took up a position on Champion's Hill and awaited events. Hovey's division was his only foe till near midday, for Grant did not till about that time complete the concentration of his forces. Pemberton clung to the defensive until Grant, on the arrival of his other divisions, supported Hovey with additional troops, carried the Confederate lines, and sent them flying in confusion toward Vicksburg with the loss of large quantities of their artillery, and a total of 3,839 men killed, wounded, and missing. The Federal loss was 2,441, but it was paying cheaply for the result achieved; it was decisive in frustrating Pemberton's march by Clinton, and it sealed the fate of Vicksburg. Thus the movement to cut Grant's communications had resulted in nothing but

the loss of precious time which should have been utilized in joining Johnston, the loss of lives yet more precious than time, and the pressing of Pemberton behind the Big Black. No wonder that, when too late, he said to Johnston, in a letter written after he had reached the haven of Vicksburg:

“I greatly regret that I felt compelled to make the advance beyond the Big Black, which has proved so disastrous in its consequences.”

The above dispatches show that he was not “compelled” to make any such move by Johnston. He was beyond the Big Black before the arrival of the latter in the Department, and had written that Edwards’ Depot would be the battle ground before Johnston had sent him a message. Johnston’s orders were to march to the east to attack a corps. He moved to the south and entangled himself with an army.

On the 16th, Johnston with his small force was stationary, they taking the rest which their labors rendered desirable, while he was awaiting a reply to his last dispatch to Pemberton, by means of which he might direct his march for a junction. On the afternoon of that day he received the note announcing the issuance of the order for a countermarch, and describing the road. The next day he marched to the westward *via* Livingston, about fifteen miles, hoping that it was not yet too late for his subordinate, by obeying the instructions, to unite with him. That night, after his two little brigades had gone into camp, he received a dispatch which dashed his hopes to the earth and foreshadowed the inevitable fate of Vicksburg. In it Pemberton, writing from Bovina, recapitulated the circumstances under which he had decided upon the move to Dillon’s, described the battle of Baker’s Creek or Champion’s Hill and its unfortunate result, and stated that he was then in position be-

hind the Big Black, but feared that he would be turned and forced to withdraw, which would render the position at Snyder's Mill untenable, but that he had provisions for about sixty days. He naively added, "I respectfully await your orders."

Before Johnston received this letter Grant had attacked Pemberton in the remarkable position in which he had placed his army, partly on each side of the Big Black, and carried it, with a heavy loss to the Confederates, and he hurled them into the works around Vicksburg. Then he occupied the position at Snyder's Mill or Haynes' Bluff, where Sherman had been disastrously repulsed in the previous December, and thus, after living on the country for over a week, he at last had on the Yazoo a regular base. This was the result of his own abilities and the zealous support of his subordinates, which formed so striking a contrast to Pemberton's actions.

It is now time to inquire as to the purpose for which Pemberton awaited orders. It was certainly not with any idea of heeding them. On receipt of this last note Johnston saw that all hope of saving Vicksburg was lost. There was but one result in case Grant resorted to siege operations. The larger the number of men cooped up in its lines, the quicker that result would be brought about and the more disastrous it would be. He knew, from the tardiness which had been shown in reinforcing him, that Pemberton's army was worth more to the Southern cause than a dozen Vicksburgs, and that the loss of so large a body of men would be irreparable. Hence his reply:

"CAMP BETWEEN LIVINGSTON AND BROWNSVILLE,

May 17, 1863.

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PEMBERTON: Your dispatch of to-day by Captain Henderson was received. If Haynes' Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value, and can not

be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies and march to the northeast."

Pemberton did not obey this order. His first impulse was to again consult his council of war. He assembled it on the 18th and laid the order before it, at the same time strenuously arguing against obedience. The council on this *ex parte* showing decided against compliance with the order, and Pemberton replied as follows:

"VICKSBURG, May 18, 1863.

"General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.

"GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication in reply to mine, by the hands of Captain Henderson. In a subsequent letter of same date as this latter I informed you that the men had failed to hold the trenches at Big Black Bridge, and that, as a consequence, Snyder's Mill was directed to be abandoned. On the receipt of your communication I immediately assembled a council of war of the general officers of this command, and, having laid your instructions before them, asked the free expression of their opinions as to the practicability of carrying them out. The opinion was unanimously expressed that it was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such *morale* and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy. While the council of war was assembled, the guns of the enemy opened on the works, and it was at the same time reported that they were crossing the Yazoo River at Brandon's Ferry, above Snyder's Mill. I have decided to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, with the firm hope that the Government may yet

be able to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the free navigation of the Mississippi River. I still conceive it to be the most important point in the Confederacy." In his official report he attempts to fortify his disobedience in the following language :

" The evacuation of Vicksburg ! It meant the loss of the valuable stores and munitions of war collected for its defense ; the fall of Port Hudson ; the surrender of the Mississippi River, and the severance of the Confederacy. These were mighty interests, which, had I deemed the evacuation practicable in the sense in which I interpreted General Johnston's instructions, might well have made me hesitate to execute them. I believed it to be in my power to hold Vicksburg. I knew and appreciated the earnest desire of the Government and people that it should be held. I knew, perhaps better than any other individual, under all the circumstances, its capacity for defense. As long ago as February 17th last, in a letter addressed to his excellency the President, I had suggested the possibility of the investment of Vicksburg by land and water, and for that reason the necessity of ample supplies of ammunition as well as of subsistence to stand a siege. My application met his favorable consideration, and additional ammunition was ordered. With proper economy of subsistence and ordnance stores I knew that I could stand a siege. I had a firm reliance on the desire of the President and of General Johnston to do all that could be done to raise a siege. I felt that every effort would be made, and I believed it would be successful."

It would seem to be clear, notwithstanding the opinion of the council, that the evacuation was practicable. Pemberton had seventy-five hundred men in Vicksburg, and Vaughn's Brigade of fifteen hundred men who had not been engaged at Baker's Creek. The only thing to

demoralize them would be want of confidence in their commander. The subsequent behavior of his troops in the assault upon them, and their patience under the long siege which followed, refute the charge that their gallantry was impaired. They would probably have been more energetic in evading an investment than in resisting one after it was completed. The high authority of Grant himself establishes that the place could have been evacuated. In vol. ii, p. 522, of his Memoirs he says:

“We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton might have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there, and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to Johnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have been his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he been in Pemberton’s place. In fact, it would have been in conformity with Johnston’s orders to Pemberton.”

Pemberton’s rhapsody over the importance of Vicksburg was as erroneous as his erratic operations. Its only value to the South was in preventing the navigation of the Mississippi. If it and Port Hudson could be made two ligatures upon that artery, then indeed their importance was inestimable. But their inability to do this had been demonstrated. Twice in a week the terrors of the Vicksburg batteries had been met, not by ironclads alone, but by unarmored transports and provision-laden barges as well; and Grant had been seen to transfer his army from the north to the south of the town. The strongest Federal armament on the river was now in the very portion which Pemberton, blind to what was passing under his eyes, persisted in considering blocked by his guns, and sacrificed an army to hold.

After this it may have appeared "the most important point in the Confederacy" to him, but not to any one else.

It is due to Pemberton to state that he was not solely responsible for the state to which his army was now reduced. Here, too, the President of the Confederacy interfered between him and Johnston, his immediate superior, as he had done with disastrous results in Tennessee in weakening Bragg, and with an effect still more unfortunate. The report of Pemberton, as quoted above, shows how the latter vouched the views of the President for his disobedience of the order to evacuate. His supplemental report gives the true explanation of his disobedience of Johnston's instructions to move to Clinton and form a junction. In it he justifies his raid on Grant's communications by publishing the following letter, written him by Mr. Davis on May 7th, two days before Johnston was ordered to Mississippi:

"I am anxiously expecting intelligence of your further active operations. Want of transportation of supplies must compel the enemy to seek a junction with their fleet after a few days' absence from it. To hold both Vicksburg and Port Hudson is necessary to a connection with trans-Mississippi. You may expect whatever is in my power to do."

So that his movement to Dillon's was an inspiration of the Confederate President. Pemberton, feeling sure of his support, deliberately set aside Johnston's orders for concentration and evacuation, and brought about the usual consequences which ensue from executive interference in the conduct of distant operations.

And yet Mr. Davis had approved Johnston's plan when he was seizing a fancied opportunity of making a point against him. On May 16th Johnston had telegraphed to Secretary Seddon that a Federal army was

at Clinton, that he had evacuated Jackson and moved to Calhoun, and that Pemberton was marching on Dillon's. When this was shown to the President, he, evidently ignorant of Johnston's orders to Pemberton, supposed the former to be responsible for the wide separation of the two forces, and indorsed the telegram thus:

"Read and returned to the Secretary of War. Do not perceive why a junction was not attempted, which would have made our force nearly equal in number to the estimated strength of the enemy, and might have resulted in his total defeat under circumstances which rendered retreat or re-enforcement to him scarcely practicable."

Johnston received, on the day after it was written, the dispatch from Pemberton stating that he would not obey the order of evacuation. His letter of the 17th, describing the battle of Baker's Creek, had rung the knell of Vicksburg. That of the 19th foretold the doom of the gallant army which was now shut up in it. Hoping against hope that he might yet collect a force to relieve him, Johnston at once replied:

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PEMBERTON: Can you not get rid of your teams? It would be better to kill than feed them. I am trying to gather a force which may attempt to relieve you. Hold out. I have just heard from Loring, at Crystal Springs."

On that day Grant completed his investment, Sherman being on the right, McPherson in the center, and McClernand on the left. As there was no immediate hope of junction with Pemberton, nothing was left Johnston but to return to the railroad, in order to facilitate his union with re-enforcements and form a relieving army. He returned at once and united with Loring, who had eluded the enemy at Baker's Creek and marched east, and with Gist, Ector, McNair, and

Maxey as they successively arrived. Thus the operations of this pregnant week resulted in the opening of a new base on the Yazoo by the Union army, the defeat of the Confederates in several battles, their retreat into Vicksburg, and their close investment. Such might have been expected from the fact, unprecedented in military annals, that during this short campaign not a single order of the superior to the subordinate was obeyed.

CHAPTER XIII.

FALL OF VICKSBURG.

THE adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is nowhere more forcibly illustrated than in attempting to relieve a beleaguered city after all efforts to prevent its investment have failed. If the Confederate Government was too weak to prevent a siege of Vicksburg, it was certainly too weak to raise one. The same re-enforcements which were given Johnston to aid in breaking up the siege might, if sent in April and placed under a competent commander as early as then, have hindered an investment and crushed the army attempting it. But the President would not yield them until it was too late to accomplish the object for which they were sent. Hence it was that Johnston, even as late as the fall of Vicksburg, did not have what might be called an army under his command. The successive detachments as they arrived had to be organized into divisions, were mainly strangers to each other and to their commanders, and had no transportation. The little artillery which they had was deficient in horses and equipments; supplies also were scarce, and difficult to procure. The region in which they were operating had been already drained to supply the armies of Grant and Pemberton; and the collection of additional horses necessary for field pieces, and of supplies for the troops, with the transportation that was essential before the army could be mobilized for active operations away

from the immediate proximity of the railroad, was a slow and discouraging task.

When Johnston moved to join Pemberton he had but two brigades—Gregg's and Walker's—their aggregate strength being six thousand men; and that was his army until the return to Canton. Here he was joined, on the 20th and 21st of May, by Gist from Beauregard, and Ector and McNair from Bragg. At the same time Loring's division, happily separated from Pemberton during the rout of Baker's Creek, entered Jackson, having lost all its artillery, wagons, and cooking utensils. These organizations, with Jackson's cavalry, numbered about seventeen thousand. They constituted the whole force till June 3d, when they were joined by Evans' Brigade of nineteen hundred men, and by Breckinridge's division from Bragg's army, which had fifty-two hundred effectives.*

It seemed Johnston's fate to be always placed on posts of duty where extended efforts were necessarily devoted to organizing armies. Until that work was consummated there could be no fair opportunity for winning laurels. Previous chapters have indicated how much labor and time were applied to this purpose at Harper's Ferry, Manassas, and the Peninsula—a tame but essential service, which in the subsequent history of the army contributed to swell the glory of his succes-

* Johnston's telegram of May 31, 1863, to the President (Official War Records, vol. xxiv, pt. 1, p. 194) gives an aggregate strength for his army of twenty-five thousand. This included Breckinridge, estimated at fifty-eight hundred and Evans, who had not arrived. Taking Evans's strength at nineteen hundred from Loring's return of May 30th (Official War Records, vol. xxiv, pt. 3, p. 936), and deducting these two bodies, and the aggregate remaining is seventeen thousand three hundred. The real strength of Breckinridge on his arrival was fifty-two hundred, and not fifty-eight hundred, as estimated by Johnston (Official War Records, vol. xxiv, pt. 3, p. 942).

sors. Similar efforts were equally necessary in Georgia and North Carolina. The Vicksburg campaign was no exception to the rule; it was probably the most difficult task of all, on account of the exhaustion of the country. Johnston applied himself to this work with his customary energy; his dispatches to the Government teem with suggestions as to the best means of raising to the highest degree the efficiency and mobility of his force. These occupations, necessary though they be, are unappreciated by the general public, which, impatient of details, gives the glory of a great battle won to the general in command at the time, and thinks not of the man who formed such an army as to render it capable of victory—the man who smooths the path by which others ride to fame.

One of Johnston's principal troubles was the continuous fault-finding of the Richmond Government. He had construed the order sending him to Mississippi as limiting his authority to transfer troops from Bragg's command. Whether he was right in so considering it or not, he had repeatedly advised against weakening Bragg, and had warned the Government that such action would involve the loss of Tennessee; so that he would not have transferred any troops even if he thought his authority to do so perfectly clear. The misunderstanding, if such it was, affected his military course in no way; yet the President could find no employment more congenial than agitating this moot question, making it the subject of many telegrams, and subsequently of a long, ill-natured letter of censure. He was determined to raise some side issue to divert the public mind from the mischief which he had done, and he could find no better one than this.

While Johnston was engaged in bettering his army and replying to the President's telegrams, the Federal

army was not idle, nor was its strength at a standstill. Its numbers, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, were about forty-seven thousand men on April 30th. The return of May 31st shows a total of over fifty thousand men present for duty operating against Vicksburg, re-enforcements having more than supplied all losses. On June 30th, according to the return of that date, its strength was over seventy-five thousand present for duty. As its losses during the siege and campaign were about nine thousand, this indicates that it had been re-enforced by nearly forty thousand men, and proves the correctness of Johnston's estimate, made in a telegram of June 19th to the Secretary of War, that its re-enforcements alone equaled his entire force.

While he was thus forming an army out of the heterogeneous material gradually sent him, Grant was occupied in protecting himself against the Vicksburg garrison and against any possible advance of a relieving force. To adopt the language of his Memoirs, he made his lines as strong against the Confederates in Vicksburg as theirs were against him, in order to hold them with a small portion of his troops. To meet Johnston, he placed more than half his army in a line facing east, which extended from Haynes Bluff on the Yazoo to the railroad bridge on the Big Black, being thus guarded on each flank by a river. This position, naturally strong, was fortified to derive all possible additional strength from art, and possessed the double advantage of being practically impregnable against attack, while exposing an assaulting force to certain disaster in the event of failure, since the Big Black must be crossed before these lines could be approached, and it would intercept retreat in case of a repulse. South of the railroad bridge the ferries were guarded by strong detachments. Offensive operations against that part of

the line were yet more hazardous, as they necessarily exposed the communications of the attacking army. All roads were blocked which led from the east toward the Federal position ; and Johnston's numbers prior to June 3d, at which time his last re-enforcements joined him, were so insignificant that it would be madness to attack, even if the organization and equipment were complete. Subsequent to that date the risk would have been greater still, for Grant's re-enforcements were many times more numerous than his own, the fortified lines were daily growing in strength, and by that time had become another Torres Vedras.

The published correspondence shows the earnestness with which he devoted himself to the task of forming an army and of giving it mobility under the difficulties he met. At the same time he was constantly reminding the Government of the hopelessness of such an enterprise without a larger force. His efforts were without avail, except to elicit from Secretary Seddon words of cheer and confidence which formed a strong contrast to the communications from President Davis. He stated his difficulties, in a letter dated June 5th, to the Secretary, who on May 23d had written him in the following gratifying terms :

" I have no official communications or instructions to send you, but can not omit the opportunity afforded by a courier going to you to offer the encouragement of my full confidence and best wishes in the trying circumstances in which you are placed. I regretted deeply, when I received the telegram announcing your arrival at Jackson [in which Johnston had stated that he was too late], that you had not been ordered to that vital field of operations at an earlier period ; but I could not think or feel that you were too late. Indeed, events since have made your presence of even greater moment

than I had anticipated ; and now, to retrieve our great disasters, and save, if practicable, the all-important command of the Mississippi River, is felt to be dependent on the presence and inspiration of your military genius. . . . I can only assure you of my full appreciation and confidence, and cheer myself under the darkening aspect of our late reverses by unabated reliance on your zeal, fertility of resource, and generalship. . . .”

Johnston replied, June 5th, to this as follows :

“ I thank you cordially for your kind letter, but almost regret that you feel such confidence in me as is expressed in it. From the present condition of affairs I fear that confidence dooms you to disappointment. Every day gives some new intelligence of the enemy's strength, of re-enforcements on the way to him. My first intention, on learning that Lieutenant-General Pemberton was in Vicksburg, was to form an army to succor him. I suppose, from my telegraphic correspondence with the Government, that all the troops to be hoped for have arrived. Our resources seem so small, and those of the enemy so great, that the relief of Vicksburg is beginning to appear impossible to me. Pemberton will undoubtedly make a gallant and obstinate defense ; but, unless we assemble a force strong enough to break Grant's line of investment, the surrender of the place will be a mere question of time. General Grant is receiving re-enforcements almost daily. His force, according to the last information to be had, is more than treble that which I command. Our scouts say, too, that he has constructed lines of circumvallation, and has blocked up all roads leading to his position. The enterprise of forcing the enemy's lines would be a difficult one to a force double that at my disposal. . . . I beg you to consider, in connection with affairs in this Department, that I have had not only to organize but to provide means

of transportation and supplies for an army. The artillery is not yet equipped. All of Lieutenant-General Pemberton's supplies were, of course, with his troops about Vicksburg and Port Hudson. I found myself, therefore, without subsistence stores, ammunition, or the means of conveying these indispensables. It has proved more difficult to collect wagons and provisions than I expected. We have not yet the means of operating for more than four days away from the railroads."

Secretary Seddon, alive to the importance of saving Vicksburg, or at least its garrison, but unwilling to send troops from Virginia despite the victory of Chancellorsville, became desperate at the outlook, and urged Johnston to attack, with or without concert with the garrison, by day or by night, manfully offering to take the responsibility. But it was not with the latter a question of responsibility. He was not willing to squander the lives of his men in wild adventures predestined to failure; he could not so far forget his duty to them. He declined to assault, reiterating the strength of Grant's position, the impossibility of combining his operations with the Vicksburg troops on account of uncertain communication and the certainty that the destruction of his army would expose Mississippi and Alabama to be overrun. In his telegram of June 23d he repeats his difficulties thus:

"There has been no voluntary inaction. When I came, all military materials of the Department were in Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Artillery had to be brought from the East; horses for it and all field transportation procured in an exhausted country—much from Georgia, brought over wretched railroads—and provisions collected. I have not had the means of moving."

He was in the meanwhile keeping up as full a correspondence with the commanders of the beleaguered

fortresses as the hostile environment would permit. On May 19th, when he realized that the investment of Vicksburg was complete, he sent a message to General Gardner, the commander at Port Hudson, informing him of Pemberton's defeat at Baker's Creek and retreat to Vicksburg, impressing on him the importance of concentration, and ordering him to evacuate Port Hudson and to bring as much artillery with him as possible, in order to replace that which had changed owners at Baker's Creek, and to move to Jackson. On the 23d, in reply to a dispatch from Gardner asking re-enforcements, he repeated his order, urging him not to allow himself to be invested, but to save the troops in any event. This last communication never reached Port Hudson, as its blockade was complete before the arrival of the courier. Too weak to aid him, Johnston endeavored to induce the commanders in the trans-Mississippi Department to relieve Port Hudson; and movements were made by the forces of Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor with that object in view, but nothing beneficial resulted.

Communication with Pemberton, while difficult and slow, was more frequent. Until the first part of June the Federal investment was not very close on the southern side of the city, and messengers slipped through each way under cover of night. The first dispatches from Vicksburg were received on May 24th; they were written on the 20th and 21st, and urged the necessity of prompt action for relief. Those of the 21st reported the men as fighting in good spirits and with unimpaired organization. To this Johnston replied, notifying him that he was sending musket caps, which were the great need, and inquiring as to the best route of approach, the position and force of the enemy. On the 29th he again wrote, informing Pemberton that he was too weak to

save Vicksburg ; that he could only attempt to extricate the garrison ; that it could not be done without co-operation, and he asked Pemberton's plans.

Meanwhile Grant, thinking perhaps that Pemberton's army was demoralized by its reverses, decided to essay an assault, and, if possible, save the long siege that otherwise was before him. On May 22d he gave orders for a general assault along the lines, and his men moved forward with great gallantry, but were sadly undeceived as to the condition of the Southern troops. They received their assailants with a murderous fire, and repulsed them at every point, inflicting a loss of over three thousand men and suffering little themselves. In the first attack of the 19th the Federal loss was nearly one thousand.

At this time Pemberton's effective strength was eighteen thousand men, subject to daily diminution from the drain of the siege. On the 7th, Pemberton reported his command as still in good spirits, and his subsistence as sufficient for twenty days ; and Johnston wrote him the same day, before receiving his note, urging the necessity of co-operation, and inquiring as to the best route by which he might approach. The remaining correspondence between them was devoted to the discussion of this question ; it continued at irregular intervals throughout the greater part of June. The last dispatch from Pemberton which came through the lines was dated June 22d, and suggested that Johnston should make proposals to Grant for the surrender of the place, but not of the garrison, which Johnston declined to do, since it would be construed as a confession of weakness ; but he authorized Pemberton to make terms if it should become necessary. The communication was never received by Pemberton, and when the time came he made terms on his own responsibility.

While these letters were being exchanged Johnston was unremitting in his labor of collecting as rapidly as possible the transportation and supplies needed for an advance. This occupied him till the 29th, on which day he decided to begin his march to relieve Vicksburg. His effective strength of all arms was only twenty-eight thousand one hundred and fifty-four. Grant's army then was over seventy-five thousand men; and, adopting the statement of his Memoirs, more than half the entire force was under Sherman, and faced east to meet Johnston, supported by the divisions of Herron and A. J. Smith. As these aggregated over seven thousand, Sherman had over forty-four thousand men with which to meet Johnston, who was advancing to attack him in an impregnable position, and with but little over half his numbers. On the evening of July 1st the Confederate army encamped between Brownsville and the Big Black, and the next three days were devoted to reconnoissances intended to ascertain the most eligible point at which to try the enemy's lines. On the night of the 3d a message was sent to Pemberton to the effect that an attempt to relieve him would be made about the 7th, that his cooperation was necessary, that he must decide upon the most convenient point at which to endeavor to break through, and that the firing would indicate where the attack would be made. Pemberton did not receive this message before his surrender.

The reconnoissances conclusively established that north of the railroad failure was inevitable. They revealed fortifications strongly manned, extending from the railroad bridge over the Big Black to the Yazoo, with all approaches obstructed by abatis. Johnston decided not to slaughter his men by desperately throwing them upon an invulnerable enemy, and extended his investigations south of the railroad in the hope of turn-

ing these fortifications and forcing a passage of the river lower down. While engaged in the necessary examinations they were abruptly terminated, and the object of his advance frustrated, by information of the surrender of Vicksburg, which took place on the 4th of July.*

This event not only put an end to the expedition, but necessitated an immediate return to Jackson, as the capture of Vicksburg released Grant's mighty host of seventy-five thousand men for a movement against Johnston's army. The latter at once fell back to Jackson, and not a moment too soon; for, without awaiting the completion of all details of the surrender, Grant, on the evening of the 4th, ordered Sherman to advance upon Johnston, and placed under his command for the purpose the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Corps, with two additional divisions, making a body of about fifty thousand men. These moved upon Jackson, arriving in front of its works on the morning of the 9th, and found Johnston's men awaiting them. These works, slight and badly located, extended from a point north of the town a

* Johnston has the weighty authority of Grant to sustain him in his decision not to attempt the Federal lines to the north of the railroad, where they had been made so strong. In vol. ii, p. 549, of his *Memoirs*, Grant says: "We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston; but as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. Where we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified and on the defensive. Johnston evidently took in the situation, and wisely, I think, abstained from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides, without accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold on Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston."

little east of the Canton road, to a point south within a short distance of Pearl River. Loring was on the right, Walker and French in the center, and Breckinridge on the left. Owing to reports of scarcity of water, Johnston hoped that Sherman would assault; and he awaited it with eagerness, confident, from the high spirit which his troops manifested, that it would be severely punished if attempted. But Sherman, instead of attacking, took to the spade himself, and placed his powerful artillery in positions to sweep the town with cross-fires. On the 12th a slight attack was made upon the skirmish line of Breckinridge, composed of the First, Third, and Fourth Florida and Forty-seventh Georgia Regiments. These repelled it with heavy loss to the enemy in killed, wounded, and prisoners, capturing also some colors, which were presented to Johnston by their captors as a testimonial of their devotion. He accepted them in the following terms:

“Major-General BRECKINRIDGE.

“GENERAL: I have learned with high satisfaction the success of your troops this morning; it increases my confidence in your gallant division. Do me the kindness also to express to the First and Third Florida, Forty-seventh Georgia, and Fourth Florida Regiments, the pride and pleasure with which I have accepted the splendid trophies they have presented me. Assure them that I equally appreciate the soldierly courage and kindly feelings to myself which have gained me these noble compliments.”

The Federal superiority in artillery showed the place to be untenable, though the lack of necessary supplies would have compelled its evacuation in any event; and information of the approach of a large ordnance train from Vicksburg—evidently to enable Sherman to com-

mence his bombardment—induced Johnston to withdraw before his troops were exposed to heavy loss from a cannonade. It was therefore evacuated on the night of the 16th, everything of value being taken away. In this siege the Southern loss, according to the official reports, was seventy-one killed, five hundred and four wounded, and about twenty-five missing. The Federal loss was one hundred and twenty-nine killed, seven hundred and sixty-two wounded, and two hundred and thirty-one missing. The retreat was in the direction of Meridian, and was continued till the neighborhood of Morton was reached. It was free from any pursuit worthy of the name.

While at Jackson, Johnston received information of the fall of Port Hudson, which took place on the 9th. Its defenders held out until their provisions were exhausted and until intelligence of the surrender of Vicksburg reached them, when they capitulated.

The Vicksburg campaign gave rise to much controversy among Southern officers. President Davis, blind to the story told by written orders, was against Johnston, and endeavored to put on him the responsibility for the delinquencies and tardiness of himself and his favorite. Evidently for the purpose of making a record, he wrote to Johnston from Richmond on July 15th an elaborate letter harshly reviewing his connection with the campaign. Johnston defended himself in a reply dated August 8th, which, both in tone and substance, forms a strong contrast to the President's letter, and which completely refuted every charge brought against him.*

* These letters are too long for insertion. Those who are curious to compare the temper of the two communications will find both letters in Johnston's Narrative, pp. 230-252. A sense of justice prompted him to publish both. Mrs. Davis does not seem to feel a similar obli-

Not content with this, the President telegraphed Pemberton on July 27th, suggesting to him that his report of the siege should be made "promptly and fully." Pemberton acted on the hint, and on August 25th forwarded to Richmond direct a report so "full" as to take up, with its exhibits, seventy pages of the Official War Records. In addition the Secretary of War, "at the suggestion of the President," wrote to Pemberton, who in the meantime had repaired to Richmond, pointing out certain weak points and asking him to elucidate them, which Pemberton endeavored to do in his letter of November 10th. In these compositions Pemberton, knowing the way to the President's heart, sought to exonerate himself by attacking Johnston. The latter, after having with difficulty obtained a copy of Pemberton's report, which should in the first instance have been sent through him, replied in an official report, which was dated November 10th, and was only ten pages in length. Up to that time he had never mentioned Pemberton except in complimentary language, and even this paper, though defending its author from an unjust and ungrateful attack, concludes in these regretful terms :

"In this report I have been compelled to enter into many details, and to make some animadversion upon the conduct of General Pemberton. The one was no pleasant task, the other a most painful duty. Both have been forced upon me by the official report of General Pemberton, made to the War Department instead of to me, to whom it was due.

"A proper regard for the good opinion of my Gov-

gation. In her Memoir she publishes the President's letter, but not General Johnston's reply. The President's letter will also be found in vol. xxiv, pt. 1, p. 202, of the Official War Records, and General Johnston's reply on p. 209 of the same volume.

ernment has compelled me, therefore, to throw aside that delicacy which I would gladly have observed toward a brother officer suffering much undeserved obloquy, and to show that in his short campaign General Pemberton made not a single movement in obedience to my orders, and regarded none of my instructions; and, finally, did not embrace the only opportunity to save his army—that given by my order to abandon Vicksburg.”*

Early in August President Davis directed that a court of inquiry, composed of Generals Robert Ransom, Jr., Howell Cobb, and John Echols, should assemble at Montgomery to “inquire into the events of the campaigns of Mississippi and eastern Louisiana during the months of May, June, and July last, and especially as to the surrender of Vicksburg, of Port Hudson, and the evacuation of Jackson.” This order, in its scope, was practically an investigation of Johnston; but he received no notice of it till after the court was to meet. On his application he was authorized to attend, placing Hardee in command. Nothing came of the court of inquiry. It was first adjourned over, and then directed to

* The reports of Johnston and Pemberton will be found in vol. xxiv, pt. 1, pp. 238-331, of the Official War Records. The Department allowed Pemberton, after he had seen Johnston's official report, to file an additional paper, which, far from communicating anything new, was merely another attack on Johnston. Johnston was not allowed to see these last two papers, or to have any opportunity of comment. Pemberton's subsequent connection with the war is given in vol. ii, p. 526, of President Davis' Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. After his Vicksburg campaign no troops could be induced to receive him, but it was thought that he might be intrusted with a mortar. He was with Lee's army; and when his old antagonist, Grant, was crossing James River in the summer of 1864, Pemberton placed his mortar where it harassed the Union army in crossing. Thereupon Grant sent some troops, who repeated the Vicksburg experience and captured the mortar. Pemberton escaped.

“suspend its sessions till further orders.” The letter of Johnston (of August 8th), the increasing light which was being shed on the campaign, the fact that Johnston was present to defend himself, and the high character of the gentlemen composing the court, showed where the blame would be placed, and the court was allowed to sink into oblivion. Late in July Johnston was relieved from the command of the Department of Tennessee, in accordance with the requests repeatedly made by him. There were no military operations of importance in his Department of the Mississippi; and he was reduced to inactivity by the re-enforcements which he sent to Bragg, and which comprised nearly all his infantry. He patriotically urged that they should be sent to take part in the great battle. He remained inactive till the rout of Missionary Ridge.

CHAPTER XIV.

DALTON.

BRAGG's Tennessee campaign culminated in the great battle of Chickamauga, in which the infantry sent by Johnston bore a conspicuous part. It was another of the fruitless victories which were won by the Confederate army of Tennessee at heavy cost. The Confederate commander did not so utilize it as to derive any considerable advantage, but devoted himself to the more congenial occupation of quarreling with his subordinates. Buckner, D. H. Hill, and Polk fell under his special displeasure; and Longstreet was so impressed with his incapacity, that, in a letter of September 26th to Secretary Seddon, he said: "To express my convictions in a few words, our chief has done but one thing that he ought to have done since I joined his army: that was, to order the attack on the 20th. All other things that he has done he ought not to have done. I am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander."

These differences became so notorious and so mischievous in their tendency that Mr. Davis repaired to Bragg's army himself, under the idea that his presence would settle all discontent and silence all complaints against his favorite. He took Pemberton along with him, expecting to make him heir to one of the corps whose commanders he and Bragg were to displace. In

spite of the Vicksburg campaign and the universal hostility to Pemberton in the army, he still enjoyed the confidence of the President.

Upon arriving at Bragg's headquarters and inquiring into affairs, President Davis sustained the latter against his generals, the most prominent of whom, despite their well-earned glory on previous fields, were sent to other points or practically relegated to retirement, and left him in command of the army. Pemberton, however, did not succeed in obtaining command of a corps. A double infliction of Bragg and Pemberton was more than even the long-suffering Army of Tennessee could endure; and Pemberton was relegated to retirement.*

The result of Bragg's retention, and of the departure of the generals in whom the troops reposed their confidence, was the greatest defeat which the Confederates sustained during the war. After Chickamauga the Federals directed their principal efforts to that theatre of operations. Every department from Virginia westward was laid under contribution to re-enforce their army,

* The authority for these statements as to Pemberton is the letter of Cooper to Bragg, dated October 4, 1863, asking whether he could be assigned to a corps, and stating that he "still possessed the confidence of the Executive"; a letter to General Beauregard from his brother, dated October 10, 1863, and stating that "General Pemberton with his staff and baggage had accompanied the President, expecting to be the successor of General Polk, but abandoned his pretensions upon learning the opposition raised by the troops"; and a letter from General W. W. Mackall to General Johnston, saying: "Pemberton consulted me about staying here in command of a corps. I told him that there was not a division in this army that would be willing to receive him; that I was sorry to be obliged to tell him so unpleasant a truth, but so it was. He told me B. [Bragg] wanted him to stay. I told him that B. ought to understand the temper of his army better than I did, but that we did not always agree upon the point. He goes away, however." These letters will be found in vol. xxx, pt. 4, pp. 727, 734, and 742, of the Official War Records.

which was huddled together at Chattanooga under the distant fire of the Southern artillery, and with a line of communication so difficult that supplies in sufficient quantities could not be obtained. Their best generals, Grant and Sherman, were sent to direct the manœuvres for relief, and the immense resources of the North were devoted to its rehabilitation. Bragg, who from his lofty perch could look down upon these mighty preparations, and must have known that they were inevitably destined to be used in an offensive blow at him, proceeded to prepare for their reception by detaching Longstreet, with a third of his army, on an expedition against Knoxville, thus inviting disaster. It soon came, in the shape of an advance of Grant upon him with a force far stronger than that diminished army which under Bragg held the heights of Missionary Ridge. On November 26th Grant's troops gallantly stormed the strong Confederate lines and carried them, inflicting a loss of nearly seven thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and capturing forty pieces of artillery. The resistance was not what might have been expected. Bragg, in his official report, states that "no satisfactory excuse" could be given for it; and there is none, except the impaired *morale* resulting from the dissensions among the officers and the lack of confidence in the commander. The Federals pursued to Ringgold, where the heroic Cleburne, with the rear guard, checked their pursuit, and enabled the Southern army to retire without further molestation to Dalton, where it halted—decimated, disheartened, and almost in process of dissolution.

After this overwhelming reverse the President dared no longer to retain Bragg in command of the army in the field, though he could not entirely forego his society or dispense with his counsel. He therefore called him to Richmond and made him a sort of military di-

rector, under General Orders No. 23, dated February 24, 1864, as follows: "General Braxton Bragg is assigned to duty at the seat of Government, and, under the direction of the President, is charged with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy."

This was the high position which Lee had occupied till called to the field after Johnston's disabling wound at Seven Pines, and which the President now conferred upon Bragg. In this position he had the right, "under the direction of the President," to supervise both Lee and Johnston in the coming campaign.

His departure at once caused all eyes to be turned to Johnston as his proper successor. The army itself had been clamoring for him from the time of his assignment to the West, and now press and people coalesced in urging his appointment. The President first offered the place to Hardee, who was one of the most earnest supporters of Johnston, and would only consent to fill it temporarily. At length, on December 16th, the President yielded to the universal demand, and sent Johnston the following order:

"RICHMOND, *December 16, 1863.*

"GENERAL J. E. JOHNSTON: You will turn over the immediate command of the Army of Mississippi to Lieutenant-General Polk, and proceed to Dalton and assume command of the Army of Tennessee. . . . A letter of instruction will be sent you at Dalton.

"JEFFERSON DAVIS."


In obedience to this order he at once repaired to Dalton and assumed command, issuing the following simple order to that effect:

"DALTON, GA., *December 27, 1863.*

"In obedience to the orders of his Excellency the President, the undersigned has the honor to assume command of the Army of Tennessee.

"J. E. JOHNSTON, *General.*"

On his arrival he found a letter from Secretary Seddon, dated December 18th, which contained instructions as to his future operations. It mainly was devoted to impressing on him what he might have been assumed to know—the importance of restoring the discipline, confidence, and prestige of the army; and he was also informed that he should assume the offensive. In the reply, written on the 28th, Johnston explained that the army was far from being in condition to undertake an offensive campaign, being deficient in numbers, arms, subsistence stores, and field transportation. It would seem to be self-evident that an army which had just been routed could not assume the offensive against its victorious opponent without large re-enforcements; but the President inaugurated an elaborate correspondence personally, and also through his Secretary of War and military adviser, urging an aggressive policy upon Johnston. He began this intervention by a letter dated December 23d, which was mainly devoted to informing Johnston of the condition of his army—as if a civilian at Richmond could give any information of an army to a general who was among them and of them. The letter painted its condition in such roseate hues as were necessarily inconsistent with the terrible experience of Missionary Ridge, and expatiated upon the army's assuming the offensive, as if all that was necessary for such a movement was a suggestion from Richmond. This correspondence, together with a similar one between Johnston and Bragg, extended through the winter



and spring, and up to the very time that the forward march of the Northern army rendered offensive operations impossible. Without attempting to recapitulate it, suffice it to say that Johnston desired to take the offensive, provided his army should be re-enforced and fitted with the supplies necessary for such an operation. The difference between him and his correspondents was merely as to the plan. The Richmond council wished him to advance with his inadequate force to the Tennessee River, near Kingston, and to attempt its crossing; and that Longstreet, who was in east Tennessee, should move around Knoxville and attempt a junction with Johnston, in which way it was hoped to separate the Northern forces at Knoxville and Chattanooga. To this scheme of the Aulic Council Johnston objected that, as the armies of Longstreet and himself were separated, with the enemy exactly between them, it might easily be frustrated by the Federals, who were free to attack either of the two Confederate bodies while in motion. He urged that re-enforcements intended to act with him should be sent to Dalton and joined to the army there, so as to render their junction independent of the enemy. His expectation was, that by the time his re-enforcements joined him the enemy would advance. Thus with his re-enforcements he might defeat his adversary at a distance from his base, and assume the offensive by pursuing him in the event of such a success. But the Richmond strategists could see no merit in any plan not their own, and notified Johnston that he could only obtain the re-enforcements for an offensive movement, quietly assuming, despite his repeated assurances, that he would not consent to an aggressive campaign. His letters and telegrams giving this assurance being ignored, Colonel B. S. Ewell, a member of his staff, who enjoyed his full confidence, was sent to Richmond to

explain his views to the Department, and his readiness to advance the moment his army was put in condition for such an enterprise. Colonel Ewell executed his commission, but with no better success than had attended Johnston's communications. Nothing could be done unless the Davis-Bragg conception of an attempted junction in face of a foe superior in strength to the combined armies, and midway between them, was first accepted. Thus did Bragg, though ostensibly removed, continue to control the operations of his old army.*

* Colonel Ewell's written report of his mission will be found in vol. xxxii, pt. 3, p. 839, of the Official War Records. Bragg's letters on the subject will be found in the same volume, on pp. 584, 592, and 614. Johnston's replies will be found in the same volume, on pp. 613, 636, 649, 653, and 666. Longstreet was clearly of opinion that the point of junction suggested by Johnston was the proper one. In his letter of March 16, 1864, to the President (pp. 637-641 of the same volume) he says: "The two armies are about two hundred miles apart, with the enemy holding all the country between us. As soon as either army starts to move the enemy must get advised of it. He, occupying the railroad, will have great facilities for concentrating his forces against one or the other of these armies, and he would cripple the one that he might encounter so badly as to prevent the further progress of the campaign. This we must assume that he will do at all hazards, as there are no supplies in the country through which our armies would pass. . . . It occurs to me that a better plan for making a campaign into middle Tennessee would be to re-enforce General Johnston in his present position by throwing the Mississippi troops and those of General Beauregard's department and my own to that point."

A Northern writer says, on the subject of this proposed aggressive: "In the light of subsequent events, it is plain that in failing to give adequate re-enforcements to Johnston, while General Grant's armies were widely separated and weakened by the temporary absence of veteran regiments, the Confederate authorities at Richmond rendered impossible the aggression for which they subsequently clamored. In December previous General Beauregard suggested as the only hope of success that Richmond and other important points should be fortified and garrisoned for defense, and that an immense army should be con-

While this discussion was dragging its slow length along, Johnston assiduously applied himself to the improvement of his army. Its effective strength, according to its field return of December 26, 1863, was only thirty-six thousand and seventeen, and it was dispirited and destitute, the infantry barefoot and half naked, the cavalry dismounted on account of the poor condition of their horses, and the artillery incapable of rapid movements from the same cause. Indeed, the resources of

centrated against Grant at Chattanooga, or thrown in bold offense from Knoxville. Later, General Johnston's suggestions were somewhat similar, but were unheeded by Mr. Davis and his advisers. The Western army remained in diffusion until concentration as a necessity of defense, rather than a condition of aggression, was hurriedly effected. Longstreet's army was sent to General Lee, and from all the troops that so long menaced Knoxville only Martin's division of cavalry joined General Johnston, while almost all the national troops that wintered in east Tennessee were free to join the combination against him. The impracticable President had entertained visions of successful aggression from Dalton, but had been, from choice or necessity, so sparing in provision for such enterprise that the thought of it, except in wildest vagary, could not be entertained. To require Johnston to advance with less than fifty thousand men against a combination of armies which in defense would greatly exceed one hundred thousand was to exact defeat. The fact that the Confederate President did not discern this revealed his incapacity as a revolutionary leader; and his subsequent criticisms of his ablest general for the nonaccomplishment of a palpable impossibility manifested the inveteracy of his self-conceit and his utter misapprehension of the situation in Georgia. His general had no choice of methods, but was confined to the defense of his position between his enemy and the campaign region south of Resaca. Had he been able to assume the offensive, he could not have reached any vital point in the rear of Chattanooga without a long detour, in dependence for supplies upon a devastated country, or on wagon transportation from a remote base."—Van Horne's *Army of the Cumberland*, vol. ii, pp. 26, 27. (This work was written at the request and partly under the direction of General George H. Thomas, and from his military papers.)

the Department were far too meager to furnish the supplies, transportation, and horses necessary to give it mobility, much less to take the offensive. In the infantry there was a deficiency of six thousand small arms; much of the artillery was of such light caliber and short range that it only exposed the gunners, and the armament of the cavalry was equally deficient. Johnston's efforts during the period of quiet allowed by the season were applied to removing these difficulties. He found it practically necessary to reform and recreate an army, as he had so often done in previous stages of the conflict. So far as they depended on his exertions this was done. His first desire as to the army was to divide it into three corps, for he believed that such an arrangement would facilitate its handling in battle. He needed a lieutenant general, and asked for Whiting, whom he had known well and favorably in Virginia. Hardee was then his only lieutenant general. The application for Whiting being denied, he asked for the assignment of Major-General Lovell, in a letter to Cooper of January 16th, and at the same time repeated his desire for an organization of the army into three corps, saying, sadly, that in his difficult and responsible position he had not possessed such advantages as his predecessor, who assisted in the nomination of many of the principal officers of his army. The President, however, had no idea of losing this opportunity for advancing a favorite; and, having failed after Chickamauga in saddling Pemberton upon the army, he seized this occasion to begin the fatal connection of John B. Hood with its fortunes. Even this assignment gave but two corps, and a third was not formed till the junction with Polk after the opening of the campaign. The good effects of these efforts toward increasing the comfort and discipline of the troops were soon apparent; their spirits returned, laggards rejoined

their commands, and by the beginning of active operations, despite the transfer of Quarles' and Baldwin's brigades, which more than offset any re-enforcements, the army had increased to an effective total of 43,887, while its moral force had grown immeasurably.

The special source of weakness was the artillery. A large proportion of the correspondence was devoted to this defect. It resulted, about the end of March, in a visit of General W. N. Pendleton for the purpose of an inspection. According to his report to Cooper, it then consisted of one hundred and eleven pieces, of which fifteen were six-pounders. In Pendleton's opinion they were worse than useless; they only exposed valuable men and animals to hostile cannon, and even to musketry which they could not silence. Twenty-seven were twelve-pounder howitzers, which, according to Pendleton, were scarcely more valuable. He recommended the addition of a number of guns of heavy caliber and of rifles, and the assignment there of officers from Virginia to aid in perfecting its organization. The condition of the horses was so feeble that they could not draw the guns in action, and they were necessarily kept some distance in the rear, where they might the more easily obtain food. These endeavors to improve all three arms were unremitting, and continued till active operations turned attention to much more important matters.

During their progress the enemy was not entirely idle. Early in February Sherman set out on an expedition against Meridian, and Johnston was ordered from Richmond to detach enough infantry to Polk to enable him to defeat this operation. He obeyed the order, and sent Hardee with his corps of about seventeen thousand men, predicting at the time that he would be too late, which proved to be the fact; for Sherman reached Me-

ridian, destroyed it, and then returned before Polk and Hardee could overtake him.

Information that Hardee had been detached reached Thomas at Chattanooga, and he was ordered by Grant to advance, with the object, as stated in his official report, "to gain possession of Dalton and as far south as possible." He sent on this expedition the Fourteenth Corps, Cruft's division of the Fourth, and Sixth Regiments of cavalry or mounted infantry, aggregating about twenty-seven thousand men. They marched upon Dalton, partly by way of Tunnel Hill to the west of Rocky Face, and partly through Crow Valley. After skirmishing with the Confederates to no result, they returned without accomplishing their object. On the return, Thomas in an official report stated that he withdrew, as he was convinced that the rebel army at Dalton largely outnumbered his force, and as the movement was a complete success, since it had caused the recalling of re-enforcements sent to oppose Sherman. He did not capture Dalton, which was his first object; and he certainly did not cause the recall of Hardee, since Sherman's return from Meridian began on February 21st, and Hardee was ordered to return on the 23d, before information of the movement of Thomas had reached the Confederate commander. The operations, involving a loss of but a few hundred on each side, were not positive enough to cause the absence of Hardee to be felt. In fact, one of his brigades (Granberry's) had returned in time to take part, recapturing Dug Gap on the 26th.

General Thomas is also in error in supposing himself to have been outnumbered. Cruft's official report gives the strength of his division at 5,643. The February return puts the strength of the Fourteenth Corps at 17,623. These aggregated 23,266, to which must be added six

regiments and four detachments of cavalry, probably about 3,000 men. According to the return of February 20th, Johnston's army, weakened by the absence of Hardee, aggregated 20,516 effectives, of which many were in the rear for the purpose of subsisting.

Nothing noteworthy transpired after this tentative affair until active operations. In his labors of preparation Johnston was much relieved by his excellent staff. The chief was General W. W. Mackall, whom he had known intimately as a gentleman of the highest character and attainments, and as an officer of talent and experience. Even Bragg bore testimony to his worth. His services were inestimable, and his cordial relations with Johnston continued throughout their long lives, which were nearly co-extensive. Hardly less useful in their respective spheres were the other members.

CHAPTER XV.

TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE.

THE great disasters which befell the Southern cause in 1863 raised the confidence of the North to the highest pitch, and they hoped to see an early termination of the war. To insure it, immense preparations were made and expeditions organized which were to move simultaneously under the general direction of their new commander in chief against the depleted armies of the Confederacy, with the object of so pressing each one that it could not re-enforce any other, and of finally smothering them with superior strength. Nothing was omitted which could be accomplished by organization or invention. The mechanical genius of the North, backed by its unbounded resources and earnest patriotism, was taxed to its utmost to equip and arm its soldiers and minister to their comfort. Recruits and new levies raised their numerical strength to its maximum, and, under the intelligent guidance of a single head, they pressed forward in concert to the attainment of a common object. Concentration and advance were the order of the day, as Banks moved against Taylor, Sigel against Breckinridge, Sherman against Johnston, and Grant against Lee.

It is an error to suppose that geographical points were the Northern objectives. However much the course of subsequent events may have tended to confirm this idea, the fact is that Grant's objective was not

Richmond, but Lee; Sherman's was not Atlanta, but Johnston. When Grant, as directing the entire operations of the national armies, came to mature his scheme for the approaching campaign, he reasoned well and wisely that as long as the Southern array of tattered uniforms and bright muskets was intact, his task would be incomplete, no matter how much territory he might overrun; and that the essential step in crushing resistance was the destruction of the military power of the South, upon which alone it depended. That accomplished, submission would follow as a necessary consequence. In his memoirs he says that his general plan was "to concentrate all the force possible against the Confederate armies in the field"; and General Sherman has well explained his part of the intended programme when he says in his autobiography: "Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah was the objective, but the army of Joseph Johnston, go where it might."

In his letter of April 4th to Sherman, recapitulating his plans, Grant defined the work assigned to his trusted lieutenant in the following language: "You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources." Until that army was crippled, the advance of Sherman into the interior was but the more hazardous as it progressed, and the "March to the Sea" the dream of an enthusiast.

In carrying out this plan, the two main objects were the armies of Lee and Johnston, which, thinned though they were from the heavy losses of the preceding year and the inability of the South to re-enforce them, were the two strongest of the Confederacy. Despite the unwearied efforts of their chiefs, they had increased but slightly in strength; and in outfit and armament they

formed a striking contrast to their foes. Hopeless of any considerable re-enforcements after the opening of the campaign, nothing remained for them but to meet their adversaries with the tenacity which had so far distinguished them, with the expectation of prolonging the struggle until the patience of the North should be exhausted.

The forces assigned to the accomplishment of the task of subjugation were commensurate with its magnitude. General Sherman had in his departments three large armies subject to his orders. Out of these he formed his active army, intending to maintain it at about 100,000 men during the campaign. The difficulties of supplies made it easier to handle a force of this size constantly strengthened from the rear than a larger one. When he moved forward, his force actually consisted of 98,797 men and 254 guns, exclusive of three divisions of cavalry, which made his total strength at that time number 110,123, of which 93,131 were infantry, 12,455 cavalry, and 4,537 artillery. Each of these was selected from the best available. The 254 guns of the artillery were the pick of the 530 pieces belonging to the three armies whose aggregate strength was before Sherman for selection. The number of calibers was reduced more than half, nothing under a ten-pounder was allowed, and the supply of ammunition was unstinted. The infantry were the veterans who had in the previous campaigns driven their antagonists out of Kentucky, northern Mississippi, and Tennessee; unlike their companions of the East, they were buoyant with the pride and confidence of constant progression. Again facing the same men who had fled before them in wild panic from the difficult heights of Missionary Ridge, and led by the favorite chiefs who had scaled those heights at their head, they hoped to make short work of their decimated enemy.

The army of Johnston, which was their selected foe, was in every respect far inferior. Its effective strength was, according to its return of April 30, 1864, 43,887 men, to which should be added the Thirty-seventh Mississippi and Sixty-third Georgia, whose strength was 1,214, making a total of 45,101. This comprised Cantey's Brigade, which (including the Thirty-seventh Mississippi) had an effective strength of 1,795 infantry and 148 artillery, and which was at Rome.

Of this number, 39,374 were infantry, 2,812 artillery, and 2,419 cavalry. The number of guns, according to the return, was 144; but this included the thirty-six pieces of the reserve (as the above total of 2,812 includes 817 men of the reserve). It also included eighteen pieces belonging to the cavalry, which was in the rear, recruiting horses.

The artillery was as inferior to that of Sherman in caliber, range, and equipment as in number. In the previous chapter allusion has been made to its deficiencies, and it had been out of the power of General Johnston to obviate them. There was still a large number of the six-pounders and the twelve-pound howitzers condemned by General Pendleton; and the condition of the horses was far from satisfactory.*

* The artillery was as follows:

Ten-pound Parrotts.....	7
Twenty-pound Parrotts.....	1
Three-inch rifles.....	5
Twelve-pound light Napoleons.....	54
Six-pound guns.....	20
Twelve-pound howitzers.....	25

Total..... 112

This shows only thirteen rifled pieces out of the total of 112. Though data exhibiting the exact composition of Sherman's artillery are not accessible to the author, it is evident, from the report of ammunition ex-

But the serious defect was the meager supply of ammunition, which compelled the artillerists to endure the incessant pounding of their rivals with rare replies, and to reserve their ammunition for charges and considerable engagements. This continued throughout the subsequent operations; and General Johnston well expresses the inconvenience to which it gave rise when, in an article on the campaign published in 1887, he says that he would gladly have given all the mountains, woods, ravines, and rivers of Georgia for such a supply of artillery ammunition proportionately as General Sherman had.

On the 5th of May the advance of the consolidated armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee commenced, each being under a separate commander, subordinate to Sherman, the leader of the whole. These subordinates were themselves towers of strength, and only inferior to Sherman in the qualities which make the successful general. At the head of the Army of the Cumberland marched Thomas, the "Stonewall" of Chickamauga, who from Mill Spring to Nashville added to his reputation in every fight. The Army of the Tennessee followed McPherson, Grant's trusted lieutenant in his Western campaigns, and enjoying his trust as fully as Sherman himself. The Army of the Ohio was led by Schofield, whose services, great as they had previously been, were to be conspicuous in the fall of that year against Hood.

In this advance Thomas was moved upon Tunnel Hill, Schofield upon Varnell's Station, inclining to the right, and McPherson upon Villanow and Snake Creek Gap, with orders to seize the railroad between Resaca and Tilton, and, after breaking it, to withdraw to Snake

pended, that a large proportion were rifled, and that these were given a prominent share of the work of the campaign.

Creek Gap and be prepared to strike the Confederate flank in the act of retreat. As Johnston's army was Sherman's objective, it was the policy of the latter to force a decisive battle as quickly as possible, while he was near his own base and the Confederates were far from theirs. This was Sherman's own opinion at the outset, as is manifest from his letter of May 5th to McPherson, in which he says: "Do not fail in that event to make the most of the opportunity by the most vigorous attack possible, as it may save us from what we have most reason to apprehend—a slow pursuit, in which he gains strength as we lose it."

From the direction of Sherman's columns it was apparent that he did not intend to fight east of Rocky Face, which extends to the west of Dalton in a northerly direction and terminates but a few miles to the north of that place, but that he would use this ridge as a protection to a flanking movement, while also endeavoring to force its various gaps. But on their approach the Southern army was formed to meet an advance by either line, with Stewart's and Bate's divisions guarding Mill Creek Gap, Cheatham on Stewart's right along the crest, Stevenson across Crow Valley joining Stewart's right, Hindman on Stevenson's right, Cleburne in front of Dalton, and Walker in reserve. Dug Gap, farther south, was held by a small force of Arkansas and Kentucky troops.

On the 8th the Confederates were vigorously attacked at Dug Gap, at Mill Creek Gap, and on each side of the latter. The weak force at Dug Gap gallantly held its ground till re-enforced by Granberry's Texans under the personal direction of Hardee, which, with the strength of their position, enabled them to repulse repeated assaults and inflict a loss much disproportionate to their own.

The attacks in the vicinity of Mill Creek Gap, made in larger force and meeting larger force, were also repulsed with great loss. The story of the other assaults was the same, the Confederates being under cover and suffering far less than their assailants.

During these operations McPherson had debouched from Snake Creek Gap upon Resaca, which was held by two brigades under Cantey. They were on their way from Polk's army, and had been halted here to defend this important point. By aid of their fortifications they held the place against McPherson's efforts until the divisions of Cleburne, Walker, and Hindman, under the command of Hood, were sent down from Dalton. McPherson, fearing for his own force, withdrew to the Gap and fortified it. This move, and a successful reconnaissance by Wheeler around Rocky Face, indicated that Sherman, abandoning his attempts against Mill Creek and Dug Gaps, was following McPherson with his main army. This necessitated on the part of the Confederates a withdrawal from Dalton to Resaca, to prevent Sherman from interposing between them and Atlanta. The movement was therefore made, Resaca being held by the constantly arriving troops of Polk's army until the main army arrived and took position. On the 13th the two armies confronted each other around this point, Polk forming the Confederate left from the Oostenaula, Hardee the center, and Hood the right, extending to the Connesauga. Polk's arrival had added about twelve thousand men to the Southern numbers.

In this position fighting ensued along the lines, the Confederates holding their ground and assuming the offensive on their right with some success. But on the left a portion of Polk's troops was driven by an impetuous charge from a hill commanding the railroad bridge; and information was also received that the Federal

forces, protected in their flanking movement by the Oostenaula, were crossing the river some distance below. This menace, being a repetition of the Snake Creek Gap manœuvre, and equally threatening to the Southern line of retreat, necessarily suspended the proposed attack by Hood upon the enemy's left, and caused the dispatch of Walker to meet it. A pontoon bridge a mile up the river and a road constructed to it during the night by the intelligent energy of Colonel Pressman, prevented any inconvenience from the loss of the position by Polk's troops.

The next day (the 15th), upon information that the rumored crossing of the Oostenaula was untrue, the idea of an attack by Hood was recurred to, and Stevenson resumed the position which he had occupied. Here he placed a battery of four guns in front of his line of battle, which provoked a gallant charge upon it by the enemy under Colonel Benjamin Harrison.* His regiment was a new one, and this was its first engagement.

It signalized its baptism of fire by this charge, capturing the guns, but being too weak to bring them off. The guns lay between the two armies equally commanded by the fire of both till night, when, on the withdrawal of the Confederates, they fell into the hands of their gallant captors, whose valor was established by the loss of one hundred and seventy-three men from that regiment alone. But, despite their bloody price, they had the satisfaction of capturing the only artillery which was lost by Johnston in battle during the campaign, for he lost no other guns than these.


Just as Hood was about to resume his advance the crossing of the Oostenaula by the Federals was confirmed, and this again suspended it; though the failure

* Late President of the United States.

of General Stewart to receive the suspending order in time involved him in an unsupported attack and a bloody repulse.

This extension of the Federal right, requiring on the part of the Southern army a line parallel to its direction of retreat, and therefore very hazardous, necessitated the abandonment of Resaca, which was safely accomplished on the night of the 15th, the troops marching southward by parallel roads. Thus the close of this stage of the campaign found the two antagonists south of the Oostenaula, the Confederates having been forced back, not by direct assault but by two skilful flanking movements, the first protected by Rocky Face and the second by the Oostenaula. So far Johnston's army was intact, and the slow pursuit which Sherman most apprehended was the course which the campaign was taking.

Discussing in later writings this initial portion of the campaign, General Sherman has said that it was his plan merely to feign at Dalton until McPherson had planted himself on the Confederate line of retreat, and has commented unfavorably upon the action of the latter in withdrawing to the Gap, instead of placing himself astride the railroad north of Resaca and fighting all comers. If this was his plan, it is strange that out of an army of one hundred and ten thousand men he gave McPherson only twenty-four thousand and reserved the balance for the feint. McPherson's movement was not a surprise to Johnston. He knew of it on the 8th, and he also knew that there was sufficient force at Resaca to hold the place until he could come to its rescue over roads prepared beforehand. He would have asked nothing better than to have McPherson leave the Gap and take a position across the railroad. A strong force thrown around McPherson's left would have cut off his retreat, while the main army, nearly double his numbers,



would have turned upon him from Dalton and driven him back upon the garrison at Resaca to certain destruction.* Vandamme's experience after the battle of Dresden illustrates the peril to a force that entangles itself with a retreating foe.

After these operations the Confederates continued their southward march, finding no position contracted enough to hold with their numbers. Hardee moved by the western road, holding the enemy off by skirmishing, and Hood and Polk by the eastern. The retrograde was leisurely, and was continued to Adairsville, where Johnston had expected to find a good position, but was disappointed. On the way the army received a welcome addition in Jackson's cavalry division of Polk's corps, about thirty-nine hundred strong.

At Adairsville the road to the south divides, one fork following the railroad to Kingston, where it turns east to Cassville, while the other runs due south from Adairsville to the same point. In the hope that the Federal army would separate, with one column on each road, Johnston ordered Hardee, on the western, to hold in check the western hostile column at Kingston, placed Polk just north of Cassville in position to engage the column advancing on the direct road from Adairsville, and moved Hood upon a parallel road east of the Adairsville road to a position from which he was to assail the left flank of the force engaged with Polk.

* In a conversation with the author a few years ago General Johnston expressed himself thus on this subject :

"I would have given all the money I had, and all I ever expected to have, if McPherson had given me such a chance. I could easily have stolen a night march upon Sherman and fallen upon McPherson with such superior force as to crush him. The fact that I transferred Hood's three divisions on the night of the 9th proves its feasibility. I have always thought that McPherson acted exactly as he should have done."

Instead of doing this, Hood, acting upon a report that the enemy was approaching from the direction of Canton, or due east (although they had for days been in constant observation from the other direction), abandoned his movement without reporting his act, and thus lost the time necessary for the execution of the plan, which was only possible while the Federal forces were separated by the greatest interval and dependent on poor cross-roads for communication. Thus this opportunity passed, and nothing remained but to abandon the scheme. Thereupon the army withdrew to the ridge south of Cassville, which was occupied by Johnston in force, with the intention of here making a stand. He regarded the position as an admirable one, and ranged Hood's corps upon the right, Polk in the center, and Hardee upon the left. Fully resolved to fight here, he issued the following battle order:

"Soldiers of the Army of Tennessee: You have displayed the highest quality of the soldier—firmness in combat, patience under toil. By your courage and skill you have repulsed every assault of the enemy. By marches by day and by marches by night you have defeated every attempt upon your communications. Your communications are secured. You will now turn and march to meet his advancing columns. Fully confiding in the conduct of the officers, the courage of the soldiers, I lead you to battle. We may confidently trust that the Almighty Father will still reward the patriots' toils and bless the patriots' banners. Cheered by the success of our brothers in Virginia and beyond the Mississippi, our efforts will equal theirs. Strengthened by his support, those efforts will be crowned with the like glories." The reception of the order by the troops proved that they were ready for combat, and encouraged their commander in his decision.

While watching the formation of the men, General Johnston was approached by General Shoup, his chief of artillery, and warned that a part of the line would be enfiladed by cannon placed on a distant hill in front of the right. He gave directions to guard against this contingency by the construction of traverses, and by suggesting to the officer commanding there that he might occupy some ravines which would shelter his troops, ready to resume his place in the line in the event of an assault. That night he met Generals Hood and Polk by invitation at the headquarters of the latter, when they united in urging him to abandon the position, and asserted that they would not be able to hold their lines, as they would be rendered untenable by the enemy's artillery placed on this hill. After a long discussion Johnston reluctantly yielded, from the fear that this opinion of the corps commanders might tend to cause the inability which they expressed. Hardee, on hearing of the decision, remonstrated, and expressed confidence in his power to hold his post, though his corps had little or no advantage of ground. But the decision was adhered to, and before daybreak the next morning the army silently withdrew and took up its march to the Etowah—a step which, as Johnston said in his official report, he always had regretted. The Etowah was crossed about noon on the 20th.

At this stage both armies paused for a couple of days, Johnston to give his men rest, and Sherman to repair his railroad and make ready for his next move. The direct line of retreat for the Confederates was along the railroad, which would give them the strong position of Allatoona Pass wherein to hold their pursuers at bay. Sherman, when a young lieutenant, had ridden through this part of the country, and noted well its topography. In the light of this knowledge he decided not to move

upon this position direct, but to compel its relinquishment by marching on Dallas. The effect of this able manœuvre would be to force the Confederates to confront him there, far to the southwest of Allatoona, which would enable him, by a gradual extension of his left under cover of the flying breastworks, in the construction of which his men were so adept, to reach the railroad to the south of Allatoona. He issued orders for this movement to commence on the 23d, sending Thomas, the center, by Euharlee and Stilesborough; Schofield, the left, on Burnt Hickory by roads to the east of Thomas; and McPherson, his right, toward Dallas by roads farthest to the west.

Meanwhile the Southern commander sent the enterprising Wheeler across the Etowah, with a strong body of cavalry, to see what was going on in the army of his enemy. Wheeler crossed the Etowah on the 22d at a point some distance above the railroad bridge and penetrated to the enemy's rear as far as Cassville, where, on the 24th, he defeated the guard of a supply train, inflicting heavy loss; and after destroying such of the wagons as he could not secure, he brought into the lines as a welcome prize a large number of wagons and a larger number of teams, with his prisoners. The information gained in this reconnoissance, together with the reports from Jackson's Cavalry down the river, enabled Johnston to detect his adversary's design. To meet him upon this new line, he at once sent Hardee's and Polk's corps to throw themselves across the road leading from Dallas to Atlanta, following them up with Hood's corps, which was to form upon their right. By the 25th the army was in position across the path of their advancing enemy, Hardee constituting the left, Polk the center, and Hood the right, the center of the latter being near New Hope Church. The Federal

line extended from Dallas in the direction of Allatoona.

That afternoon Hood's center division (A. P. Stewart's) was assailed by Hooker's corps, advancing in deep order. Two of the brigades had some protection from logs which they had barely had time to throw into the form of a rough rampart. The attack was of the most determined and gallant character, only pausing when within fifty paces of the Southern line, and the Federal loss was commensurate with the courage of the assault. So heavy was the fighting in this vicinity that the peaceful name of "New Hope Church" no longer suited the invaders, and they called it "Hell-Hole," as conveying a better idea of their experience at the spot.


After this fight Sherman recurred to the tactics of extending his left, which necessitated the transfer of Polk to the right of Hood, Hardee closing upon Hood's left. This race of flying breastworks occupied two days without serious fighting; but on the morning of the 27th, in the vicinity of Pickett's Mill, Cleburne's division was furiously assailed by Howard's corps. Here, too, the attack was of the most fearless nature, attaining a point less than twenty paces from the Confederate lines; but the coolness of Cleburne's men and their well-directed fire repulsed it with great slaughter. After the Federals had withdrawn discomfited, Cleburne advanced and captured a number of prisoners who had taken shelter in a friendly ravine.

It was in this action that, after three soldiers had been successively killed in trying to save a Federal standard which was in danger of falling into the hands of the Confederates, a fourth, braving the fate of his companions, succeeded in bearing it away. The Federals had an opportunity the next morning to partially avenge this repulse. Bate's division assailed their

right, under the wrong impression that it had been much weakened, but was repulsed with a loss of several hundred men.

The next morning it was intended to attack the Federal left at daybreak, Hood to commence the movement and the other corps to join successively. Long after the appointed time a message was received from him to the effect that he had found a division of the Federal left thrown back and intrenched. As the loss of time rendered the attempt inexpedient, even if it had not been so originally, the plan was abandoned. Nothing but cavalry affairs and skirmishing occupied the next few days. By the 4th of June Sherman had reached the railroad, holding it as far south as Big Shanty, thus reaping the fruits of his masterly manœuvre, and pressing the Confederates back to a position extending from Lost Mountain by Gilgal Church to the railroad, which covered all roads leading from Marietta. For several days no fighting of consequence took place, Sherman being engaged in repairing his railroad, and Johnston in strengthening the positions where he expected the next fighting to occur. He was compelled to fortify his positions beforehand, for the great scarcity of intrenching tools in his army, and the fact that Sherman had a large pioneer corps to work while his soldiers slept, rendered it impossible to keep pace with their foes in field fortifying. At this time General Sherman was re-enforced by the Seventeenth Corps, numbering nine thousand effectives.

The constantly increasing length of Sherman's communications rendered his situation critical if they could be seized by a strong force in his rear and permanent injury inflicted on his railroad, already severely taxed to supply his needs. Any lengthy interruption in the receipt of his daily supplies of ammunition and provi-



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sions would have compelled him to attack on his adversary's terms or to retreat.

Johnston, alive to this, had from the outset endeavored to secure the organization of such an expedition. As early as May 7th, before Polk had joined, he had asked him by telegraph whether he could not throw a cavalry force into middle Tennessee; and on May 10th he repeated the suggestion to Polk, and to S. D. Lee, his successor in Mississippi. On June 3d, in telegrams to Bragg and S. D. Lee, he renewed the request, claiming that such a step, if successful in breaking Sherman's communications, might produce great results. He renewed the recommendation on the 11th, 12th, 13th, 16th, and 26th. On the latter date Bragg replied for the first time, saying briefly that there was no force available for the purpose. It was not until July 11th that President Davis communicated to Johnston his ideas on the subject. They were, that a strong cavalry detachment should be sent from his own army and charged with that duty. As Johnston needed all his cavalry, not only to protect his own communications but also to hold portions of his lines against the superior numbers of his foe, this did not meet the approval of his judgment. General Hood, when in command later in the campaign, thought better of it. He adopted the President's strategy, sent off his cavalry, and at once Sherman's cavalry were upon his communications and Atlanta fell.

Had Johnston's suggestion been acted upon, and a strong body of horse under the gifted Forrest been sent upon such an expedition, the story of that campaign might have been reversed. In the view of the Administration, the protection of Mississippi and Alabama from raids was of more importance than the defeat of this invasion. It was but another phase of the old question

on which President Davis and General Johnston had differed from the outbreak of the war, each with equal sincerity and positiveness—the question of the relative wisdom of concentration for decisive operations or diffusion to protect territory.

It was the 14th before the Union army again commenced to press the Confederates in their new position. Here Pine Mountain was in advance of the main line, and was held by Bate's division of Hardee's corps. As Hardee apprehended that from its advanced station it was liable to be cut off, Johnston, in company with him and Polk, visited the hill to examine it. The group attracted the fire of a Federal battery, one of whose shots killed General Polk. His corps was assigned temporarily to Loring.

The abandonment of Pine Mountain—which was decided upon after this inspection—caused a withdrawal, first to a line behind Mud Creek, which was found to be partly enfiladed; and hence the army withdrew to yet another position, part of which included Kenesaw Mountain. This was occupied on the 19th, Hardee being on the left, across the road from Lost Mountain to Marietta, Loring being in the center, of which Kenesaw was part, and Hood on the right. Noye's Creek was in front, but it was swollen by recent rains, and Sherman availed himself of this to extend his right and intrench. This necessitated the transfer of Hood to Hardee's left. Hence the Confederate position was parallel to its line of communication, which rendered it very perilous.

On the 22d occurred the affair of Culp's Farm, which was a serious check to the Confederates. This was upon the Confederate left, and was between Hood on one side and Hooker and Schofield on the other. Hood, after repulsing an attack, assumed the offensive and attempted to capture some artillery strongly posted on a hill and

gallantly defended. The result was a disastrous repulse, with a loss of about one thousand men. These operations were the prelude to the great battle of Kenesaw Mountain. Till then Sherman had abstained from direct assaults, and had wisely used his superior strength to the best advantage by taking position near his antagonist, intrenching a portion of his army, and flanking his adversary with the remainder. Such a movement here would involve leaving his railroad and taking supplies with him. He resolved to risk the chance of an assault, hoping to find a weak spot at which he might break through. He reasoned that the immense results of success, if achieved, would justify the attempt, for it would probably mean the destruction of the Army of Tennessee and a speedy termination of the war. His lieutenants agreed with him, and the 27th of June was chosen as the day for the battle. The Southern army was still in the Kenesaw lines. With great difficulty a few guns had been dragged by hand to the summit of Little Kenesaw, which gave a fine position from which to play upon the Federals below. There was space for but few pieces, however. The Northern army concentrated a large number against them, and for some days before the grand assault the artillery duel had been progressing. Though Kenesaw was a mountain in name, it was hardly so in fact; for the Federal artillerists were not only able to attain its summit with their projectiles, but even to shoot entirely over it, and create consternation among the Confederate teamsters on the other side.

The points selected by Sherman for his principal efforts were Featherston's right and French's left, of Loring's corps; and Cheatham's right and Cleburne's left, of Hardee's. Logan was to move against Featherston, Howard against French, and Palmer against Cheatham and Cleburne. Each was to be strongly supported. The

selected points of attack nearest the railroad were on high ground; the other was south of the mountain on rolling ground, and was in some places not protected by abatis and head logs. Preparatory to the assault, skirmishing and artillery fire commenced along the whole line of the two armies, and the assailants formed for the advance in deep columns with narrow fronts.

The story of the three assaults was the same. Nothing could surpass the gallantry which the assailants displayed; but it was in vain, for everywhere they were met with equal courage, and were in no case able to break the lines of the defenders.

Logan's attack first struck the Twelfth Louisiana, which was some distance in advance, deployed as skirmishers. They held their ground until the Federal line was almost upon them, and then retired to the main line. Logan's troops impetuously followed, receiving a destructive fire not only from Scott's Infantry in front, but from enfilading artillery. No troops could withstand it, yet they advanced till they reached a point near the Confederate works, where they protected themselves as best they could and obstinately refused to withdraw.

Howard's attack fell upon Cockrell's Brigade of French's division and a part of Walker's division. Its determination was equally conspicuous and equally futile, and many of the dead fell upon the very slope of the Confederate intrenchments. After losing the chivalrous Harker, and many others less distinguished perhaps but equally courageous, it was also arrested.

But the heaviest assault fell upon Cheatham, and, despite the appalling loss inflicted upon them, the Union men reached a point so near the Confederate lines that it was safer to remain than to withdraw. At one time the aspect of affairs was so threatening that only a

prompt advance of part of Cheatham's reserve prevented a penetration of the Confederate works. This point in the line was named by the troops the "Dead angle," from the number of Federal dead counted there after the fight was over.

In Cleburne's front occurred one of the prettiest episodes of the civil war. In the heat of the conflict the undergrowth and dry wood of the forest was set on fire by the artillery, and the Federal wounded were threatened with a death more awful than that which they had already braved with such fortitude. The Confederates, observing this, called to their foes to come and remove their disabled comrades. By common consent a truce was declared for the purpose, many of the Southern troops assisted in the task, and the men who a few moments before had been contending in a death struggle now vied with each other in the humane work of carrying their helpless fellow-creatures from this dangerous locality. When the chivalrous duty was accomplished the truce was declared at an end, and they again became enemies.

In this battle the Federal loss was about twenty-five hundred, and the Confederate about five hundred, according to the official reports. Its unsuccessful issue convinced Sherman that he could gain nothing by direct onslaughts, and induced him to resort once more to the flank extensions by means of which he had so far in the campaign forced Johnston out of his successive selected positions. Pausing for a short time to make arrangements for this manœuvre, which involved leaving the railroad for a time, by the collection of the supplies necessary to insure its success, Sherman commenced it on July 2d by transferring McPherson to his right, to strengthen Schofield, and by threatening with his cavalry a crossing of the Chattahoochee near Sandtown, several

miles below the railroad bridge, the river below the bridge being guarded only by some Georgia militia under General Gustavus W. Smith. This brought the Union right as near to Atlanta as the Southern left, forcing the latter to fall back or hold a long line parallel to their railroad. In consequence the Kenesaw position was abandoned, and the Confederates withdrew to a position several miles south, which crossed the railroad at Smyrna and on its left curved southwardly, protected in front by Nickajack Creek. The position had been prepared beforehand in anticipation of this contingency.

Sherman detected the relinquishment of Kenesaw at once, and started his army in hot pursuit, hoping to catch his enemy at a disadvantage in the confusion of retreat, believing that there would be no pause north of the Chattahoochee, and eager to strike a decisive blow at a receding foe while astride a difficult stream. Impressing these views upon his lieutenants by urgent communications to them on the 3d of July, he pushed Thomas forward along the railroad, and McPherson to his right toward Schofield. On the 4th the armies again came in contact, and the Confederates were found in their position across the railroad. An attempt of one of McPherson's divisions to force them was repulsed with loss, but the strengthening of the Federal right, necessitating a corresponding policy on the Confederate left, caused the Southern army to withdraw to the lines nearest the Chattahoochee, which better covered the principal roads to Atlanta; and the Federals closed upon them in their new position. Here again there was a pause on both sides, Sherman utilizing the time to improve his railway and to study out the best thing to do next, and Johnston to fortify Atlanta and the approaches by which he expected his opponent to advance. Jack-

son's Cavalry watched the lower part of the river, and Wheeler's the part above the bridge.*

* Sherman's disappointment at his failure to damage Johnston on the retreat from Kenesaw is evinced by his note of July 5th to Stoneman, in which he says : " We ought to have caught Johnston on his retreat, but he had prepared the way too well."

CHAPTER XVI.

ATLANTA.

THE problem now was, by which side Sherman would approach Atlanta to commence the operations which were to be the crisis of the campaign. Though the defense on the westward would be more difficult, since the streams there, being perpendicular to the defenses, would render a continuous line impossible, other considerations were conclusive in favor of the approach on the eastward. Above the bridge the river was fordable, which not only facilitated a crossing by Sherman, but exposed his communications to the Confederate cavalry if he selected the other approach. In addition, a movement by this flank threatened the communications with Richmond, which Sherman was the more anxious to break as he had just heard from Grant that the Confederate troops, which had been threatening Washington from the Valley of Virginia, and which were estimated at twenty-five thousand, would probably be sent to re-enforce Johnston. Despite the fact that on this side the ground was more favorable for defense, Sherman, impelled by these reasons, decided to approach from this direction.

Johnston correctly divined that Sherman would come to this conclusion, satisfied that the first of the above reasons would cause so skillful an opponent to adopt this line of approach. But the Southern commander decided that he could not defend the river line itself

with his force. Besides being fordable in many places, its form was concave, thus rendering the line of a defender necessarily weak. But its large tributary, Peach Tree Creek, which joins it a short distance above the railroad bridge and is nearly as difficult of passage as the river itself, presented a convex line, and the heights on its side next to Atlanta a good position. Hence he decided not to seriously contest the passage of the Chattahoochee, but to await the enemy's approach behind Peach Tree Creek, hoping there for an opportunity to strike an isolated fraction of his enemy's force. In addition to this, Atlanta was strongly fortified; and being so near his base, he felt that the constant flank extensions with which his enemy had manœuvred him skillfully out of successive positions by threats of interposing between him and his base, would necessarily cease. He did not believe that Sherman could break his communications without exposing his own, though this was the latter's plan, and he was as confident as Johnston. The upper part of the Chattahoochee was closely watched by Wheeler; and Johnston resolved to place his army in its chosen position as soon as the movements of his adversary rendered it expedient.

By July 7th Sherman had completed his railway and decided upon his direction of approach, which, as expected, was across the upper part of the river. He had already secured a crossing at Roswell, but this was far up stream, and it was important to effect a passage lower down. On the 8th this was accomplished near the mouth of Soap Creek by the division of Cox, and a position on the south bank fortified, thus insuring a good *débouché* for the national army.

While this was being done, menaces and demonstrations were kept up by Sherman far down the river to distract attention. But on the night of the 9th, Johnston,

fully advised by Wheeler of the operations above, withdrew from his works on the north side of the river, prepared to take position along the Peach Tree Creek line, which extended from the Western and Atlantic Railroad to the Georgia Railway between Atlanta and Decatur. Sherman promptly crossed his whole army, moving McPherson far to his left to strike the latter railway between Decatur and Stone Mountain, Schofield by Cross Keys toward Decatur, and Thomas direct on Atlanta by the roads from Pace's and Phillips's ferries and Buckhead. This would bring Thomas across Peach Tree Creek where Johnston expected, and cause the separation of the Federal right and center, by which he hoped to profit. These changes occupied a week, and the approach of the Federal forces to the Confederate lines was not before the 18th.

But Johnston was not to carry out the plans which he had devised. On the 13th General Bragg arrived at Atlanta, and, before seeing Johnston, wired the President that indications seemed to favor an evacuation. Soon afterward he saw Johnston, who invited him to make full inquiries into the state of affairs, and offered to send for the corps commanders, that he might have the best facilities for information. Bragg, in reply, assured him that his visit was entirely unofficial; that he would be glad to see the corps commanders as friends, but in no other way; that he was on his way to obtain re-enforcements from the trans-Mississippi. So far as the documentary evidence discloses, he saw but one corps commander, and that was General Hood. He bore back with him to Richmond, to which he immediately returned, a letter from Hood, dated July 14th, in which Hood did not hesitate to state that the army during the campaign had had several chances to strike a decisive blow; that it had failed to take advantage of them; that

it was of great importance that the army should attack Sherman; that he had so often urged that they should force the enemy to give battle as to be almost regarded as reckless by the officers high in rank in the army, since their views had been opposite to his; and that he regarded it as a great misfortune that they had failed to give battle to the enemy many miles north of the position which they then held; and he concluded by assuring the President that he would do his duty cheerfully and faithfully. The letter made no reference to the lost opportunity of Cassville or the butchery of Culp's Farm.

The motive which prompted General Hood, while still a subordinate of Johnston, to write thus secretly and disloyally of his chief and ungenerously of his brother officers, can only be judged by the event.

And the act of Bragg in thus visiting Johnston and returning to Richmond to urge his removal, after his generous treatment by Johnston under circumstances somewhat similar in the spring of 1863, is one of the antitheses of history.

On the night of the 17th, while Johnston was making his preparations to fall upon the enemy while they were engaged in the passage of Peach Tree Creek, he was arrested in their midst by the receipt of the following telegram:

"General J. E. JOHNSTON: Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of general under the late law of Congress. I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that, as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the immediate vicinity of Atlanta far in the interior of Georgia, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the command of the

Army and Department of Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to General Hood.

“S COOPER, *Adjutant and Inspector General.*”

To this unexpected reward for his labors he replied as follows:

“*General* S. COOPER, Richmond: Your dispatch of yesterday received and obeyed. Command of the Army and Department of Tennessee has been transferred to General Hood. As to the alleged cause of my removal, I assert that Sherman’s army is much stronger compared with that of Tennessee, than Grant’s compared with that of northern Virginia. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance much more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta than to that of Richmond and Petersburg, and has penetrated much deeper into Virginia than into Georgia. Confident language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evidence of competency.

“J. E. JOHNSTON.”

But he allowed no resentment to interfere with the cause to which he had devoted his talents. He congratulated his successor upon his preferment, and, at the latter’s request, unfolded the plans under which he had intended to be governed. He explained his scheme of falling upon a divided column of his foe with his main force while they were separated by Peach Tree Creek, which would be decisive if successful, as it would back the enemy against a part of the river where there were no fords; while if unsuccessful, he had a safe refuge in Atlanta, whence, no longer in danger of being flanked, he might hope to obtain fair opportunities to sally forth with his concentrated forces against an adversary extended by the necessities of investment. At the request of Hood, he gave orders the next day which arranged

the troops in the selected positions, and did everything to insure the successful execution of his plan by his successor.

A distinguished Northern soldier and writer who participated in these operations shows that Johnston's anticipation of the Federal movement was verified by the fact. He says: "Just at this time, much to our comfort and to his surprise, Johnston was removed, and Hood placed in command of the Confederate army. Johnston had planned to attack Sherman at Peach Tree Creek, expecting just such a division between our wings as we made." *

Despite the dismay which pervaded the army when the news of Johnston's removal was communicated, and of which the Southern executive was made aware, it persisted in its action, and Johnston took leave of his soldiers in the following order:

"In obedience to orders of the War Department, I turn over to General Hood the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee. I can not leave this noble army without expressing my admiration of the high military qualities it has displayed. A long and arduous campaign has made conspicuous every soldierly virtue, endurance of toil, obedience to orders, brilliant courage. The enemy has never attacked but to be repulsed and severely punished. You, soldiers, have never argued but from your courage, and never counted your foes. No longer your leader, I will still watch your career, and will rejoice in your victories. To one and all I offer assurances of my friendship, and bid an affectionate farewell.


J. E. JOHNSTON, *General*."

The men did not hesitate to evince their disapproval

* General O. O. Howard in *The Struggle for Atlanta*, vol. iv, p. 313, of the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*.

of the removal by cheering as they passed General Johnston's headquarters, and by proclaiming in every way consistent with discipline their trust in him. The following account of the feeling of his brigade by one of the brigade commanders, quoted from a letter to Johnston, may be taken as an expression of the feeling in the army :

“ For myself I do not believe that the devotion of any army in the world to its commander was ever truer than that of the Army of Tennessee to you ; and that devotion was never deeper than on the disastrous day when the overwhelming and incredible announcement burst upon us that you had been removed. I well remember that day and how its dismal tidings stunned and shocked us all. I shall never forget it. I wish I could. The news first came into my brigade about an hour by sun on the morning of the 18th of July, in the shape of a horrid rumor. Officers hurried to my headquarters with consternation in their faces to inquire of its truth. I did not hesitate to denounce it as an invention of the enemy, to disturb us on the eve of battle. Presently, to my delight, there came from division headquarters an order to me stating that a false and injurious rumor was passing through my camp to the effect that General Johnston had been removed, directing me to contradict it, and cause the arrest and punishment of the author of the mischievous report. In a moment there was an outburst of joy all over the brigade, and the men went hunting about for the person who started the tale, swearing they would lynch him. In a short time, however, I saw an officer from division headquarters approaching me on foot. He beckoned me aside and informed me that the report of General Johnston's removal was unfortunately true, and that he desired me to put the best face upon the matter in my power and prepare the men for



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the announcement as well as I could. I did so in good faith, but the terrible revulsion of feeling only revealed how powerful was your hold upon the affections of that army."

The only rejoicing at his removal outside of those who were responsible for it was among his opponents. His great antagonist has since (in his article on *The Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War*, published in vol. iv, p. 253, of the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*) written of it as follows: "At this critical moment the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable service. Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood was substituted to command the Confederate army."

And General Jacob D. Cox, who was an actor in the operations, speaks thus of the removal in his monograph on the Atlanta campaign: "It is certain that the change of Confederate commanders was learned with satisfaction by every officer and man in the national army. The patient skill and watchful intelligence and courage with which Johnston had always confronted them with impregnable fortifications had been exasperating. They had found no weak joints in the harness, and no wish was so common or so often expressed as that he would only try our works as we were trying his."

Thus ended his association with this memorable campaign, in which he had taken a beaten army, galvanized it into life, faced with it a superior force of the best soldiers of the North under a leader worthy of the men he commanded, and conducted a retreat without loss of material or spirit for a hundred miles to his chosen ground of combat. Here, with his army intact and full of trust, he was suddenly removed from its head.

It has been asserted that General Lee was consulted before this action was taken by the Confederate Govern-

ment, and the weighty authority of his name has been cited to sustain it. The contrary is the fact. That General Lee advised against it is placed beyond question by the statement to that effect of Colonel Walter H. Taylor, of his staff (on p. 139 of his work entitled *Four Years with General Lee*), by a letter to the same effect from Colonel Charles Marshall, of his staff, and by the letter from General Wade Hampton to General Johnston which is published in vol. iv, p. 277, of the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*.

No account of this campaign is complete without a statement of the strength and losses of the two armies. Yet nothing is more difficult to state with accuracy.

General Sherman, in his *Memoirs*, states his "effective strength for offensive purposes" to have been at the outset 98,797 men and 254 guns, exclusive of three divisions of cavalry, which must have been about 12,000 strong, since his force, as given in the *War Records*, was 110,123 on April 30th. On May 31st it was 112,819, and on June 30th 106,970, his re-enforcements having nearly supplied his losses.

No means of ascertaining the number of his re-enforcements are accessible. Blair brought him nine thousand men in one body, and the notes to the organization of his army, as published in the *War Records*, show that the Twenty-fifth Illinois, Eighth Kansas, Sixty-ninth Ohio, Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania, Tenth Michigan, Fourteenth Michigan, Twenty-third Missouri, Twenty-second Michigan, Second Cavalry Brigade of Garrard's Division (three regiments), Fifty-fifth Illinois, Thirtieth Ohio, Thirty-seventh Ohio, Fortieth Illinois, Seventh Illinois, Forty-first Illinois, Forty-fifth Ohio, Third Brigade of Judah's or Hascall's Cavalry (four regiments), One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois, Sixty-fifth Illinois, and Third Brigade of Stoneman (two regiments and a squad-

ron), or twenty-six regiments in all, joined his army during the time Johnston was opposed to him. And these organized bodies were exclusive of the large number of recruits and furloughed men who joined individually during his advance. Though from these data it is impossible to give accurate figures, it is evident that the Northern re-enforcements were large. As he had 230,000 men present for duty in his departments, so skillful a leader would certainly bring up sufficient re-enforcements to preserve his preponderance of strength.

The only means of hazarding even an approximate estimate of his re-enforcements is afforded by a passage in General Sherman's official report, in which he says (after stating his numbers at the outset): "About these figures have been maintained during the campaign, the number of men joining from furlough and hospitals about compensating for the loss in battle and from sickness." As his losses in battle alone aggregated 37,081, his re-enforcements must have been at least that number.

The Federal losses up to the time of Johnston's removal are yet more difficult to fix with certainty. The Army of the Cumberland is the only one of the three which gave its losses by monthly statements. Its total losses to September 1st were 22,807, of which 14,521 were incurred prior to July 1st, or about two thirds. The loss of the Army of the Ohio during the campaign was 3,969, and that of the Army of the Tennessee during the campaign was 10,314. Assuming that this same proportion of two thirds prevailed in these two armies, then their loss prior to July 1st would be 9,522, making a grand aggregate to that date of 24,043. It is probably far within bounds to suppose that Sherman's loss in his entire army during the first eighteen days of July was 1,000; and hence it may be assumed that of his total

loss, at least 25,000—if not more—were incurred while opposing Johnston.

That this is a fair estimate may be verified in another way. General Sherman, in his *Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War*, previously cited, states that his losses on July 20th were 1,710, on July 22d 3,641, and on July 29th 700, or a total of 6,051 in those three engagements, which were the only heavy ones after July 18th. Add to this the casualties of the Army of the Cumberland after September 1st, which were 2,567, and deduct the aggregate from the total loss of 37,081, and the remainder is 28,363. It is probably an overestimate to assume the Federal loss after July 18th to be as high as 3,363, exclusive of those engagements; so that this also would indicate a loss of at least 25,000 prior to that date. The number of dead counted by the Confederates on the numerous occasions when their gallantry had brought them near enough to be counted, and the silent testimony of the Federal city of the dead near Marietta, caused the Confederates to estimate the Federal loss as very much greater than this figure.

The effective total of Johnston's force at the beginning was 45,101, as has been seen. On May 2d Mercer joined with 1,400 effectives. In a few days Loring's and Cantey's divisions of Polk's corps joined the army. Loring, according to the return of May 10th, had 4,652 effectives. Cantey's Brigade has already been included. It numbered 1,943. Deduct this from his divisional strength of 4,150, as shown by his return of June 10th, and the remainder of 2,207 should be counted as reinforcements. At Kingston the division of French came up. Its return of May 10th gives it 3,975 effectives. At New Hope Church, Quarles' Brigade joined from Mobile with an effective strength of about 2,200. At Resaca, Martin's cavalry division brought 3,500 effectives to the

army; and Jackson's cavalry of Polk's corps joined near Adairsville with 4,537 effectives, adopting its return of June 10th. On July 3d the Fifth and Forty-seventh Georgia Regiments were taken from the army and sent to Savannah. Their aggregate strength was about 600 effectives. This made a total force throughout the campaign of 66,972. The greatest strength of the army at any one time was probably on June 10th, when, according to its return of that date, it numbered 60,564 effectives. On June 30th its effective total was 54,085, and on July 10th 50,932, which was about its strength when Johnston relinquished command.

The losses of the army in killed and wounded, while led by Johnston, were 9,972, according to the reports of its medical director. This does not include the cavalry or the loss in prisoners. It is impossible to state these with accuracy, for the cavalry made no report, except Wheeler, for the month of May, during which he states his loss in killed, wounded, and captured at eighty-one. Assuming this as an average per month, and his loss in the campaign would be about three hundred. Jackson's division was weaker than Wheeler in numbers, and did not have as much fighting, so that his loss was probably less. If it was the same, the total cavalry loss did not exceed six hundred. This is also evident from the fact that the reported strength of cavalry in the returns of June 10th and 30th and July 10th is about the same, the decrease being in the other two arms.

The character of the operations was such that neither side lost heavily in prisoners, for there was but little opportunity to make them. Outposts and skirmishers were occasionally picked up, but, as the Confederate line was never broken, the number of prisoners must have been insignificant. The prisoners constituted about thirteen per cent of Sherman's loss, and there is no reason to

suppose that the percentage was higher in Johnston's army, whose cavalry had on more than one occasion brought in large captures. If it was the same, they would number about fourteen hundred, which would make the total Confederate loss under Johnston to be about twelve thousand from all causes—an estimate probably over the fact.*

Some writers have made the Southern army larger than the above figures by taking from its returns everything included under the "present for duty," instead of the column of effective total. By this means the Southern army is made to appear but little inferior to Sherman's—a startling discovery, at war with the universally accepted ideas at the time. No higher authority on this subject can be quoted than General Sherman himself. In his *Memoirs* he takes the Confederate statement of "effective total," and quotes it as representing his adversary's strength for the purpose of comparing it with his own. And in the same work he says that he always estimated his strength as double Johnston's, and knew that he could afford to lose two to one without disturbing their relative strength.

The same unimpeachable authority may also be cited to show that the figures of his own army quoted above represent its fighting force. In his *Memoirs*, after describing the intelligent means adopted by him to reduce his transportation (and hence the necessity for details) to a minimum, he speaks of the numbers given as his

* General Sherman, in his *Memoirs*, in stating Johnston's loss for different periods, takes the total captures made by him during the campaign and averages them over the whole period, thus making his captures for May and June as large as for the subsequent months. This manifestly could not have been in accordance with the facts, for in his great victories over Hood he probably made more captures in a day than Johnston lost in a month.

force "present for battle." In his official report he speaks of them as his "effective strength for offensive purposes." The returns themselves, as published in the War Records, purport to give the "effective strength" of his army; and in his Memoirs he states that the only reports called for were the ordinary trimonthly returns of "effective strength."

In addition to this, he organized a pioneer detachment of two hundred freedmen to each division (there were twenty-two divisions), who relieved the soldiers in the work of intrenchment, and obviated the necessity of details for that and other purposes. Hence the comparison of the "effective total" of Johnston with the "effective strength" of Sherman must be a reasonable approximation to the fact, adopted as it is by both the generals in their military calculations then and their military writings since. Both Sherman and Johnston were noted for their candor, and their statement on such a subject ought to be conclusive.*

* A notable article on the subject of Johnston's strength is that of Major E. C. Dawes, published in vol. iv, p. 281, of the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. Whether he is right or not in his contention that all the "present for duty" should be taken instead of the "effective total," there are certainly some mistakes in his figures. He states Johnston's artillery at the outset to have been 144 pieces, taking it from the return of April 30th. This includes the 36 pieces of the reserve. The report of W. F. Barry shows that Sherman's reserve artillery was not included in his 254 pieces. He had 530 guns in all in his departments. Out of the surplus of 276 pieces a reserve of 18 batteries was organized, which was constantly drawn upon in the campaign. Major Dawes states Sherman's strength at the outset to have been 104,000. The official returns published in the War Records give it as 110,123. He states the strength of Mercer's Brigade at 2,800. It was 1,400 (Johnston's Narrative, p. 302). In discussing the home guards, composed of men beyond or under the conscript age, which were not a part of the regular enlisted Confederate army, he is certainly in error. He estimates the Georgia militia—which the wonder-

But mere numbers are not the only index of the comparative efficiency of armies. In this respect Johnston was at a striking disadvantage as compared with Lee. The latter commanded an army which had held its own for three years, the former an army which had been chased out of two States. And conversely, the adversary of Lee was an army which did not have the confidence springing from previous steady advance, like the army of Sherman.

Sherman's army was, in addition to this, a better army than Grant's. It was the pick of three armies, each of which was veteran. Its material was from the young States of the West—men who from their youth had been accustomed to danger and manly sports. It had but little of the mercenary element in its ranks, but was actuated by that spirit of patriotism which gave additional force to their bravery. Its officers were selected from those who had already gained their trust, and this confidence between officers and men was reciprocal. It was an army of which the most warlike nation known to history might well have been proud.

Mr. John C. Ropes, in an article on 'The War as we See it Now,' published in *Scribner's Magazine* for June, 1891, after showing that the armies of Grant, Lee, and Johnston had seen their best days, and noticing the fact that most of the Western States had kept up their old regiments by recruits, instead of organizing new regiments of raw troops, says :

"It may have been noticed that the Federal army of the West was not included in the foregoing estimate. We are disposed to think that, unlike the armies of

ful energy and zealous co-operation of Hon. Joseph E. Brown, the great war Governor of Georgia, had brought into the field under General Gustavus W. Smith—at 5,000. That officer, in his official report, states their force prior to July 22d as 2,000.

Johnston, Lee, and Grant, the army commanded by Sherman entered upon the campaign of 1864 in better condition in every respect than it ever was in before. It had had ample time to repair the losses of Chickamauga; it had not been weakened, as had its antagonist, by the withdrawal of a part of its force for service elsewhere; its losses at Missionary Ridge had not been large, and its success there had been of the most striking and brilliant kind. It was composed in the main of Western regiments that had enlisted in 1861, and had, to a great extent at least, been kept up to a fair average of strength by the wiser and more military policy which the Western States generally adopted in the matter of recruiting their contingents, of which we have spoken above. Hence General Sherman's army reaped the full benefit of all the most favorable military conditions that can effect the efficiency of an army. Its unity had been strictly preserved; it had not been depleted by losses or by detachments; it had not been 'watered' by the addition of raw troops. It was under a commander who was the idol of his men, whose great abilities were universally and cheerfully acknowledged, and who possessed the entire confidence of the general in chief and the Government at Washington."

Considering his paucity of resources, his lack of support from the Confederate Government, the ability of his opponent, the valor and numbers of the host which was pressing upon him, this retreat will, to adopt the language of one of the most distinguished Federal soldiers—General Hooker—who spoke from his own observation, long be regarded "as the most prominent feature of the war, and a useful lesson for study for all persons who may hereafter elect for their calling the profession of arms."

CHAPTER XVII.

NORTH CAROLINA.

AFTER the removal of Johnston in front of Atlanta he was assigned to no command, and the Administration proceeded to carry out its strategic plans in its own fashion. Having shattered his magnificent army in wild assaults upon Sherman, and given it the *coup de grace* at Nashville, Hood also sought the obscurity of private life, but with very different reflections from those in which Johnston could justly indulge. The blood of thousands of gallant soldiers uselessly sacrificed cried aloud from the battlefields of Georgia and Tennessee; the spectral chimneys and heaps of ashes by which the track of the desolating "March to the Sea" could be traced were silent monuments to the consequences of the action which by the removal of Johnston had rendered such things possible.

During these gloomy days he was in retirement, denied all opportunity of defending his country. He so remained until February of 1865, and was convinced that his military service was at an end, though from all parts of the South the demand for his restoration was unceasing.*

* As late as February 13, 1865, General Johnston, in a letter to his brother Beverly, alluding to a debate in the Confederate Congress, says: "If I had not believed it before, Mr. Semmes' late speech would convince me that my military service in this war is terminated."

But in the early part of that month the Confederate Congress established the office of commander in chief, to which Lee was appointed, and General Breckinridge was made Secretary of War. One of the first acts of the new commander in chief was to send the following telegram to Johnston, which was received at Lincolnton, N. C., on the 23d :

"General J. E. JOHNSTON.

"Assume command of the Army of Tennessee and all troops in the Department of South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia. Assign General Beauregard to duty under you as you may select. Concentrate all available forces and drive back Sherman.

R. E. LEE."

Considerate to the last, his first step was to ascertain from Beauregard whether this assignment was agreeable to him. Ascertaining that it was, he at once addressed himself to the task of trying to form an army out of the scanty and scattered material at his disposal.

After having seen Beauregard on the 23d, he telegraphed to Lee stating that Hardee was moving by Florence and Cheraw with about 11,000 men, and Cheatham and Stewart by Newberry—the last two having 3,200 of the Army of Tennessee—while in front of Sherman was S. D. Lee with 3,000 of the Army of Tennessee and the cavalry, the latter estimated at 6,000. These numbers were estimates, and subsequently proved to be excessive. Many of Hardee's men were South Carolina militia, who soon left him. At this time Sherman was at or near Cheraw, with a force of 53,275 infantry and artillery and 4,391 cavalry, adopting the return of March 1st, published in his Memoirs. His army was moving in two columns, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, with the cavalry, forming the left wing, and the

Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps forming the right wing. His objective was not manifested, Raleigh and Goldsboro being equally threatened. In addition to Sherman's movement, Schofield, with a force which alone outnumbered the Confederate army even if concentrated, was approaching from Wilmington.

The first problem for Johnston was to unite his widely dispersed troops in such a locality as to be enabled to interpose them in front of the vastly superior Federal host. This was no easy task, as Sherman was between the small Confederate forces, and by rapid marching could keep them separated. Johnston also suggested in the above telegram that Bragg be ordered to report to him with his command, and Lee at once adopted the suggestion. Bragg's troops consisted of Hoke's division, numbering 4,775 infantry and 782 artillerists. His batteries were the only artillery which Johnston had. Hood had lost most of it in his Tennessee campaign. Johnston fixed Smithfield as the rendezvous for the different bodies which were to make up his army, and sent them orders to hasten their march to that point. It was about midway between Goldsboro and Raleigh, and was well selected as a position from which the Confederates might be thrown in front of Sherman, whether he moved toward Raleigh or Goldsboro. These orders, arrangements for the transportation of which the army was almost destitute, and the collection of necessary information as to the whereabouts both of friends and foes, consumed many days. On March 4th Johnston transferred his headquarters to Fayetteville, whence he could better issue instructions, and not far from which he hoped that the union of his forces would be consummated.

On the 6th Bragg reported from Goldsboro that Cox was approaching Kinston. Johnston at once instructed the troops at Smithfield, about two thousand in number,

to re-enforce Bragg. They were under the command of D. H. Hill, one of the generals with whom Bragg had quarreled after Chickamauga. In the message to join Bragg, Johnston said to him, "I beg you to forget the past in this emergency"; as he was himself forgetting it. Hill was not the man to resist such an appeal. He zealously co-operated with Bragg, and the result was that at Kinston Cox's column was checked with great loss, the Confederates suffering comparatively little.*

Meanwhile Hardee, accompanied by Hampton's cavalry, was slowly falling back toward Fayetteville. The only fighting before reaching that point was between the cavalry; in the aggregate it was in favor of the Confederates. In the most important of these affairs Hampton surprised Kilpatrick and captured his camp, holding it some time and bringing off many prisoners, besides releasing the Confederates whom Kilpatrick had captured.

As it was patent that Sherman's northward march was with the object of joining Grant in an attack upon Lee, it was necessarily the duty of Lee and Johnston at

* The editors of the *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. iv, pp. 698 and 700, place the Federal loss at Kinston at 1,257, of which 57 were killed, 265 wounded, and 935 were captured or missing; and the Confederate loss at 134. These figures are doubtless taken from the official reports. In that publication they frequently annex the statements of Northern officers in relation to Confederate losses to the Confederate official reports. It is to be regretted that they do not adopt the same course in reference to Confederate statements of Northern losses. The Kinston affair shows how this would sometimes work. The day after the battle Johnston telegraphed to Lee that Colonel Sale reported one thousand prisoners at Goldsboro, and five hundred more on the way. This report of Colonel Sale, made for the purpose of arranging transportation at a time when the condition of Southern roads forbade any exaggeration, is certainly worthy of credit if the official reports on either side are to be questioned at all.

the proper time to avail of their interior lines, so as to combine against one or the other of their antagonists. In the desperate state to which the Southern cause was now reduced this offered the only possible chance of success, since the Confederate armies were each hopelessly outnumbered. Hence the correspondence between the two commanders shows what was in the mind of each. On March 1st, replying to a letter from Lee, written the day after Johnston's restoration to command, the latter suggested: "Would it be possible to hold Richmond itself with half your army while the other half joined us near the Roanoke to crush Sherman? We might then turn upon Grant."

This same idea is repeated in a letter to Lee of March 11th. Had Lee had his own way, and been allowed to withdraw seasonably from the Petersburg lines instead of waiting till they were forced, the junction of two such bodies under two such leaders might well have rendered an Appomattox impossible.

Johnston, while taking every precaution to meet Sherman on either line which he might adopt, was satisfied that his real design was to take the eastern route by Goldsboro, since that would keep him in communication with the coast, insure a junction with Schofield, and facilitate the eventual union with Grant. Though Johnston's orders for the concentration of his detached forces had been promptly given, poor railway service, lack of transportation, and the dispersed condition of the troops rendered their junction slow. In the meantime nothing was left him but to practice patience, and to urge Hardee and Hampton to impede the Federal march as much as possible. They seconded his views with the intelligence, courage, and ability which they always displayed, and enabled many fragmentary organizations and individuals of the Army of Tennessee to reach their trusted

leader, whose restoration again kindled their expiring hopes.

On March 11th Sherman occupied Fayetteville, Hardee withdrawing in the direction of Averysboro, until he reached a point about four miles from that place, where he stopped, threw up intrenchments, and determined to make a stand. Here he was in front of the Federal left wing, consisting of two corps. These attacked him on the morning of the 16th, and after a sharp contest flanked him out of his first position and forced him to fall back a short distance to a stronger one, which he held till night, repulsing every assault. Before morning, after all fighting had ceased, he retired, in consequence of information that the enemy were crossing Black River to the east. In this affair Hardee's loss, as reported by him, was four hundred and fifty in all. The Federal loss, as reported, was five hundred and fifty-four, which included no prisoners, although the Confederates had ocular demonstration that they had made captures. They reported a smaller number of killed than the Confederates, although the latter acted on the defensive and under cover. After the commencement of the retrograde movement Hardee withdrew to Elevation.

A sufficient number of the Confederate detachments was now in supporting distance to enable Johnston to attempt something of greater magnitude than skirmishing. Weak as he still was, he determined to attack the Federal left wing, in the hope that the line of march separated it sufficiently from the other to render possible the delivery of a severe blow, which, if not great in direct results, might at least lighten the despondency which weighed heavily on Southern hearts. He judged from General Hampton's description of the country that Bentonville would be a point favorable for his purpose, for the reason that the route of the Federal left was

there some distance from the parallel road by which the other wing was moving. On Hampton's intelligent description of the ground, it was decided to make the attack from a position near Bentonville, and orders were issued for the concentration of the little army. Hampton with great daring and ability held the chosen ground all day of the 18th with his cavalry, and was joined at dark by Johnston with a part of the infantry. On account of deceptive maps Hardee had a greater distance to march than was supposed, and did not come up till next day. That night Johnston telegraphed Lee as follows: "The troops will be united to-day except two divisions. Cheatham's corps not arrived. Effective totals, infantry and artillery: Bragg, 6,500.; Hardee, 7,500; Army of Tennessee, 4,000. . . . Hardee's loss on 16th was 450."

These numbers were mere estimates, including some troops not up, and were greater than the fact. According to the return of March 17th, the infantry and artillery, exclusive of Hardee, numbered 9,513 effectives. Hardee's strength on the 23d was 5,528 effectives, which, with his loss of 516 in the coming battle, would make his numbers before it 6,042. The cavalry, according to its return of March 25th, did not exceed 4,000. Johnston's army, therefore, exclusive of cavalry, numbered about 15,000 men. The Federal left wing, against which the attack was to be aimed, numbered about 28,000 men exclusive of Kilpatrick's cavalry, which was about 4,500 strong.

On the morning of the 19th the troops were formed for battle. Bragg was ranged across the road, and the Army of Tennessee, under A. P. Stewart, was drawn up farther to the right, with its own right thrown forward. The gap between the two, to be filled by Hardee on his arrival, was temporarily held by the only artillery which

the army had. Before Hardee's deployment, and just as his troops arrived, a strong attack was made upon Bragg, who called for re-enforcements. Johnston sent the first division of Hardee, under McLaws, to his aid, and the other, under Taliaferro, to the right. But by the time McLaws arrived Bragg's troops, under the intelligent guidance of Hoke, their gallant division commander, had completely repulsed the Federal attack. An assault upon Stewart was likewise repelled.

On account of the delay in the arrival of Hardee, and the time taken in deploying through difficult thickets, the Confederate attack was not made till three o'clock in the afternoon, by which time the Federals had been able to erect some slight intrenchments. It was commenced by Hardee on the right, the other troops joining in the movement successively. The thrilling sight of Johnston, their old commander, and Hardee, one of their old lieutenants, after long separation personally leading them, revived the hopes and the courage of the Army of Tennessee; and their charge, worthily emulated by representatives of other armies, was irresistible. The Federals were driven back upon their troops in the rear and into a dense growth of young pines, protected on the right by a swamp and by intrenchments. The disorder produced in the Confederate advance by the difficult nature of the country necessitated great delay in reforming, and the lateness of the hour enabled the Federals to keep this position till dark. The Confederates, however, held the field, bringing off their own wounded and some of the Federal, with three pieces of captured artillery; and at night they withdrew to their first position, which was fortified as much as possible with the limited implements at their disposal.

On hearing the sound and receiving intelligence of this action, Sherman at once turned his right wing in the

direction of the firing, hoping to come upon the Southern rear while they were facing their foes on the other side. Johnston, ascertaining their approach, faced Hoke's division toward them, parallel to the road, and lengthened the line with his cavalry to Mill Creek. On account of his feeble numbers it was hazardous and thinly held; and the bridge over Mill Creek, in the direction of the Confederate retreat, was in great danger if a strong effort to break through this array, which was hardly more than a picket line, had been made. On the 20th, Sherman's entire army was concentrated against the Southern army, and several attacks were made upon it which were not very pronounced; and they were uniformly repulsed—so completely, in fact, that the Confederates brought in many of the Federals who were wounded in them. That evening Johnston transferred McLaws to the left of Hoke to strengthen his own left, which was the critical point. No further attempt was made to force the Confederate defenses till the evening of the 21st, when Mower's division moved against the extreme Confederate left, broke through the mere skirmish line, and was advancing on the road to Mill Creek bridge. Hardee and Hampton met this movement by a countercharge of Cumming's Georgia Brigade upon the van, while a small body of Texas cavalry fell upon the right of the Federals, and Allen's Alabamians, directed by Wheeler, assailed their left. Under the combined attack of these small bodies, together constituting but a few hundred men, the Federals withdrew. Hardee, in the advance, had the grief of seeing his gallant son, only sixteen years old, fall in this charge. The Confederates held their position till night, when they withdrew unmolested. According to General Johnston's contemporaneous memoranda, the total Confederate loss at Bentonville was two hundred and twenty-four killed, fourteen

hundred and seventy wounded, and six hundred and fifty-five missing among the infantry; and fifteen killed, eighty wounded, and eighteen missing among the cavalry, making a grand total of twenty-four hundred and sixty-two. Most of the prisoners were captured by losing their way in the thickets on the first day. Some of those reported as missing afterward rejoined their commands. General Sherman, in his official report, gives his total loss as sixteen hundred and forty-three, of whom two hundred and eighty-seven were prisoners. In it he also states that Slocum, who commanded the left wing, which did nearly all the fighting and suffered three fourths of his reported loss, claims to have captured three hundred and thirty-eight prisoners; while Howard, who commanded the right wing—which, according to Sherman's Memoirs, only skirmished and was held back from any vigorous aggressive, and according to the Confederate accounts was repulsed in every attempt which was made—claims to have taken twelve hundred and eighty-seven prisoners. Slocum's statement as to the number captured by his wing is probably correct. Howard's must be a mistake, for he had no opportunity to make any such captures. Johnston's memorandum, made at the time, shows that he lost only six hundred and fifty-five prisoners. Another memorandum in his military papers shows that he captured nine hundred and three prisoners, of whom one hundred and fourteen were taken by Hardee's troops, four hundred and seventeen by the Army of Tennessee, and three hundred and seventy-two by the cavalry. Sherman, however, reports only two hundred and eighty-seven prisoners among his losses. As the Confederates acted generally on the defensive, and repulsed all attacks made upon them, the presumption certainly would seem to be that they inflicted a heavier loss than they suffered. Sherman apparently

thought so at the time, for in his official report he prudently observes: "I am well satisfied that the enemy lost heavily, especially during his assaults on the left wing during the afternoon of the 19th, but as I have no data save his dead and wounded left in our hands, I prefer to make no comparisons." * Whatever the comparative losses, the battle was in its results highly beneficial. The confidence of the army was restored, for it had met its old antagonist, repulsed his attacks, and retired with captured cannon and prisoners. Its perils and privations could now be forgotten, and under its trusted leaders North Carolina might yet cause Tennessee to be erased from their memories. When Johnston proudly telegraphed to Lee, after the battle, that the "troops of Tennessee Army have fully disproved slanders that have been published against them," his gratification at being able to say this of the remnant of his old command can be better imagined than described.

After the withdrawal the army retired in the direction of Smithfield, and Sherman marched to Goldsboro, where he effected a junction with Schofield, which increased the strength of his army to nearly 90,000 men of the three arms. Johnston, re-enforced by the arrival of some additional troops of the Army of Tennessee, had, according to his return of March 27th, 13,635 infantry, 1,033 artillery, and 4,093 cavalry. With these odds against

* This may partially explain the discrepancy between Johnston's report of his missing and the Federal claims. Many of the Confederate wounded were left in the retreat on account of the want of ambulances and the severe character of their injuries. The Federals may have counted these as prisoners, whereas Johnston in his report counted them as wounded. But even this would not entirely account for the discrepancy, as Johnston brought off most of his wounded. These variant estimates show the uncertainty of going behind the official returns, and of taking the statements of one as to the losses of the other.

him he could but telegraph Lee, when discussing their proposed junction: "Sherman's course can not be hindered by the small force I have. I can do no more than annoy him. I respectfully suggest that it is no longer a question whether you leave, present position; you have only to decide where to meet Sherman. I will be near him."

The battle was followed by a period of comparative inaction. Sherman visited Grant at City Point, to confer as to combining their operations, and allowed his men the repose which they had well earned. Johnston devoted himself to improving the outfit and armament of his improvised force, and closely observed the enemy with his cavalry. On April 5th he heard of the evacuation of Richmond, though without any details, and for these he telegraphed to Secretary Breckinridge at Danville. The telegram was answered by President Davis, who could not give any information.

On the morning of the 10th Sherman commenced his march from Goldsboro, moving in the direction of Raleigh. The Confederates moved in the same direction, having a start of about a day's march. Hardee, with a portion of the cavalry, kept on the north side of the Neuse; and the remainder of the army, accompanied by Johnston in person, proceeded by the road which crossed the river at Battle's Bridge, near which he encamped for the night. While here he heard from President Davis that Lee was reported to have surrendered. On the 12th, in obedience to a telegram from the President, he repaired to Greensboro, the army continuing its march in the meanwhile; and that morning Beauregard and he had an interview with the President and with three members of his Cabinet, Reagan, Benjamin, and Mallory. Breckinridge was expected that night. The President, in the interview, devoted himself to drawing roseate

pictures of the hosts which he expected to raise by his eloquence, oblivious of the fact that such appeals had failed in less desperate circumstances, and could scarcely be expected to have any effect in such a crisis, and ignoring the fact that there were not muskets enough to arm all the veterans of Johnston's army alone. The aimless interview ended without result. That night Secretary Breckinridge, on his arrival, confirmed the report of Lee's surrender. This intelligence convinced Johnston that further prosecution of the war was hopeless, and that nothing was left but to make peace. In conversations with Breckinridge, Mallory, Reagan, and Beauregard, he found that their views coincided with his own. He was designated by the others as the proper person to make the announcement to the President, though he strenuously objected to acting as spokesman, and urged that one of President Davis's constitutional advisers could undertake the task with more propriety than himself.

The next morning Johnston and Beauregard were summoned to attend the Cabinet meeting. Johnston, on being asked for his opinion, called attention to the weakness of his small army, which could be overwhelmed by the multitudes of Grant, Sherman, and Canby, and to the lack of provisions, repair shops, ammunition, and other necessities. He insisted that it would be a crime against humanity to continue the war, throwing away valuable lives, and further devastating the South by drawing after him the Federal armies. His views were seconded by every one except Benjamin, who was apparently as unsubdued as ever. The President, with great reluctance, consented that Johnston should dispatch a letter to Sherman, proposing an armistice, in order to allow the civil authorities to make peace. The letter was at once drawn, and was as follows :

“The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am therefore induced to address you in this form the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful operations to terminate the existing war.”

This was sent to Sherman by Hampton, and was received by him the next day (the 14th). He at once assented to an interview, stopped the movements of his forces, and showed an ardent desire to save the South from further desolation. A meeting was arranged midway between the lines on the Raleigh road. It took place on the 17th, at the house of Mr. Bennett. It was the first time that the two generals had met, though both had been in the old army, and they had confronted each other at almost every stage of the war, from Manassas to Bentonville. As soon as they were alone, Sherman produced a telegram announcing the assassination of Lincoln—a piece of intelligence which greatly grieved Johnston, as he saw at once the evil effect it would have, and the greater harshness it would entail upon the Southern people. Proceeding to the object of their meeting, Sherman proposed that Johnston should surrender on the terms which had been granted to Lee. This Johnston declined, on the ground that his army was not surrounded, as Lee’s had been; but he proposed that they should make permanent terms of peace, and use their influence with their respective governments to obtain a confirmation of their action. This suggestion was approved by Sherman; and they agreed

upon most of the details, but without reducing them to writing. It was also agreed that they would meet the next day at the same place. When they met, according to appointment, Johnston was accompanied by Breckinridge, who attended as a major general, since Sherman would admit none of the civil authorities. After an interchange of views, the following terms were agreed to:

“ 1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *statu quo* until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time—say forty-eight hours—allowed.

“ 2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from all acts of war, and to abide the action of the State and Federal authority. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance of Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the meantime to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

“ 3. The recognition by the Executive of the United States of the several State governments, on their officers and legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

“ 4. The re-establishment of all the Federal courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

“ 5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their polit-

ical rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

"6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

"In general terms, the war to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing said armies. Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfil these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme."

As soon as these terms were agreed upon, copies were sent to the civil authorities of each side for ratification, it being known that several days would necessarily elapse before they could be returned.

During this interregnum Johnston received from President Davis a note authorizing him to obtain from Mr. J. N. Hendren, treasury agent, thirty-nine thousand dollars in silver, and at the same time a later note ordering him to send it to Mr. Davis at Charlotte. General Johnston thought that the state of affairs justified him in refusing to obey the second order; and therefore he collected the money and divided it among his troops, officers and privates sharing alike. At the same time he wrote the following:

"GREENSBORO, N. C., *April 21, 1865.*

"SIR: I have heard from several respectable persons that the Government has a large sum of gold in its posses-

sion. I respectfully and earnestly urge the appropriation of a portion of that sum to the payment of the army as a matter of policy and justice. It is needless to remind you that the troops now in service have fully earned everything that the Government can give them, and have stood by their colors with a constancy unsurpassed—a constancy which enables us to be now negotiating with a reasonable hope of peace on favorable terms.

“I beg your favorable consideration of this application.

“Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

“J. E. JOHNSTON, *General*.

“*Major-General J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, Secretary of War.*”

Arrearages of pay for many months were then due the troops, and it would certainly seem that some of the Confederate treasure should have been paid them. But with the exception of the small sum of silver above mentioned, which gave them only one dollar and twenty-five cents apiece, they received nothing.*

* An experience which General Johnston had just after his final capitulation indicates the affection which his soldiers entertained for him. After the disbandment a ragged private called him aside, expressing a desire to speak to him. When they were alone he took from his pocket the very money which he had received in the distribution and offered it to Johnston, urging him to accept it by saying that he could go back to work, but that he knew Johnston must have been left straitened by the result of the struggle. The latter was much affected by the offer, but of course declined it. General Duke, in his *Last Days of the Confederacy*, vol. iv, p. 762, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, states that the silver coin of the Confederate treasury was divided among the troops composing the escort of Mr. Davis at the Savannah River, each man receiving about thirty-two dollars. They were more fortunate than Johnston's men, though not more deserving. The remainder of the treasure was probably captured by stragglers and plunderers on the way. President Davis had little or none with him when he was made prisoner.

On the 24th, notice was given by Sherman that the terms previously agreed upon were rejected by his Government, a result mainly due to the exasperation caused by the assassination of Lincoln. Upon communicating this fact to the Confederate Executive, Johnston was directed by it, in case he could not hold the infantry and artillery together, to bring all the cavalry and such of the other arms as wished to join the cavalry and could be mounted, and with them to join Mr. Davis. To this Johnston objected that it ignored the duty which he owed to the army and people, and provided only for the protection of the President; since a force of such size would drag in its pursuit large bodies of Northern forces, with all the horrors attendant upon a second "March to the Sea." He therefore again proposed a meeting to Sherman with a view of ending the war. The latter readily assented, and they met on the 26th at the same place as before—the house of Mr. Bennett. They soon agreed upon the following terms:

"1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston's command to cease from this date.

"2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro, and delivered to an ordnance officer of the United States Army.

"3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman; each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly released from this obligation.

"4. The side arms of officers and their private horses and baggage to be retained by them.

"5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed

by the United States authorities so long as they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may reside."

A few days afterward the following supplemental terms were agreed to by General Schofield on behalf of General Sherman. An important object attained by them was to place all the horses of the army, whether private or public, at the disposal of the soldiers in their return to their homes and subsequent industrial pursuits, thus greatly relieving their necessities:

"SUPPLEMENTAL TERMS.

"1. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for their march to their homes and for subsequent use in their industrial pursuits. Artillery horses may be used in field transportation if necessary.

"2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equal to one seventh of its effective strength, which, when the troops reach the capitals of their States, will be disposed of as the general commanding the department may direct.

"3. Private horses and other private property of both officers and men to be retained by them.

"4. The commanding general of the Military Division of West Mississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to give transportation by water from Mobile or New Orleans to the troops from Arkansas and Texas.

"5. The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by their immediate commanders.

"6. Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command to be included in the terms of this convention."

By these arrangements, and through the generosity of Sherman, who furnished them a large amount of rations, the return of the troops to their homes was made

comparatively comfortable, considering the state of the country at the time. On the 30th of April Johnston announced the result of his negotiations to the governors of Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida in the following telegram:

"The disaster in Virginia, the capture by the enemy of all our workshops for the preparation of ammunition and repairing arms, the impossibility of recruiting our little army, opposed by more than ten times its numbers, or of supplying it except by robbing our own citizens, destroyed all hope of successful war. I have therefore made a military convention with General Sherman to terminate hostilities in North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. I made this convention to spare the blood of the gallant little army committed to me, to prevent further suffering of our people by the devastation and ruin inevitable from the marches of invading armies, and to avoid the crime of waging hopeless war."

This, with a proclamation to his army exhorting them to be good citizens, expressing his admiration of their constancy and devotion, his gratification at their treatment of himself, and his wishes for a prosperous future to them, ended his military career; and he returned to private life the pacificator of the South, with the crowning glory of having saved the property and lives of its citizens, and conferred upon it the blessings of peace.*

* Johnston's course in terminating the war, which was practically accomplished by his convention, has always been approved by the mass of those who were in position to judge of its necessity. No one has ever questioned its propriety except Mr. Davis in his writings. By grossly exaggerating Johnston's force and resources, he has endeavored to create the impression that this capitulation was unnecessary. It has been seen that all his Cabinet, except Mr. Benjamin, realized its necessity. Johnston's army, insignificant in numbers at the outset, was melting away by desertion, for the hopelessness of further resistance was patent to every private soldier in the ranks. Mr. Davis had approved

the initial negotiations for reasons which applied with equal force to the final ones. On learning of the rejection of the first convention, he directed Johnston to disband the infantry and artillery and send him simply the cavalry—a convincing proof that he had given up the cause as lost; for he could not have intended to continue the war with a handful of cavalry and no infantry. The following letter, written by him to his wife at the time, and since published in the *Sun* of February 14, 1886, shows what he thought of the question then:

“CHARLOTTE, N. C., *April* 23, 1865.

“MY DEAR WINNIE: I have been detained here longer than was expected when the last telegram was sent you. . . .

“The dispersion of Lee’s army and the surrender of the remnant which remained with him destroyed the hopes I entertained when we parted. Had that army held together, I am now confident that we could have successfully executed the plan which I sketched to you, and would have been to-day on the high road to independence. Even after that disaster, if the men who straggled, say thirty or forty thousand in number, had come back with their arms and with a disposition to fight, we might have repaired the damage; but all was sadly the reverse of that. They threw away theirs, and were uncontrollably resolved to go home. The small guards along the road have sometimes been unable to prevent the pillaging of trains and depots. Panic has seized the country. . . .

“The loss of arms has been so great that, should the spirit of the people rise to the occasion, it would not be at this time possible adequately to supply them with the weapons of war.”

CHAPTER XVIII.

A PRIVATE CITIZEN.

THE mere military hero, after the conclusion of the conflicts which have called his talents forth, bears with impatience the quiet of peace, and rusts away, longing for the exciting scenes which once aroused him. Not so the citizen soldier, called to the field by a sense of duty, and sheathing his sword with the consciousness of duty performed to the best of the ability with which Providence has endowed him. Such a character no longer pines to lead his squadrons in sanguinary onslaught on a foe; but by example he remains as much their leader as before, and teaches them that the highest triumph of the citizen soldiery is to resume the pursuits of peace, obedient to law, and contented with their lot. Of such a life, quietly and unobtrusively pursuing the even tenor of its way, there is little to relate; for it may truthfully be said of men as of nations, "Happy those who have no history."

Such is eminently true of Johnston. In his last general orders to that faithful band which had clustered around its standards to the last he had said:

"In terminating our official relations, I earnestly exhort you to observe faithfully the terms of pacification agreed upon, and to discharge the obligations of good and peaceable citizens as well as you have performed the duties of thorough soldiers in the field. By such a course you will best secure the comfort of your

families and kindred, and restore tranquillity to our country."

In his own conduct he set the example of acquiescence in the war. No fear of his victors drove him in voluntary exile to foreign lands, but he resolved to share for weal or woe the fate of the people whom he had defended and for whom he had shed his blood. The grandest lesson of the civil war is the quiet dignity with which Lee and Johnston, the great leaders of the Southern armies, bore the result, thus powerfully contributing to the pacification of their section, and retaining the respect and friendship not only of their own followers, but of those who so long had faced them in battle and knew from experience the powers of their genius. It was Johnston's privilege to count among his firmest friends and greatest admirers Grant and Sherman, who of all men were best qualified to estimate his military and personal traits at their true value.

When the conflict closed, it was neither in accordance with Johnston's tastes nor compatible with his means to remain idle; and his first care was to engage in some occupation which would gain him a livelihood. Declining with gratitude but firmness all offers of aid from his admirers, and asking but a place which would enable him to render an equivalent for what he should receive, his first experiment was with a railroad, his second with an express company. These were brief and far from satisfactory; and he then engaged in the insurance business, making his home in Savannah, which was full of his friends. Here he remained for near a decade, giving to his business the same conscientious and thorough watchfulness which had marked his military duties.

In 1873, while in Savannah, he had an opportunity to aid in raising funds for the monument to be placed at Lexington over his old friend and comrade in arms,

Lee; and his activity and success were such as to secure a large contribution and elicit a handsome resolution of thanks for his efforts from the Memorial Association.

The next year he published an account of his military operations during the war, under the name of *Johnston's Narrative*.^{*} This book, while in its style as simple and unaffected as its author, is a powerful reply to the strictures upon him as a general which had been circulated by his enemies, and is based on evidence which would seem to leave no room for discussion. These strictures had been freely circulated during the war by the Administration, and by the coterie who knew no better way of ingratiating themselves than by taking sides against Johnston. With a self-sacrifice which elicited universal commendation, he had refrained from any reply as long as there was a possibility of its injuring the cause to which he had devoted his military talents; but in this publication, no longer hampered by such restraint, he gave free expression to his sense of the injustice done him, and showed in vigorous though parliamentary terms the difficulties under which he had labored, and the lack of support which characterized the demeanor of the Administration toward him. The book obtained a large circulation among the soldiers of both sides and the students of the military art across the ocean, and is an acknowledged authority. From the time of his return to civil life Johnston had intended to return to his native State whenever his business would permit. In 1877 he carried out this intention, and re-

^{*} He had an uncle who was taken prisoner by the Indians, and who on his return from captivity published an interesting account of his adventures under the title of *A Narrative*. The book is scarce, and little known. General Johnston was a great admirer of this little book, and frequently talked of it when with his relations. He adopted its title as the title for his work.

moved from Savannah to Richmond. He was not allowed here to remain long in retirement. In the fall of 1878 a strong sentiment in favor of his nomination to Congress by the Democratic party was developed, and he was triumphantly elected, serving for one term as a member of the House of Representatives, and gaining the esteem of both parties by the liberality of his views. He was not gifted with eloquence, and hence took no part in debate; but was earnest and attentive to the committee work which devolved upon him, and was specially interested in everything which tended to increase the efficiency of the army.

On the expiration of his term he retained his residence in Washington, and was appointed Commissioner of Railroads during the administration of President Cleveland—an office which annually took him on an inspection tour across the continent. While in Portland, Oregon, on one of these occasions, in August, 1885, he was requested to act as a pall-bearer of General Grant, who since the war had been one of his warmest friends among the Northern officers, and had given many gratifying evidences of his esteem. He hastened to New York to attend the obsequies, and joined the North in paying tribute to the illustrious dead.

Soon after his return to Virginia he was elected a member of the Board of Visitors of the old College of William and Mary, at Williamsburg, of which his friend and former staff officer, Colonel B. S. Ewell, was president. Such men as George Washington and Henry Lee had preceded him on this board, which, during its existence of nearly two centuries, has numbered the greatest names of Virginia on its roll. The meetings of this body were during the final exercises of the college, on the 4th of July of each year. The reunions with his old friends and the enthusiastic reception with which he

was always welcomed made these meetings exceedingly pleasant and gratifying.

On February 22, 1887, he received a crushing blow in the death of the helpmate to whom he had been married for over forty years. For a long time before her death Mrs. Johnston had been a martyr to suffering, and the devoted attentions of her husband were as unremitting as those of a youthful lover. She died suddenly at their residence in Washington, and left him a lonely old man, bereft of all which made life dear. No language can describe the extent of his loss. He could never afterward trust himself to mention her name, and his house remained from the time of her death exactly as she had left it.

In the spring of 1890 Johnston yielded to the urgent invitations of his old comrades, and went to Atlanta to attend the memorial exercises. If any evidence was needed to show him that he had not been forgotten, and that his fame was still fresh in the city whose foes he had once held at bay, it was here furnished him in abundance. Amid the throng he was the central figure, and his visit was a continual ovation. One of the many pleasant incidents of his stay is thus described in one of the Atlanta journals:

"As the first carriage drove away, the Governor's Horse Guard came up the street, forty strong, under command of Captain Miller. The company was an escort to the hero of the day. With the Governor's Horse Guard came a carriage drawn by two black horses. In that carriage was General Joseph E. Johnston. The old hero sat upon the rear seat, and beside him was General Kirby Smith. . . . The carriage was covered with flowers. 'That's Johnston! that's Joe Johnston!' yelled some one. Instantly the Governor's Horse Guard, horses and men, were displaced by the old battle-

scarred veterans. The men who fought under the hero surrounded the carriage. They raised it off the paved street, and they yelled themselves hoarse. Words of love, praise, and admiration were wafted to the hero's ears. Hands pushed through the sides of the carriage and grasped the hands of the man who defended Atlanta. The crowd grew and thickened. Captain Ellis tried to disperse it, but could not. Then the police tried; but the love of the old veterans was greater than the strength of both Captain Ellis and Atlanta's police force. For ten minutes the carriage stood still; then, as it began to move, some one called out, 'Take them horses away!' Almost instantly both horses were unhitched, and old veterans fought for their places in the traces. Then the carriage began to move. Men who loved the old soldier were pulling it. Up Marietta Street it went to the Customhouse, then it was turned, and back toward the opera house it rolled. The rattle of the drum and the roll of the music were drowned by the yell of the old soldiers; they were wild, mad with joy; their long pent-up love for the old soldier had broken loose. Just before the carriage reached the opera house door a tall, bearded veteran on a horse rode to the side. Shoving his hand through the open curtain, he grasped the hand of General Johnston just as a veteran turned it loose. The general looked up. 'General Johnston!' cried the veteran. General Johnston continued to look up. His face showed a struggle. He knew the horseman, but he could not call his name. 'Don't you know me, General—don't you know me?' exclaimed the horseman. In his voice there was almost agony. 'General Anderson, General,' said Mrs. Milledge. General Johnston heard the words, and, rising almost from his seat, exclaimed, 'Old Tige! Old Tige! Old Tige!' The two men shook hands warmly. Tears

were flowing down the cheeks of each. 'Yes, Old Tige it is, General,' said General Anderson; 'and he loves you as much now as ever.' The scene was witnessed by hundreds. The ladies in the carriage cried. General Smith turned his face away. . . . The carriage stopped in front of the stage door to the opera house. The general and his escort were assisted to the ground. Old veterans tried to lift him to their shoulders, but were warned that his health would not allow it. Meekly they drew away. In it the same love was apparent which characterized their greeting. Mrs. Milledge took the old hero by the arm, and, followed by General Smith and Mrs. Chevalier, started for the stairway. The crowd fell back silently, making a pathway for them. It was a pathway strewn with love and not with flowers. As they started up the steps an old veteran touched the general, saying: 'Mars' Joe, let me touch your garment. I fought through the war, and have traveled two hundred miles to see you.' The old general stopped and grasped the old man's hand. A minute later he disappeared in the opera house."

Equally gratifying was his reception this same year in Richmond, on the occasion of the unveiling of the equestrian statue of Lee. The reunion of soldiers from all parts of the South enabled him to see again multitudes of his old army associates; and his exhilaration at meeting them was enhanced by the privilege of paying a tribute to his friend and old companion, R. E. Lee. In the ceremonies the duty was assigned to him of pulling the cord which released the drapery and exposed to the world the form and features of his noble successor in the command of the Army of Northern Virginia.

From the time of the death of Mrs. Johnston he had been gradually becoming weaker. His gait was as

steady and his head as erect as ever, but his vital powers were gradually on the wane, and his advanced age precluded all hope of recuperation. On the death of his great antagonist, Sherman, he was selected as one of the pall-bearers, a call which he felt that he could not refuse; for Sherman had always lavished evidences of friendship and admiration upon him. Though unusually feeble at the time, Johnston attended the obsequies; and the bad weather which prevailed gave him a cold, which greatly enfeebled him. From the time of his return he was confined to his house, and his strength gradually failed him, until, on the night of March 21, 1891, he peacefully passed away in his residence, No. 1023 Connecticut Avenue. The immediate cause of his death was heart failure. No delirium evoked fancied hosts from the shadowy past, or aroused him to utter in a last effort ringing orders of battle; but the vital engine simply stopped the performance of its functions, and he fell asleep as quietly as if there was to be a waking. No one was with him save his brother-in-law, the friend of his youth, Robert M. McLane, who had seen him bleeding from his first wound received in the fight with the Florida Indians, and who now closed the eyes that were to open no more.

The funeral, at his expressed desire, was as unostentatious as his life. It was that of a private citizen, not of a soldier. No martial music followed him to the grave; no military salute pealed its volleys over the frame which had so often breasted the deadly fire of battle, and which still bore within its texture the foe-man's lead. He was laid to rest in Greenmount Cemetery, Baltimore, which contained the ashes of the two whom he had loved best in life—his noble wife, who rested beside him, and his gallant nephew, Preston Johnston, whose remains had been brought back by him from

Mexico. Nothing marks his last resting place but this simple inscription, selected by himself :

JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON,
SON OF
JUDGE PETER & MARY JOHNSTON, OF VA.,
BORN AT
LONGWOOD, PRINCE EDWARD CO., VA.,
FEBRUARY 3, 1807.
DIED MARCH 21, 1891.
BRIGADIER GENERAL, U. S. A.
GENERAL, C. S. A.

Honors were lavished upon him throughout the South on receipt of intelligence of his death. Resolutions were passed in countless numbers by organizations of veterans, and minute guns were fired in every place of importance. Nor were these confined to the South; not a few among the soldiers of the North paid tributes of respect to one whom they admired and whose greatness they knew. Virginia, his native State, was foremost in doing him honor, and on the long roll of her mighty names is proud to class him with Washington, Jackson, and Lee, types of the highest manhood and noblest attainments, whether in the leadership of a successful revolution or in the more difficult task of heroically fighting against fate in behalf of a lost cause. On his death, well could his mother State sob amid her tears, in the words of her ancient motto, to the mighty trio of heroes who had preceded him: "En, dat Virginia quartum."

CHAPTER XIX.

CONCLUSION.

A STRONG testimonial to Johnston's greatness as a commander is the fact that since the close of the civil war his reputation has been constantly increasing. The romance of a brilliant success, due possibly to accident, may, during the progress of a struggle, raise some Cleon or Gates to an altitude so lofty that their fall, when it comes, is but the more disastrous. But he only is the great leader whose campaigns stand the cold, impartial study of military students; with whom success counts for little, unless a review of surrounding circumstances and relative resources demonstrates that it was not due to chance. With the general public, during and since the war, the commander whose lot it was to organize armies for others and relinquish their leadership just as they became the veterans who could win Fredericksburgs and Chancellorsvilles, obtains but little credit. The public imagination must be inflamed by the brilliancy of actual combat, and thinks little of the strategy which secures equal results without bloodshed, except to ridicule and condemn it. The renown which the great captain transmits to future ages must rest upon a more solid foundation. It must meet the approval of those experts in the profession of arms who are seeking in the annals of past conflicts exemplars for their guidance. Tested thus, Johnston's name passes into history with ever-growing luster; for the publication of records heretofore not

accessible, and of military memoirs by leading participants of the opposing sections, have cleared up the obscurity which partly veiled many of his campaigns, and have placed him in the clearer light which vindicates his operations, and which he, from patriotism, did not attempt during the struggle to shed upon his acts.

But however much a certain faction at the South misrepresented and underestimated him, those who met him in the field placed a juster value upon his talents. Sherman tells us in his *Memoirs*,* in connection with the siege of Vicksburg, that his abilities were recognized, and that General Grant then told him that Johnston was about the only general on that side whom he feared. John Russell Young, in his account of General Grant's tour around the world, reports him as saying:

"The Southern army had many good generals. Lee, of course, was a good soldier, and so was Longstreet. I knew Longstreet in Mexico. He was a fine fellow, and one of the best of the young officers. I do not know that there was any better than Joe Johnston. I have had nearly all of the Southern generals in high command in front of me, and Joe Johnston gave me more anxiety than any of the others. I was never half so anxious about Lee. Take it all in all, the South, in my opinion, had no better soldier than Joe Johnston—none, at least, that gave me more trouble." †

Sherman's estimate of him was equally high. In his article on "The Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War" he speaks of him as "equal in all the elements of

* Vol. i, p. 328.

† Around the World with General Grant, vol. ii, pp. 212, 213. It is to be regretted that General Grant here, as in some of his own writings, allows himself to speak disparagingly of Lee. Even he can not afford to depreciate Lee's fame.

generalship to Lee."* Colonel Chesney, the eminent English military writer, in an article entitled "Sherman and Johnston, and the Atlanta Campaign,"† says:

"If men were to be judged of solely by the difficulties they overcome, independently of the direct results achieved, then General Johnston might fitly head the list of great American commanders; for on his side was neither the supreme military power wielded by Grant, nor the prestige which made Lee almost independent of those who nominally controlled him; much less the harmony of thought and action with his superior which assisted Sherman from first to last. A dictatorial president, puffed up, as his dispatches show, with mistaken belief in his own military judgment, and advised by the very officer whom Johnston had superseded, was, from the moment of the latter's appointment, disposed to interfere with his arrangements and prescribe his strategy. . . . His men, to whom he came as a stranger, were neither attached personally to their chief, like the Army of Virginia, nor improved in discipline to the same degree as their adversaries. . . . In all these points, therefore, he was at a striking disadvantage as regarded his opponent; yet, with these against him, and with but one half the number of the Federals, he contrived to hold them back, led though they were with such versatile skill and unwearied energy as the records of modern war can hardly match, for nearly two months and a half in the advance which an active pedestrian could have made in as many days. Surely this is of itself a sufficient testimony to his powers of leadership. One day of faltering when halted, one hour of hesitation when it became necessary to fall back, might have brought instant ruin to him

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. iv, p. 252.

† Fortnightly Review, November, 1875. Republished in Eclectic Magazine, January, 1876.

and to his army. . . . What he might have ventured had a rasher or less wary commander—such as Grant himself, for instance—been before him, is as impossible to say as it would be to declare what would have been the result to Lee had Sherman taken the place of Grant in Virginia. As things actually were disposed, it is not too much to declare that Johnston's doing what he did with the limited means at his command is a feat that should leave his name in the annals of defensive war at least as high as that of Fabius, or Turenne, or Moreau."

Lord Wolseley, in a review of the same campaign,* says: "It has always struck me that Sherman's overcautious slowness of movement was here the result of the very high reputation as a leader generally accorded to Johnston, and acknowledged by all the regular officers in the United States army. During this early part of the campaign Sherman seemed rather to aim at the protection of his army from some skilful counter-attack by his active and redoubtable enemy than at any bold, offensive operations of his own. In fact, he was determined to afford Johnston no opportunity for any display of his well-known genius and enterprise. The result was a hesitating slowness of movement. Notwithstanding his great numerical superiority, he hesitated to adopt any vigorous offensive in front of so skilful a tactician. This illustrates very usefully and clearly the power and effect of one of the many moral influences always at work in war, not only upon the heart and soul of an army as a whole, but upon the brain, reasoning, and actions of individual commanders. The cautious nature of the policy to which Sherman here carefully restricted himself was apparently dictated by the dread that he might omit some precaution, and so give his clever an-

* Published in the New York World of May 31, 1891.

tagonist an opening of which he might be able to take advantage. How often is this the case at chess! A man, perhaps a good player, destroys his play by over-caution, the result of the awe with which his antagonist, of great repute as a player, has inspired him."

The above are but samples of his high repute among military critics. Citations of the same character might be multiplied indefinitely. If, despite executive opposition and neglect, despite long periods of forced inactivity, he has left so high a reputation, how towering would it have been had everything been in his favor!

It has been the habit of superficial writers on the civil war, while rating Johnston highly as a defensive commander, to assert that he was not adapted to offensive operations, nor inclined by nature to undertake the conduct of an aggressive campaign. When this estimate is critically examined, the impartial student must conclude that General Johnston did not have the opportunities which others possessed. The hostility of the Southern Administration never left him in command of an army long enough to raise it to the degree of perfection and confidence in itself and its leader that was necessary for aggressive operations. It never placed him in charge of an army ready drilled and homogeneous or flushed with success. It was his fate to take masses of undisciplined troops and to make armies out of them; or to be placed in charge of soldiers demoralized and disorganized by disasters springing from the incapacity of others, and, in the face of superior numbers, to teach them to regain their self-respect and to extort respect from their foes. When he had accomplished this, and had made of his armies the finely tempered weapon which he could trust, and with which he could not only parry but strike, he was promptly superseded, and some one else was sent in his stead to profit by the work and to

reap the glory. A review of his career shows this beyond question.

The first year of his service is devoted to the organization and instruction of the volunteers who in battle then showed but one attribute of the soldier—courage. He made of that mere throng the Army of Northern Virginia. Conscious at length of its discipline and *morale*, he suddenly assumes the offensive at Seven Pines against odds much greater than those which faced his successor in the same campaign, and is struck down on the eve of a decisive success. Those who contend that he was great only on the defensive have not read the story of Seven Pines.

His next service is in the West, in charge not of an army, but of a large territory. When the crisis comes at Vicksburg he is ordered to repair to that point and assume command; and, on arrival in the vicinity, finds the enemy between him and his army, its commander disobedient, insubordinate, and sustained by the Administration, which entails as a necessary consequence its confinement within the walls of Vicksburg. He finds himself in command of six thousand men destitute of all equipments for a campaign, and these are slowly raised to twenty-eight thousand. Brought together piecemeal from all quarters of the Confederacy, without artillery, transportation, or supplies, unacquainted with each other and with their commander, he makes of them in a few weeks an army of such self-confidence that he does not hesitate to advance to the attack of a victorious force seventy-five thousand strong, securely fortified, and aiming to cut off his retreat over an unfordable river. But on the eve of an attack, while he is engaged in reconnoitering for the purpose, the garrison which he is attempting to relieve succumbs, and the object of his advance is frustrated. Those who say that

he was great only on the defensive have surely never read the story of Vicksburg.

Next he is placed in charge of Bragg's defeated and disheartened force. He takes that army, diminished in numbers, barefoot, half starved, almost in process of dissolution. Confidence in him brings back the laggards to the ranks, and re-endows it with hope and daring. For months he fights its old foe, strongly re-enforced and constantly fed with recruits. He repulses it in every assault, crosses in its presence large streams without loss of men or material, and is only prevented from striking back by the opposition and disobedience of the lieutenant who is to replace him—designing and preparing to turn upon his foe with a "Lockerbie lick" at the crossing of Peach Tree Creek, and only prevented by a stab in the back which paralyzes the arm upraised to strike. Those who say that he was great only on the defensive have never read the story of Atlanta.

He is next called from his privacy by the despairing wail of the South in the closing act of the drama. Forgetting his private wrongs, hearing only the call of duty, he collects a handful of his old soldiers, survivors of the butchery to which prejudice and incompetency had doomed so many of their comrades, and bursts upon the double numbers of Sherman's flank, himself foremost in the charge; and the sun of the Southern Confederacy sets upon a contest which raises the drooping spirit and results in a convention unique in history. Those who say that he was great only as a defensive leader have never rightly read the story of Bentonville, the Montmirail of the Lost Cause.

If he effected these results with such paucity of means, with improvised forces hardly formed when the time for action came, what might have been hoped had he, like Lee, been given an army ready formed and con-

fidest, and had he been allowed to retain it throughout the conflict? With Lee commanding in Virginia from the outset, and Johnston in the West, can it be doubted that in the Mississippi Valley, as on the Atlantic slope, the Confederacy might have boasted a Chancellorsville and a Fredericksburg; and that the Army of Tennessee, a worthy brother to the Army of Virginia, would never have had cause to blush at the name of Missionary Ridge and Nashville?

That general is the greatest who, careless of his own blood, spares the lives of his men; who, despising the *éclat* of a bloody field, fights only when he has an object for battle and reasonable chances for victory. Measured by the meager resources available, by the indifference of his Government, by the character of the armies intrusted to him, Joseph E. Johnston will be treated in history as equally great in the defense and in the aggressive—as much entitled to be called the sword of the Confederacy as its shield. Invariably brought forward only in crises when all seemed lost, only when the fears of the Executive stifled for a time its prejudices, he never declined the leadership of a forlorn hope; and it is unjust to ignore the difficulties which he never shrank from facing, and to join in the parrot cry of the uninformed that he was great only in defense. The Southern Belisarius, always the victim of court disfavor, yet always indispensable, his self-abnegation deserves fairer treatment.*

* "It is not perhaps irrelevant nor an exaggeration to say that General Johnston's career presents the most remarkable anomaly of military annals. From the beginning to the end he was distrusted and depreciated by the Confederate authorities, yet he held from first to last the confidence and admiration of armies and people; and every effort of the several made to retire him to obscurity but strengthened him in popular esteem, and resulted in calling him to new exaltation

But though Johnston was never allowed to retain command of one army long enough to achieve the great results which only flow from long association and perfect mutual trust between general and soldier, he never failed to win the love of his men. They trusted him because they knew that their blood would not be wasted. When he gave the order they did not hesitate to shed it, for they were certain that there was some object to accomplish and some hope of its accomplishment. They admired him because they knew that he would not ask them to go where he would not go himself. His order was "Follow," not "Go." They had seen him at Manassas seize a regimental standard to bear in person, and only relinquish it to guide its gallant bearer to the spot in the van where it should be placed. No poet has handed down the incident in burning words, like a similar incident in the life of Lee; but the act was as daring and as effective as if a Tyrtæus had accompanied it with a battle ode. At Seven Pines they had seen him unhorsed by a shell while leading the advance. Near Marietta they had seen the ball which struck down the

of power, new display of genius and increase of fame. It seemed impossible to dispense with him. The public outcry for his installation in responsible leadership was irresistible. His genius was openly decried and his administration condemned by his superiors, yet it was utterly in vain so far as the public confidence was concerned. The people stubbornly believed in him, and the soldiers clamored for his generalship and fought under it with an unshakable trust and a loving enthusiasm. And while he labored under a continuous censure from the Confederate rulers, he enjoyed a constant triumph of praise from the masses of the people. It certainly presents a strange incident of the war, this incongruity of Johnston's connection with the struggle. Another curious fatality of Johnston was, that his genius was conspicuously and most mournfully vindicated by the blundering failure of others, instead of the successes achievable by the enforcement of his counsels and plans."—Avery's History of Georgia, pp. 279, 280.

saintly Polk barely miss him. They saw him in the closing drama of Bentonville at the head of his charging line. They called him their Game Cock, because of his gallantry and martial bearing, and they strove to emulate him in courage and coolness.

But, much as they admired him, they loved him none the less. Despite his natural reserve, he soon won their devotion. They did not content themselves with the simple tribute of cheers. Their feeling was deeper than the effervescent excitement of the moment. One of them can best tell why :

“Old Joe Johnston had taken command of the Army of Tennessee when it was crushed and broken, at a time when no other man on earth could have united it. He found them in rags and tatters, hungry and heart-broken, their *morale* gone, their pride a thing of the past. Through his instrumentality and skilful manipulations all these had been restored. We had been under his command nearly twelve months. He was more popular with his troops day by day. We had made a long and arduous campaign, lasting four months; not one single day in that four months that did not find us engaged in battle with the enemy. History does not record a single incident of where one of his lines was ever broken—not a single rout. He had not lost a single piece of artillery, he had dealt the enemy heavy blows; he was whipping them day by day, yet keeping his own men intact. His men were in as good spirits and as sure of victory at the end of four months as they were at the beginning. Instead of the army being depleted, it had grown in strength. 'Tis sure he had fallen back, but it was but to give his enemy the heavier blows. He brought all the powers of his army into play. Ever on the defensive, 'tis true, yet ever striking his enemy in his most vulnerable part. His face was always to the

foe. They could make no movement in which they were not anticipated. Such a man was Joseph E. Johnston, and such his record. Farewell, old fellow, we privates loved you because you made us love ourselves! . . .

“CHAPTER LXXIII.—GENERAL HOOD TAKES COMMAND.—It came like a flash of electricity, staggering and blinding every one. It was like applying a lighted match to an immense magazine. It was like the successful gambler, flushed with continual winnings and success, staked his all and lost. It was like the end of the Southern Confederacy—things that were were not—it was the end. . . .”*

As a strategist, the foundation principle of Johnston's theory of the art of war was a disregard of mere localities, and a conviction that the proper policy was concentration for decisive blows—reasoning that success thus achieved would regain all the territory lost to win it. In this he was always at issue with the Government, which could not withstand the pressure of local protests, and insisted on endeavoring to hold all points, gradually enabling the larger forces of the North to gain the mastery. It is the best vindication of his plans that in almost every instance they were forced upon the Administration by the current of events, after having been first rejected. After Manassas, he advised the concentration there of an army sufficient to manœuvre McClellan out of his position and force him to fight, asking sixty thousand men, though McClellan had treble that number under his orders. The reply of the Administration was an offer to send enough recruits to take the surplus arms (about equivalent to a brigade), and a refusal to withdraw troops from the South for fear of losing some of the seaports. With his weak force he

* From a History of Company H, Maury Grays, by S. R. Watkins.

lay at the advanced position of Centreville, far in front of any afterward held in Virginia during a winter by the Confederates, confronting odds far greater than any subsequently opposed on that theatre of operations. At the beginning of the campaign the next spring he repeats his suggestion of concentration, this time to fall upon McClellan as he debouches on Richmond. The Administration again declines, saying that the troops withdrawn to accomplish this would cause the evacuation of Norfolk and the possible loss of Charleston. And yet those very troops are afterward united with his army, but not till the enemy has prepared for himself a safe haven of refuge, thereby escaping with defeat when his fate might have been destruction. On going to the West he advises the transfer of troops from the trans-Mississippi to be joined to the army defending Vicksburg, and opposes any weakening of the Army of Tennessee. The Administration adopts exactly the opposite course: Bragg is weakened, the trans-Mississippi troops are put in motion too late and in insufficient numbers, although at the very time the Northern leaders are drawing from their forces west of the Mississippi to re-enforce their Vicksburg army; and the result is the loss of Vicksburg and the loss of Tennessee. He advises strengthening the army at Dalton by the troops of Polk and Longstreet for an offensive campaign. The Administration rejects his plan, unless he will consent to base it on a junction at a point near enough to the enemy for the latter to frustrate it. Longstreet never joins him, Polk not until Sherman has begun to fight him; and when that army, after his removal, takes the offensive under the guidance of the Administration and the selected exponent of its plans, its destruction follows as a necessary consequence.

If the history of warfare in America teaches any-

thing, it is that this country can not be conquered by the mere capture of posts. He who holds otherwise is blind to the story of the Revolution and the War of 1812. Nothing could have suited the South better than an attempt of the North to seize and garrison its cities. Its great extent of territory would then have become its strength, the superior numbers of the enemy would have been dissipated in numerous garrisons, and the Southern armies, equal to any movable forces which its foe could have brought against them, might have faced them with confidence and destroyed them in detail. Under the strategy of President Davis the extent of Southern territory was a source of weakness; under Johnston's it would have been a bulwark of power.

Great though he was as a captain, he was equally great as a man. Despite the repeated injuries which he suffered, no word of complaint escaped him; he made no attempt to weaken the Administration which might cripple it in its struggle with the enemy. He lay quiescent under misrepresentation, took upon himself without a murmur the responsibility justly chargeable to others, and waited for the slow but certain vindication of time. When the crowning wrong was put upon him in front of Atlanta, he generously explained his plans to his successor and gave him the benefit of his matured study. When the army, on receiving intelligence of his removal, evinced ominous signs of excitement and rage, he threw his influence in the scale to aid in composing the discontent. And he had the noblest revenge that ever soldier took. Called back by the summons of Lee to command the fragments of the magnificent host whom he once had led, emerging from his modest retirement, not as an Achilles to avenge the slaughter of a friend, but as a Camillus to rescue his hard-pressed country, he counted not his foes, but struggled against destiny to repair the

disasters of others. And, by the very irony of fate, he saw the man who for four years had heaped indignities upon him a suppliant for an escort to protect him in his flight. The most striking contrast of the civil war was Johnston, as the last representative of the Confederacy, making terms of peace, while Jefferson Davis was speeding toward the seacoast.

A writer in the *Land we Love*, a periodical edited for a time after the war by General D. H. Hill, draws a comparison between Johnston and Washington. He says: "When Johnston fell under the Executive ban and a howl was raised against him by a partisan press, how sublimely great was the silence of the man! It was necessary for the good of our cause that the Administration should be supported to the last, and his defense might weaken that support. It required no common exercise of self-denial to bear a positive wrong rather than inflict a possible harm upon the country; but the patriotism of the great soldier was equal to the effort. Another act of self-abnegation on the part of General Johnston has won the admiration of the British people. When sent out after the battle of Murfreesboro to investigate the cause of the alleged dissatisfaction with the Southern commander, and to take command himself if he found the grounds of complaint were real, he had the magnanimity as well as delicacy to decline his own advancement under these extraordinary conditions, and he did what he could to strengthen the hands of General Bragg. . . .

"Here we would notice a remarkable resemblance between the military views of the Father of his Country and Johnston. It has been quite common of late years to deny to Washington the credit of being a great captain. It has been often said that his campaigns were failures and his battles defeats. . . .

"Now military genius is not exhibited merely in splendid achievements and wonderful victories. The genius of Napoleon never shone so brightly as on his last disastrous campaign.

"But the great captain is the man who thoroughly understands his position, who thoroughly knows the temper and character of his own troops, the qualities of the troops opposed to him, and the capacity of their leader; who knows how to husband his own resources and to destroy those of his enemy; who knows when to fight and when to retreat; who knows how to discriminate between what is essential to secure eventual success, and what is only of transient and factitious importance. . . .

"Whatever opinion the world may have of Washington as a military leader, it is sufficient, in our mind, to mark him as one of the great generals of history that he made no such dreadful mistakes as we poor rebels did about the value of positions. Now, General Johnston had precisely the same views on this subject. 'Let the place go, and save the garrison,' was his motto from the beginning to the end of the war. He retreated from Harper's Ferry, but he kept his troops in hand to aid in striking a heavy blow at Manassas. He withdrew his army from the *cul de sac* at Yorktown, much to McClellan's chagrin and mortification; but then he turned upon his pursuers with terrible effect at Williamsburg, at Eltham's Landing, and at Seven Pines. He had given the necessary order for a retreat from Vicksburg, but Pemberton unfortunately thought that the position, and not the army, was the important thing, and Vicksburg fell and all the troops were captured. He retreated from Dalton; but he inflicted day by day such heavy losses upon Sherman that the disparity between their numbers had almost ceased to exist. He was decried for his retreats,

just as Washington was for his. But time has already wrought a mighty change in men's opinions, and we believe that all history will enroll the name of Joseph E. Johnston beside that of the man he so much resembled in mind and character."

His generosity was as great as his magnanimity. He never attempted to reap the glory due to others, but was always glad to bestow compliments upon his lieutenants. In his official report of Manassas he spoke of Beauregard in terms of praise. In his report of Williamsburg he gave the credit to Longstreet, gracefully saying that the clear head and brave heart of the latter reduced him to be a mere spectator. On going to the West, he said kind words of Bragg, and spoke in gratifying terms of his operations. He repeatedly mentioned Pemberton in terms of commendation, refrained even from pointing out his disobedience of orders till forced to it by Pemberton's official report, and during the siege said more than once that he was convinced Pemberton would make a gallant and obstinate defense. Not until both Bragg and Pemberton had requited his generous treatment with insult and ingratitude did he retort, and then only in terms of sorrow rather than anger. Until the close of hostilities he never spoke of President Davis himself in harsh language; although the latter, after removing him at Atlanta, did not hesitate to add to the anguish of the blow by publicly accusing him of disloyalty.*

He was an utter stranger to that ambition which has actuated so many of the great soldiers of history. He had no ambition save to do right and to serve his country to the best of his ability. The only renown which he coveted was the approval of his own conscience and

* Grant's Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 345.

the good opinion of his countrymen. He sought no opportunity for mere military distinction apart from the good of his country. He sacrificed no human life for mere glory. When a word from him might have raised such a protest from his army in Georgia that President Davis could not have disregarded it, he did not speak it. When he was urged at the last to continue the war, and might have done so without the responsibility for its continuance, and might have served as a rallying point for those who at least wished to die a glorious death, he took the ground that it would be the highest of human crimes to continue the contest, and relegated himself to private life by his own will as modestly and as nobly as Washington on surrendering his commission. How incomparably greater is the man who can act thus, than he whose fame is perpetuated by pyramids of human skulls and the ashes of burning cities!

His personal character was not less admirable than his public career. Unselfishness was his rule of action. His own convenience was secondary to the comfort of the humblest creature whom chance threw in his way. While on his journey to Atlanta to assume command of the second army of the Confederacy, he excited universal remark by having an ordinary box car assigned to himself and staff, instead of imitating the brigadiers of the time and taking possession of a passenger coach, to the discomfort of the women and invalid soldiers for whom the limited transportation of Southern railroads was insufficient. During that famous campaign he thought nothing of wrapping himself up in a blanket and sleeping on the ground, without even a tent to cover him. In the very last years of his life no woman, whatever her station, stood in a public conveyance while he sat. The lady with her furs and the seamstress with her bundle equally attracted his attentions and profited by his courtesy.

He was one of the most modest of men. Detesting ostentation in dress or manner, always holding back where others pushed forward, his magnificent mien yet made him the cynosure of all eyes; and his face would be suffused with blushes like those of a woman at the notice which he unconsciously attracted.

He was one of the purest of men. His thought and conversation were as delicate and refined in all companies as if ladies were always present and listening to his every word. Had the suggestion of the heathen god been adopted and man had been made with a window in his breast, in order that the most secret thoughts might be revealed, the world might have viewed in crystal clearness and purity the inmost thoughts of Joseph E. Johnston, and found nothing that was not elevated and elevating.

He was in his private transactions the soul of honor. None with whom he was thrown in business dealings would ever hesitate to accept his verbal assurances and to act upon them with perfect confidence. None would expect him to take any position which was not consistent with the highest principles of fairness and rectitude, and in which he was not wholly sincere.

He was one of the most charitable of men. Despite his modest means, many an old comrade could tell how Johnston had contributed to relieve his wants, leaving its record in his bank book perhaps, but never in his ledger.

He was one of the most courteous of men. Firm in his own opinions, he always listened with deference to the views of others. Wonderfully entertaining in conversation, he never obtruded his thoughts, and it was only in response to overtures from others that he would, with the admirable brevity and terseness which were so forcible, enliven and elucidate the subject under discussion.

Reserved though he was, from that innate modesty which prevented his ever making the first advance, and which by strangers was often mistaken for coldness, he was to those whom he knew and esteemed devoted in friendship. To them he was not cold, but greeted them with the hearty grasp of both hands, which bespoke a welcome more cordial than could be expressed by words.

In domestic life his character was yet more beautiful. The feeble pen of his biographer, hopeless of doing him justice, can not venture upon an attempt to depict it. The interesting companion, the unwavering friend, the unselfish, devoted husband, the Christian gentleman, the ardent patriot, the great captain, he will live in history as one of its colossal names, as the able leader, worthily occupying a place in the front rank of the world's military chiefs, as the great man, great in those qualities which elevate him above the mere commander; just as the Chevalier Bayard stands on a higher pedestal than Napoleon, and Epaminondas than Alexander.

He has joined the valiant lieutenants who have long been awaiting him; and in his apotheosis is greeted by Jackson, Bee, and Stuart from his Eastern army; by Hardee, Polk, and Cleburne from the Western. Inseparably associated with those mighty chiefs, and encircled by the hosts whom they marshaled in defense of home and fireside, he descends to posterity with ever-brightening fame.

APPENDIX.

ORATION OF LEIGH ROBINSON AT THE MEMORIAL EXERCISES IN WASHINGTON, D. C., ON MAY 12, 1891.

"DEATH makes the brave my friends," was the great word of the great Crusader; and though the outward empire of the chivalry he led has crumbled to dust, and "their swords are rust," the intrinsic nobleness thereof survives the first crusade and the last. Wherever nobleness has a house, there shall this gospel also be preached. Nor can it be said to be strictly bounded by the noble. The emulation of brave lives, and the preservation of their images, is the wise instinct of mankind. The path to immortality is fortitude. In every noble arena this is the crucial test. The corner stone of every fortress of man's power and man's honor is man's fortitude. Our inmost shrines are altars to this tutelary god. Deep in the heart is the sense of that ineradicable royalty which makes the crown of thorns more than the crown of gold—martyr more than victor. It is the true-fixed, the constant quality, that hath no fellow in the firmament. Constancy is the pole on which the heavens turn.

As one who wore this armor against fate, and walked erect beneath it till fourscore had been passed; as one who in all relations evinced the enduring fiber which sets the seal on every excellence—Joseph E. Johnston is our theme. We are to consider the example of a life which by birth was martial. To the son of one of Lee's Legion, nourished by the breath of heroes, in the heroic prime, a soldier's life seemed the natural office of a soldier's son. A cadetship at West Point was the signal that the parade ground of his life was chosen, the tuition of his destiny begun, the Olympian battle joined. "Better," sings an ancient bard, "better is the grave than the life of him who sighs when the horns summon

him to the squares of battle." So sighed not the young second lieutenant, who, graduating with honor in 1829, first won his spurs in the Florida War.

The war itself must be acknowledged to be a part of that sad chapter which registers the uncontained avidity of a victor race. When, in July, 1821, Spain ceded the Floridas to the United States, the Indians were roaming unmolested over the Peninsula, and were the recognized possessors of broad and fertile acres in the heart of the country. The white man's remedy for this is the tangle of treaties, from whose network the Indian emerges a desolating savage. It is ever a perilous moment, when weakness is the guard of fertility and rapacity is strong. But it is when, in the sequel, devastation and havoc have been loosed, and tottering age, and infantile weakness, and woman's sorrow are alike devoured by infuriated murder, that the army appears upon the scene. Whatever was the primary right or wrong, our young second lieutenant was in the field not for outrage but to quell it. He was there to act a soldier's part in the school of a soldier's strife and duty. Right worthily he did it. For it fell to him to extricate from jeopardy the command in which he was himself but a subordinate—a jeopardy so great that it left him with the marks of five bullets on his person and clothing. On the anvil of an indomitable will he was already beating into polished brightness the fearless mettle of his soul. Henceforth his "baptism of fire" stands sponsor for him. His knighthood has been laid upon his shoulder.

It is the track of the accomplished knight which we follow in the war with Mexico—that ardent nurse of heroes—where our second lieutenant has grown to be captain of engineers on the staff of Winfield Scott. When Vera Cruz yielded to bombardment, Captains Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston, of the general's staff, were appointed to arrange the terms of its surrender. Worthier ambassadors of victory could not have been chosen.

The army then moved along the great national road made by the old Spaniards to the ancient capital of Mexico. On April 12, 1847, cannon shots from Cerro Gordo checked the cavalry advance, and made it certain Santa Anna would give battle there. At the head of a pass winding its ascending way through a nar-

row defile of mountains the enemy had fortified himself by a series of breastworks armed with cannon, which commanded the road and each other. It was easy to see that on the left the position could not be taken. Skilful reconnoissances, in which Johnston bore a conspicuous part, decided the plan of battle, which was an attack upon the right. At the beginning of the assault Johnston was ordered to make one more reconnoissance. The rattle of musketry had been heard but a few minutes, when he fell, severely wounded, at the head of his daring movement. Of such is the kingdom of victory! There is the dangerous pass; there the difficult height; there the hero's place; there he falls! An army rushes over him to triumph. So the steep cone was carried—"the lofty and difficult height of Cerro Gordo," as the commanding general called it.

A soldier's wounds are the rounds in his ladder. His letter of credit is written in his blood. His noble traffic is the safety of others in return for blows to himself. Johnston's wounds pointed to him as the fit man to be lieutenant colonel of the fine regiment of Voltigeurs. At their head he led the assault upon Chapultepec, and at their head he was again shot down. But his wounds could not impede him from entering the City of Mexico as commandant of the regiment he had so gallantly led.

After the war he was for a time acting inspector general. Still later he was made lieutenant colonel of cavalry. Finally he was appointed quartermaster, with the rank of brigadier, the highest prize which was then accessible.

Such was the prologue to the more stupendous drama upon which the curtain was now to rise. On one side of that curtain hung every ambitious hope, the fruition whereof might now be counted sure; on the other the strain of an unequal and untried power against the odds of number and organized resource. To choose the latter was to plunge into an angry flood which might prove the dark abyss. It was the leap from sure eminence into the storm and roar of the elements. To Johnston there was no alternative. His choice was the hero's choice, where the sacrifice was all that was certain. The forlorn hope had ever been his hope. He forsook the assured eminence for the earthquake of revolution; to stand or fall with the soil it rocked. It was the peril of everything, only to be justified if principle was at stake.

Johnston's justification can be given in no words better than his own. I believed, he says, "that apart from any right of secession, the revolution begun was justified by the maxims so often repeated by Americans, that free government is founded on the consent of the governed, and that every community strong enough to establish and maintain its independence has a right to assert it. Having been educated in such opinions, I naturally determined to return to the State of which I was a native, join the people among whom I was born, and live with my kindred, and, if necessary, fight in their defense."

It was but little more than a decade since Johnston had freely shed his blood in a war which grew out of our very willing vindication of the right of Texas to secede from Mexico and accede to the Union. The United States somewhat loudly proclaimed to the world that this was right. A President had been elected for triumphing in that cause. It was natural for Johnston to believe that a right which had been so exultingly attributed to a province of Mexico, colonized under her laws, was necessarily annexed to that Commonwealth of Virginia, which was the first free State of this New World. Indeed, it will be always difficult to explain why Texas herself did not have at least as much legal right to go as to come.

But for Johnston, as for destiny, there was but one tribunal to which the issue was referred, and that was visibly confronting him. It was for the sword to write the record. The gauge of battle was thrown down, and by Johnston lifted with a knight's good conscience. What followed is written in letters of flame, and in this crude summary is only referred to as illustrative of character; for the first word and act of Johnston when he drew his sword on the side he so unreservedly espoused, prefigures his quality—the judgment as unswerving as it was intrepid, the faculty to be bold or cautious as the emergency demanded. His sure eye quickly saw that the triangle formed by the Potomac, the Shenandoah, and Furnace Ridge was untenable by any force not strong enough to hold Maryland Heights, which swept every part of it by enfilade and reverse fires; and that, moreover, it was twenty miles out of position to defend against Patterson's expected advance, or to prevent McClellan's junction with him. His soldierly sense informed him that Winchester was the strate-

gic point for every purpose. There the practicable roads from west and northwest, as well as from Manassas, meet the route from Pennsylvania and Maryland. Thither, on the 15th of June, he moved his meager force from the funnel of Harper's Ferry. On the next day Patterson crossed the Potomac. The skill with which, one month later, he eluded Patterson's army of more than thirty thousand, and hurled his own from the mountains upon McDowell, was the master stroke of Manassas—Johnston's rear column, under Kirby Smith, coming upon the field just as Barnard Bee was falling, and Jackson's Stonewall the last Gibraltar. Just when the South Carolina Brigade was hardest pressed, an aid or courier of Bee, meeting Johnston, asked, "Where are your Virginians?" "In the thickest of the fight," was the Spartan answer. It was a victory won by an army which itself barely grazed defeat, and one, therefore, difficult to pursue. But in this cursory glance one thing can not be omitted—the full credit which Johnston everywhere gives Beauregard.

The bold design submitted by the military officers, in a council of war at Manassas, in September, 1861, to concentrate at that point the strength of the Confederacy, even at the cost of leaving bare of defense points more remote, so that there might be taken an aggressive which would be decisive, is a matter of history. It is expressive of a brave but well-balanced judgment, heedful and comprehensive, which sought to exchange risk where victory was not vital for where it was. It is true weighty reasons were given for overruling it. An army of sixty thousand soldiers was the force deemed essential to such a movement. Troops to increase the army to this number could only be furnished by taking them from other positions then threatened. This seemed to the Executive unreasonable. New troops could not be furnished because there were no arms save those which were borne by the troops then in the field. Arms were expected from abroad, but had not come, and the manufacture was still undeveloped. By this council of war a light is thrown on the military conditions, which for succeeding months were defensive only. In the penury of men and arms thereby revealed excessive forwardness was not obligatory. But the defensive was one which, whenever assaulted, as at Leesburg, displayed an undismayed and impenetrable front.

At the close of the winter and opening of the spring of 1861 the time had come for Johnston to embrace in his vision and preparation the four routes whereby McClellan might advance—the one chosen the previous July; another by Fredericksburg; the third and fourth by the lower Rappahannock, or the Peninsula between the York and James. The choice of the second route (joined to movements which by the aid of the river it was easy to conceal) would place McClellan at least two days nearer Richmond than was Johnston at Bull Run. Face to face with these conditions, the Confederate General, between the 5th and the 11th of March, placed his entire army on the south bank of the Rappahannock, where with equal readiness he could resist his antagonist advancing from Manassas, or meet him at Fredericksburg, and at the same time be in a position to unite with others, should he move from Fortress Monroe or by the lower Rappahannock. On the latter date McClellan occupied the works at Centreville and Manassas, which, except by Quaker guns, had been deserted since the evening of the 9th. Fortress Monroe was then chosen as the base of operations against Richmond. Soon perceiving the evidence of this, Johnston moved to the south of the Rapidan, whence he could still more effectually unite the forces of opposition to the meditated movement. McClellan's plan was to capture the force on the Peninsula, open the James, and press on to Richmond before re-enforcements could arrive. Two things baffled his purpose—first, Magruder's inflexible intrenchments; second, Johnston's alertness. On the day McClellan began his movement from Fortress Monroe, Johnston began the movement to swell Magruder's handful. It was on the 5th of April that McClellan was brought to a halt in front of Yorktown and the supporting fortifications. As the conclusion from the artillery duel of this day, which was protracted until dusk, it was deemed inexpedient to carry these positions by assault. It was an army of a hundred thousand against twelve. With such forces against such forts, it had been ascertained that the ground in front of those frowning heights and forbidding swamps was swept by guns which could not be silenced. Accordingly, parallels were started to bring Yorktown to terms by a more gradual procedure. There is, however, no parallel to the confession extorted from McClellan by Magruder.

From the final parallel it was thought siege batteries would be ready to open on the 6th of May. Johnston's computation coinciding with McClellan's, Yorktown was evacuated on the night of the 3d. On the morning of the 4th empty works again capitulated to the conqueror.

It was at the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton Roads, at about half-past five on the morning of the 5th, that Hooker's sharpshooters, leading the pursuit, drove in the Confederate picket. It was in front of Fort Magruder, one of a cordon of redoubts thirteen in number, which Magruder's forethought had constructed. It was just two miles from the venerable shades and spires of Williamsburg. Within two miles of Hooker at the time were thirty thousand troops; within twelve miles the bulk of the Army of the Potomac. He therefore made his dispositions to attack, so that if he did not capture the army before him he would at least hold it until others could. Williamsburg was a well-fought field, where Hancock leaped to fame, and where none can be reproached with want of valor. But the army in front of Hooker was neither captured nor held. The well-calculated blow of Johnston was fierce and stunning, and his very deliberate retreat was no more interrupted. What most interests us to-night is the magnanimous grace with which Johnston refers to the officer in command of the troops engaged. "About three o'clock," he says, "I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a mere spectator, for General Longstreet's clear head and brave heart left me no apology for interference."

Meantime McClellan was bending every energy to the active shipment of troops by water to the west bank of the Pamunkey, opposite West Point. In vain did he seek there the unguarded spot. Just how to strike when blows were exigent, and how to hold up his buckler against surprise, in one instant to be shield and spear, was Johnston's secret. He had retired before overwhelming numbers with the step and gesture of a master.

It was Johnston's theory of war that the time for blows to be efficient was not when his enemy was near his base and he distant from his own, but under exactly reverse conditions. As early as April 15th Johnston proposed that McClellan's army should be attacked in front of Richmond by one as numerous, formed by uniting all the available forces of the Confederacy in

North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, with those at Norfolk, on the Peninsula, and then near Richmond. Such an army surprising McClellan by an attack, when he was looking to the siege of Richmond, might be expected to defeat him; and defeat a hundred miles from his then base of supplies would mean destruction. On the 22d and 27th he reiterates this view. A month later the new vigor of twenty-five thousand soldiers, drawn from North Carolina and the South, added to the "red right arm" of Jackson, and launched by the genius of Lee, was the thunderbolt to rive asunder McClellan's oak. Johnston's plan would have forestalled preparation by the unexpected before a change of base was feasible.

Reasons having been presented in opposition to his original plan, Johnston's next design was to encourage an increasing interval between McClellan's troops as the latter approached the Chickahominy, and, when he was fairly astride the little river, to attack him. He must do this before McDowell, moving southward from Fredericksburg, could swell the tide of battle against Richmond. On the morning of May 30th reconnoissances showed that one entire corps, and a part if not the whole of another, were on the south side of the river. In point of fact, the corps of Heintzelman and Keyes were across—the latter in advance. Heintzelman was at White Oak and Bottom's bridges, with the nearest support to him some six miles distant, on the opposite side of the stream. The Chickahominy ran between the two wings of the army. Johnston now saw his opportunity, and to see it was to seize it. A violent rain storm which fell soon after, swelling the stream and perhaps making it impassable, convinced him that the hoped-for hour had struck. His orders were at once given. Written orders were dispatched to Hill, Huger, and G. W. Smith, and in writing acknowledged. Longstreet, being near headquarters, received his orders verbally. G. W. Smith was to take position on the left, to support the attack which the other divisions were to make upon the right. All were to move at daybreak.

Seven Pines, which was to be the chief scene of encounter, is at the junction of the Nine Mile and Williamsburg roads. Casey's redoubt was a half mile nearer to Richmond. His division and artillery formed the first line to be attacked, the left resting upon White Oak Swamp, the right extending across the York River

Railroad. White Oak Swamp, the Williamsburg road, and the railroad are nearly parallel. Johnston expected the blow by his own right to be delivered before 8 A. M., and was confident that the effect of it would be a complete victory on the south side of the swollen Chickahominy. This opinion is fully shared by General Keyes, and published by him in his *Fifty Years' Observations*.

Wherever the responsibility may be lodged for the failure to attack, not only at 8 A. M., but even as early as noon, the defect was not in Johnston's orders and timely preparations. For some reason never sufficiently explained, and still matter of controversy, the attack on the right did not begin until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. But even after the delay of all these hours, the rush of Hill and Longstreet had stormed and carried the intrenchments opposed to them, with the camp equipments, ordnance and stores belonging to the troops assailed, driving Casey in utter route back upon Couch, and Couch upon Heintzelman, when their onward movement was stopped by the falling night. Johnston had stationed himself on the left to take part in the co-operating movement—where the force in front of Smith had been rescued from defeat by Sumner's opportune arrival—and had just ordered each regiment to sleep where it fought, to be ready to renew the battle at dawn, when he received a musket shot in the shoulder, and a moment after was unhorsed by a fragment of a shell which struck him in the breast. The reins of his steed and of his victory fell from his hands. The brightness of his sword shone for an instant, and then the darkness swallowed it. The sharpness of it slept when the night became its sheath. A hero was borne upon his shield fallen but undismayed. Beneath the smitten breast there lived a heart unsmitten.

When Johnston was stricken down at Seven Pines he left an army which had been animated by him to a new consciousness of valor—the Army of Virginia, whose organization was the work of his hand. Doubtless one object of the blow was accomplished in the check to McClellan's advance on the south side of the swamp. Nevertheless, as the strategy in the valley and the leap to Manassas was the shining image of the boldness and caution so happily mixed in him, so Seven Pines might be construed to be the malignant prophecy of that dark fate which

seemed thereafter to rise in mutiny against him and be the incessant wound of victory. Rarely has the countenance of fate worn a look and spoken from a lip so cynical as in that chapter wherein, as it were, war's master was made his victim, his own edge turned against him. It was the superlative satire of events. Johnston's eminence was tried in the most fiery furnace in which such energies could be constrained to walk. The field of victory spread before him to be organized was, with recurring bitterness, snatched from him on the day the prizes were bestowed. We feel as if we were witnessing less the encounter of man with human circumstance than the supernatural warfare of a Titan whose fight is with the skies.

Johnston reported for duty on the 12th of November, and on the 24th received orders of that date assigning him to the command of the Department of the West—a geographical department, including the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and parts of Louisiana, Georgia, and North Carolina. Had the reality of this command been delivered to Johnston, it would have been the very arena for the employment of his large gifts. The vision which is competent to survey and manage the whole landscape of war and direct the grand movements and general arrangements of campaigns is known as strategy. Of this great faculty Johnston was the master.

The world's mad game is not played blindfold. The genius of war, like other genius, is not the mere gift of luck, but the consummation of a profound attention to details and all the forces of supremacy. The game in which the greatest intellects are matched for the greatest stakes must be an intellectual game. The successful general, who succeeds against disproportionate numbers and resources, is not a military gambler, but the closest of all close calculators. His greatness is that when he does stand upon reality he knows it, and is not to be terrified out of it or the daring which it justifies. This is the application of the great saying of the Roman orator, "A man of courage is also full of faith." Genius has its own way of dealing with the impossible, but it is not a senseless way, nor ever really reckless.

Johnston went to the West not to do brilliant things for their own sake, but to win the cause of which he was the soldier. Accustomed as he ever was to ride in the van of danger, his bruises

of battle shining like stars upon him, he was the man of all others to be heeded when he counseled caution. His whole life was that glorious thing—fair combat through strife to victory. With an unshrinking devotion equal to any task, he proposed to his own courageous intellect that system of the offensive-defensive which once before in the world's annals was the salvation, and the sole salvation, of the bravest and most determined people on its face. The greatest of all warlike races rescued itself from destruction, and the world's future empire from a rival, by slowly learning that victories may be won by avoiding no less than by seeking battle; that a march or manœuvre at the right time is more potent than a battle at the wrong time; that to seize a position which will threaten the adverse army the instant it does move, may far exceed the value of an attack upon it if it does not; that the circuit of a large and politic strategy is wider and higher, and makes its demands upon an intellectual grasp more subtle and more vivid than the mere rapture of pitched battle. This was the instruction of which Fabius and Marcellus were the apt pupils, and Hannibal the schoolmaster.

It is idle now to speculate as to what might have happened had Johnston been allowed to be the real mainspring of movements he was so fitted to direct—if the substance of his important command had been delivered to him. Fortune opposed him with an iron heart which no excellence could touch. He opposed fortune with an iron will, which, unconquered and undismayed, has outlived fortune's worst and triumphed over it. His strife seems to be waged less with visible than with some inscrutable power, which baffled but never met him in authentic shape. It is his peculiar fame that no disappointment and no calamity has been able to deny and to dethrone his real supremacy. All noble strength partakes of the wrestler's agony. The thing which we honor is the unshrinking dedication of thews and sinews by man to his fellows, in the face of the frown of power and in the teeth of temporal scorn. That which makes the brave man, struggling in the storms of fate, a sight for gods and men, is the magnanimity to rise from strain and overthrow with a rectitude of will untainted and unspent; the uprightness which bows with bended knee before God's footstool, but not with bended neck under man's yoke, nor subjugated brow under life's oppression. The struggle

of fate seemed to be to write the death warrant of all which to Johnston was most precious; but the final victory was with Johnston. The moral self which was his charge to keep, the post of which he was God's sentry, was never once surprised, never once surrendered. What was then his lonely outpost is to-night his citadel.

The ink was hardly dry upon the special order assigning Johnston to the Department of the West when he promptly made known the plan of campaign which commended itself to him. Inasmuch as the army of the trans-Mississippi was relatively strong and the army now proposed to be placed under him was relatively weak, and the latter subject to the further disadvantage of being divided by the Tennessee River, he urged that the united force of both departments be thrown at once on Grant. As the troops in Arkansas and those under Pemberton had the same great object—the defense of the Mississippi Valley—and both opposed to troops having one object—the possession of the Mississippi—the main force of the latter operating on the east side of the river, the more direct and immediate co-operation of the former was the thing advised. He significantly adds, "As our troops are now distributed, Vicksburg is in danger." He proposed, therefore, the union of the forces of Holmes and Pemberton; those of Bragg to co-operate if practicable. By the junction he could, as he believed, overwhelm Grant, then between the Tallahatchee and Holly Springs, far from his base—the place for victory.

No notice having been taken of this plan, and suggestions made by him respecting the commands of Bragg and Pemberton, as well as objections interposed by him to the diminution of the former force to augment the latter, failing also of approval, Johnston acquired the feeling that his wide command was little more than nominal. To be answerable for issues without authority to order or potently advise, is "a barren scepter" which none can grasp with use or honor. Upon the ground that armies with different objects, like those of Mississippi and Tennessee, were too far apart for mutual dependence, and therefore could not be commanded properly by the same general, Johnston asked to have a different command assigned him. Ultimately a special order did so reassign him. Intermediately he received specific orders directing him where to go.

It was on the 22d of January, 1863, while he was inspecting the defenses of Mobile, that he was ordered to go to the headquarters of Bragg for the purpose of determining whether the latter had so far lost the confidence of his army as to make it expedient to supersede him. If such was found to be the fact, Johnston was to be his successor. It was hardly fair thus to make a generous mind at once competitor and judge—to place him in a position where his merest word would exalt himself at the expense of the party judged. Johnston threw every doubt in favor of his companion in arms, and advised against Bragg's removal. His letter to the Confederate President upon this subject deserves to be known more widely than it is. "I respectfully suggest," he wrote, "that should it then appear to you necessary to remove General Bragg, none in this army or engaged in this investigation ought to be his successor." This is the voice of a true knight. It is the reflex of that grace of mind which is ever the noblest ornament to its greatness. When death has silenced him who wrote, it speaks to the hearts which survive like a trumpet in the stillness of the night. He had returned to Mobile, when, on the 12th of February, he was ordered to assume charge of the Army of Middle Tennessee. At the time the general of that army was bowed and broken by the illness of his wife, supposed to be at the point of death. With a natural chivalry Johnston postponed the communication of the order, reporting to Richmond the reasons for so doing. Once more an act of noble grace! These are the acts which write their bright light on the human sky. When the particular crisis had passed, Johnston's own debility was such that he could not assume command, and the order was indefinitely postponed. He had reported for duty all too soon, and too severely taxed the adamant which knew so little how to yield. It was not until the 12th of March that he was able to resume his duties in the field.

Johnston had inspected Vicksburg during Christmas week, and even so early had decided, as he shortly afterward stated to General Maury, that it was a mistake to keep in an intrenched camp so large an army, whose true place was in the field; that a heavy work should be constructed to command the river just above Vicksburg, "at the turn," with a year's supply for a good garrison of three thousand men. Until April 14th Pemberton's tele-

grams indicated an effort against Bragg, in whose vicinity Johnston was, and not against Vicksburg. On the 16th of April the Union fleet passed the batteries of Vicksburg. To the mind of Johnston it was clear that, when this could happen, Vicksburg ceased to be of any more importance than any other place on the river. On the 29th of April and 1st of May Pemberton announced a movement upon Grand Gulf with a view to Vicksburg. Johnston replied on the instant, telling Pemberton to unite all his troops from every quarter for the repulse of Grant while the latter was crossing the river, and to move at once for the purpose, adding, "Success will give you back what was abandoned to win it." On the 9th of May a dispatch was received by Johnston, at Tullahoma, in middle Tennessee, directing him to "proceed at once to Mississippi to take chief command of the forces there." He replied: "I shall go immediately, although unfit for field service." From the shell which had unhorsed him at Seven Pines he had not yet so far rallied as to be able to ride into the field. But the orders he forthwith gave reflect the warrior grasp which nothing could relax. Three things were clear to Johnston: first, that the time to attack was when the enemy was divided in the passage of the river; second, that the invading army must be defeated in the field, and that Vicksburg must fall if besieged; third, that Vicksburg ceased to be of exceptional importance after the junction of the upper and lower fleet. In coincidence with these views were his orders to the officer in command at Vicksburg: to leave the intrenchments there, and unite with himself in an attack upon the separate detachments of the opposing force; but, in any event, to evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and save the army, which could not escape if Vicksburg were besieged.

When, from a failure to execute these instructions, Sherman, on the 13th of May, was able to interpose four divisions at Clinton, on the Southern Railroad, Johnston, then hurrying forward with his little army, at once ordered Pemberton to come up with all the strength he could assemble, in Sherman's rear, promising his own co-operation. Clinton was seventeen miles east of Pemberton. As is well known, and doubtless because of the importance ascribed to Vicksburg, Pemberton moved south instead of east with a part only of his force, and out of reach of the little

band waiting to participate at Clinton. He marched to the disasters of Champion Hill and Baker's Creek. On being so informed, in terms which admitted of no mistake, Johnston ordered the immediate evacuation of Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

It is not desirable to discuss the considerations which caused a sincerely patriotic soldier to so deviate from these orders as to invert, and, in effect, to annul them. Johnston's orders meant to him, as he states, "the fall of Port Hudson, the surrender of the Mississippi River, and the severance of the Confederacy." Saving that it was already severed, this was true. If, however, instead of deviation there had been execution, whether or not it would have made the difference between the disaster which was sustained by Pemberton at Baker's Creek, and victory at Clinton, it would certainly have made the difference between an army captured in Vicksburg and an unconquered one outside of it. The investment of Vicksburg was completed on the 19th, and its surrender was then but a matter of time. Mr. A. H. Stephens states that on the 23d of June he was informed at the War Department that the surrender of Vicksburg was inevitable. If the besieged could not escape the besieger at the beginning of the siege, still less at the end; if the force within did not possess the power to unite with the force without before the siege began, how much less could it expect to effect such junction after forty days and forty nights of exhaustion were added to it? If the stronger force within the citadel could not cut its way out, how much less could the weaker force without be expected to cut its way in? At the time Johnston had but two brigades. The race of collecting troops wherewith to relieve the besieged was run against those who could easily outstrip him. After five weeks of indefatigable exertion he could only say, on the 20th of June, "When all reinforcements arrive I shall have about twenty-three thousand." A twice-beaten army inclosed in Vicksburg could not be saved by one not equal in strength to a third of the covering force. To have attempted it, against strong circumvallations, would have been to complete the capture of the army within by the wanton massacre of the army without—to fling a second catastrophe after the first. The fate of Vicksburg and Port Hudson was sealed, unless an army strong enough to carry Grant's intrenchments could be brought to the assault.

"He should have struck a blow," it is said. To strike a blow unwisely is one of the simplest of human actions. It is done daily with the smallest possible profit to mankind. It will ever be a narrow cockpit in which the tactics of Donnybrook Fair score their success. The shout of victory or death is irrelevant where death alone is possible. It is not even to court the hazard of a die to rush to sure destruction. Should the general then set his cause upon the cast, and rush into the battle merely to die there? The rush of despair proclaims as much fear as courage. Johnston was right. The place to defend Vicksburg was in the field. As a beleaguered city its defense was hopeless. Isolation was destruction. Vicksburg ceased to be of value when its bluffs could no longer close navigation to a hostile force nor keep it open to a friendly one. The army within was invaluable, and could not be replaced. To immure was to sacrifice. To shut in strength was to shut out strength. In the great game of danger he wins the day who really risks the least, however he may seem to hazard all. Courage and skill are shown in disregarding the imminent appearance, in the confidence of victory seen through the deadly imminence. But when to the unblenching eye of war's leader the peril is the only reality, and the victory beyond is the illusion, it is fatuity to strike. The perilous movement is victorious only when it places an adversary at a real disadvantage. Instead of a concentration of the weaker army, as ordered by Johnston, so as to be able to fall upon the stronger one in detail, by the deviations from his orders the weaker army was so distributed as to be taken in detail by the concentrated stronger one.

There are times in life's experience when the winds of fortune seem to sport with human actions; when those we would unite with frustrate us, to their own cost and by their sacrifice; times when it would look as if some sardonic deity had been unbound to baffle calculation, to poison the springs of action, to shake from their center faith and duty, to perplex reason and conscience, and to the death-call of a true endeavor be the mocking Mephistopheles.

Something akin to this must have been present to Johnston when he saw the strength of the West hewed in two by movements which seemed to solicit the fortified line of the enemy to

enter, like a wedge of steel, between Vicksburg and his own exterior force ; when he saw the relatively strong force retire behind works because of inability to meet the enemy in the open field, and then from their walls call upon the relatively weak force to storm that same enemy in his fortifications. In such catastrophe all that man can do is to oppose duty to dejection, make clear the record of responsibility, and follow with unfaltering step the light left in the sky. This done, the result is with the great Captain of events, who makes and unmakes life and its aims. It was the destiny of Johnston to be the unhearkened Cassandra of his time, the sageness of whose counsel history will measure by the fatality of not receiving it.

It is marvelous that after such a calamity as that at Vicksburg the small army which had been gathered by Johnston was pursued by no worse disaster. While Vicksburg and Port Hudson stood, and there was hope that either might be succored, Jackson was essential to the manœuvring army—the key to the position. When they fell, the military value of Jackson ended. Nevertheless, Johnston drew up in front of it, inviting an assault, and only when his adversary showed he again intended to resort to the sure course of investment did he withdraw. I believe there is no dispute that Johnston's management here was one of signal ability. One of his officers, who in the later history of the war took sides with Hood, in speaking of Johnston's masterly management at this point, added this commentary: "I may say I never saw Johnston do anything which did not seem to me better done than any one else could do it. My only criticism is that there was not more of it." The faculty to do whatever is done better than any one else can do it is one which is never redundant, and therefore one which a community struggling in the death-grips for existence can ill afford to part with, and invite to do nothing.

During the remainder of the year the operations of the Union army in Mississippi were limited to predatory expeditions. Nothing was captured which was in Johnston's custody, nothing defeated which he led.

During this summer Johnston received a letter from the Confederate President criticising his conduct and conclusions in terms which were hardly those to win a hero's assent. To this Johnston replied with that invincible clearness of which, as of the art

of war, he was the master. There would seem to be ground for the dilemma, afterward interposed by Johnston, that if the criticisms of him were deserved, the further retention of him in command was indefensible. And his services were to be retained!—unhappily, thereafter upon terms of mutual distrust between him and the authority to which he reported.

It was on the 18th of December, 1863, that Johnston was ordered to assume command of the Army of Tennessee. The instructions which awaited him at Dalton advised him that he would probably find the army there disheartened by late events and deprived of ordnance and materials; that it was hoped his presence would do much to re-establish hope, restore discipline, and inspire confidence.

Johnston succeeded to Bragg upon an unenviable throne. Whether justly or unjustly, the experiences of the preceding year had alienated the allegiance without which it was incoherent and discredited. The battle of Missionary Ridge was the greatest disaster sustained by the Confederate arms in pitched battle during the whole war. Nearly one half the guns, caissons, and munitions of the defeated army had been abandoned. Dalton had not been selected because of its defensive strength, but simply because the retreat from Missionary Ridge had ceased at that point. Johnston was sent to repair disaster. The army he now commanded was the same which under Bragg had been routed at Missionary Ridge. Sherman's army was the one which had routed it. The defeated army had been depleted since the battle. The successful one had been augmented. Johnston so reorganized and reassured his dispirited force, that when the campaign opened in the spring the poorest regiment he had was superior in effectiveness and drill to the best when he took command. The change was swift and permanent. Thenceforth no army in the Confederacy excelled, if any equaled it, in drill and discipline. The whole army felt that a lofty gentleman was in command, animated by a noble and pervading justice which no favor could bias and no incompetence mislead. The genius for rapid organization could not be more splendidly evinced. Wherever his hand was laid a life of discipline sprang up. It was the same organizing skill which had laid the foundation of the Army of the East. It was a wonderful personal influence and mastery which thus drew to

him an army acquainted chiefly with disaster. If nothing else existed to reflect his excellence, the miracle which he wrought in this transformation, from complete rout to complete confidence, from fatal chaos and dismemberment into compact order, would of itself preserve for us the image of a great mind's authority and magnetism. As Johnston looked upon this work of his creative week he saw that it was good.

When, on the 6th of May, 1864, the duel between the two armies began, two things must be borne in mind: first, that on the preceding 4th of July one third of the strength of the Confederacy had fallen, in the East and in the West, at Gettysburg and Vicksburg; second, that when the policy of wearing out by attrition was inaugurated, it was desirable for the weaker party to be economical of wear and tear. The time had surely come when the Confederacy could not be prodigal of life; when it should take no step which was not calculated with disciplined precaution. It must make no mistake. The man for this supreme emergency was then at Dalton—a man with that great attribute of a leader in convulsion, the capacity to see things as they are. As with a merchant, so with a general, his first business is to know when to spend and when to spare. Johnston took into consideration the natural features of the country in front; the susceptibility for defense, natural and artificial; the importance of time without disaster to his own side; the slight result of inconclusive defeat to his opponent. Only brilliant success could now be compensation for serious loss. All these were realities which he was not permitted to forget. He was now where previous adversity might be the background for the revelation of his skill—if only he was trusted! Even the Divine Hero did not do his mighty work where faith was wanting.

The chief criticism of Johnston's conduct of this campaign rests on his failure to attack Sherman at Rocky Face, three miles north of Dalton, when McPherson was detached to intercept Johnston's communications, by the movement through Snake Creek Gap. I believe no intelligent criticism imputes blame to him for a failure to attack at any other point. The disposition of the Confederate army about Dalton had been made in the hope that Sherman would attack with his whole force; therefore Johnston's entire strength was concentrated there. For the mo-

ment his communications were unprotected. A mountain divided the opposing forces. The difficulty of the passes was as great to one side as the other. In these conditions to change from the defensive and yield the advantages of ground was a certain risk. On May 1st the effective strength of Johnston's army—infantry, artillery, and cavalry—was 42,856. On April 10, 1864, Sherman reported *as present for duty* 180,000 men. Out of this force he proposed to form a compact army of exactly 100,000 men, for the purpose of his advance. The number above given is to be distinguished from the number borne on his rolls, which amounted to upward of 340,000 men. Supposing the utmost, a victory by Johnston over the 100,000 picked men, Sherman had behind him the fortified gap at Ringgold, and behind that the fortress of Chattanooga. Nevertheless, a division of his adversary's force—that moment of division which is always the moment of weakness—was just the moment which Johnston was wont to seize, and he was about to seize this, when his reconnoissances assured him that it was the bulk of Sherman's army which, covered from exposure by the curtain of Rocky Face, was marching toward Resaca by Snake Creek Gap, and could without serious resistance cut his connections while he was engaged by the force in front. It was the infirmity of Johnston that he would not incur great risk without reconnoissance. He would not leap in the dark. He had the gift—as it proved to him, the fatal gift—of always knowing what he was about. Unless he at once intercepted Sherman the ruin to him was certain. Months afterward one of his officers ventured to ask why he did not attack at Rocky Face. The sententious reply was, "Napoleon once said, 'The general who suffers his communications to be cut deserves to be shot.'"

He should have fought, his critics say, "as Lee and Jackson fought at Chancellorsville; he should have thrown everything on the hazard of a die; complete victory in front would have been followed by the rout of the force in the rear." Such critics forget that the victorious army at Chancellorsville was not one which, after complete defeat at Fredericksburg, had been delivered to a new commander, with a friendly caution as to the probable effect of such late tragedy upon spirit and organization. Chancellorsville had been prepared by all the host of victories which fought

for it like another army. That army was one which believed defeat to be impossible. The army at Dalton had never known what real victory meant. It was of incalculable importance that the engagement of the latter army, under their new leader, should be sharply discriminated from all which had preceded it. In mere bravery the past could not be exceeded. It was the wise discerning stroke of the new *régime* which it was essential to infallibly impart.

Under any military conditions one might ask, Is it wholly reasonable to exact, as a matter of strict military right, that a general, on taking command of an army, shall at once, without more words, become a Robert E. Lee or Stonewall Jackson, at the highest pinnacle of their earthly achievement? One might conclude, from the inclination expressed by some to inaugurate the triumphs of Lee and Jackson, at the portal of the Georgia campaign, that such inauguration was a matter of election and pure preference by ambitious minds; that one, whose heart was in the right place, might make a habit of the military marvel of the war. Alas! the rarest and most fortunate displays of greatness, Chancellorsvilles and Centrevilles, are not creatures of suffrage; and all who go forward on such disastrous hypotheses, in Georgia campaigns and elsewhere, are destined to discover that desire, aspiration even, is not synonymous with faculty.

It was in this same month, after the terrible repulse of Spotsylvania Court House, that Grant made a flank movement to the North Anna, not unlike that of Sherman to Resaca. The object of Grant was by a detour eastward around the point where the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad crosses the North Anna, to cut Lee's communications. Did Lee strike the force left behind? No; nor did he attempt to strike the force sent forward before re-enforcements could arrive; but, by the most expeditious interior line, he moved his own army to Hanover Junction, where Hancock met it. Here the two parts of the Army of the Potomac were not only separated, but a river so ran between them, that to get from one of Grant's wings to the other that river would have to be crossed twice. On the other hand, Lee had concentrated his army between the Little River and the North Anna, not only in a strong position, but so situated that it could easily act in unity and concentrate upon either of the opposing wings. Some

say Lee should have left a small part of his force to hold the intrenchments of his left, and attacked Hancock with the rest of his army.

Hancock's force did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry. Leaving seven thousand to hold the west face of his intrenchments and the apex on the river, Lee might have attacked Hancock with possibly thirty-six thousand infantry. But, as an able officer suggests,* Hancock was intrenched, and Lee well knew the advantage that gave, and that he could not afford to suffer the inevitable loss. Those who would make the Atlanta campaign exactly like Chancellorsville should remember that, from the last day's fight at the Wilderness to Appomattox, Lee attacked no more; that from this time on Lee fought only behind intrenchments; that what could be done in 1863 could not necessarily be done in 1864.

The whole criticism of Johnston strangely forgets that the victorious results at second Manassas and Chancellorsville were the consequences of Jackson's spring upon the rear of Pope and Hooker, and not because Jackson suffered himself to be in their predicament. The question presented to Johnston at Rocky Face was not whether he would do like Stonewall Jackson, but whether he would deliberately do like the generals whom Stonewall Jackson defeated.

Every man in authority is the shepherd of a trust; but what so sacred as the general's?—lives that will step to death at his bidding! Of all fiduciaries, none has such account to render as he who is commissioned to wage the fight of a people. Human life is the talent laid in his hand, to be poured out like water, if unto him it seemeth good. Of all trusts and talents this is the one to be wisely used, and in no wise abused. The policy of Johnston was not the step forward which would slide three steps back, but the step back which would find the strength to stride trebly forward. It was the drawing back of the ram's foot to strike with the horns.

The movement from Dalton began on the 12th of May. Polk's advance under Loring, and Polk himself, reached Resaca from Demopolis, Alabama, on the same day. French's division of the same army joined near Kingston several days later, and Quarles'

* General A. A. Humphreys.

Brigade at New Hope Church on the 26th. One may be permitted to believe that Johnston incurred as large risk as could be exacted of a soldier and a patriot when he left the whole protection of his rear to the expected arrival of this much-hurried re-enforcement. The position taken at Resaca to meet the movement through Snake Creek Gap was made untenable, in consequence of a similar movement by Sherman toward Calhoun—the last movement being covered by a river as the former was by a mountain. But the ground in the neighborhood of Cassville seemed to Johnston favorable for attack, and, as there were two roads leading southward to it, the probability was that Sherman would divide—a column following each road—and give Johnston his opportunity to defeat one column before it could receive aid from the other. He gave his orders accordingly for battle on the 19th of May. The order announcing that battle was about to be delivered had been read to each regiment and received with exultation. The Roman signal—the general's purple mantle lifted in front of the general's tent—may be said to have been given. But General Hood, owing to information received from one of his staff, deemed himself justified in not executing the order to himself, and the intended attack was for this cause abandoned. General W. W. Mackall was sent to Hood to ask why he did not attack as ordered. Hood sent word in reply that the enemy was then advancing upon him by two roads, and he could only defend. Johnston then drew up his army on a ridge immediately south of Cassville to receive the attack of the now united columns; but the conviction of both Polk and Hood of their inability to hold their positions against attack caused Johnston to yield his own. He did this upon the ground that he could not make the fight when two of the three corps commanders of his army were opposed to it. Hood said that, in the position in which he then was, he was willing to attack but not willing to defend. Johnston's view was that the time to attack was when his enemy was divided, and the time to draw together and defend was when his enemy was united. But unless we are to reason that when Johnston was unwilling to fight, and some of his generals willing, Johnston must be wrong; and when Johnston was willing to fight, and his generals unwilling, the latter must be right; it is hard to see why he should be blamed for Rocky Face, and they uncriticised for Cassville. As-

suredly in both instances the hesitation was the honest doubt of courageous men. Again, at New Hope Church, after Sherman's determined but vain assault, Johnston made his own dispositions to attack. Hood was to assail Sherman's left at dawn on the 29th of May, and Polk and Hardee to join in the battle successively. At 10 A. M. Hood reported that he found the enemy intrenched, and deemed it inexpedient to attack without fresh instructions. The opportunity had passed. The proposition had originally come from Hood, and received the sanction of Johnston. Hood says the opportunity had passed, not because his views had changed but because the situation of the enemy had changed. Doubtless this was so. And might not the commander in chief of that army be permitted to assign the identical reason for his own change of plan at Rocky Face?

At New Hope Church, at Kenesaw Mountain, all that fierce attack could do was tried and found wanting. As the attack was resolute, so the repulse was bitter. If there was no such repulse, as at Fredericksburg, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor, it must have been owing to the fact that there was no such attack—persistent as Sherman's undoubtedly were. In Johnston's view, between Dalton and the Chattahoochee, the 19th and 29th of May offered the only opportunities to give battle without attacking the preponderant force in intrenchments. But Cassville he considered his greatest opportunity.

From Resaca to Atlanta might be called a siege in open field—daily approaches and resistances, daily battle, so received as to make the losses to the assailant more than treble those of the defensive forces. Sherman's progress was at the rate of a mile and a quarter a day. Every day was a warlike exercise. In the warfare of attrition, at this rate of progress, battle could ere long be given upon equal terms.

The advancing army found, in the wake of that retreat, no deserters, no stragglers, no muskets, no material of war. Retreat resembles victory when it is the assailant who is chiefly worn by the advantageous battle of each day. Think for an instant of this single achievement, that in all the difficulty of the time, in the imminent breach of daily battle, Johnston's troops did not miss a meal from Dalton to Atlanta; that the primitive prayer, "Give us this day our daily bread," was punctually answered out of the

smoke and roar of unremitting war; that, too, when not only the nutrition of life but the nutrition of death was scant; when he had to be parsimonious of ammunition in his skirmishes in order to be sure of it for his general engagements. He swung his army upon its hinges with the smoothness of well-oiled machinery, which no more swerved from its appointed course than do the forces of Nature because a campaign of death reigns all around. We seem to touch the pulse of destiny itself as we accompany that regular throb of recoil and repulse, and that still flexure of sockets about a pinion of resolve that knew no turning.

Johnston felt himself daily growing stronger against an adversary daily growing weaker. Tireless in his vigilant activity, clear in his purpose, every tactical, every strategic advantage was hourly on his side. No jeopardy stole upon him unawares. With a deadly precision he divined and repelled every adverse stroke. He handled his army as a man would the fingers of his own hand. As link by link he unwound his resource as of magic, and his determination as of steel, it was like the movement of the hand of time on the face of a clock—so imperturbable, so infallible, so inflexible the external calm, the unhasting certainty. It was as if one fate had been found to confound another. The weak place in the joinings of his mail was nowhere found. Every blow had rebounded from him or was parried by him. Every material preponderance had been rebuked by a general's intuition and a hero's sword. We can almost see the lionlike glare of his warlike eye, and the menacing lash of his agile movement, as rampart by rampart he retired, his relative force rising with each withdrawal, and his united living wall making his earthen wall invincible.

Missionary Ridge had made this Johnston's mission—to draw his adversary from his base, and thereby compel the reduction of the force in front, by the regular growth of that required to guard the rear of each remove; to move back with such assured precaution as never once to be surprised or placed at disadvantage; to skilfully dispute each foot of ground with the least expenditure of his own forces; to thus more and more reduce the disparity existing, and, warily biding his time, to beckon his adversary forward until the field of his own choice was made the final arbiter between them. And now the justifying proportions and the coigne

of vantage had been won. All that executive foresight could do had been achieved. Here he would meet his foe face to face on ground which would equalize numerical odds. At Dalton Johnston was a hundred miles from his base. At Atlanta it was Sherman who was so separated. The fortresses which, at Dalton, Sherman had in Ringgold and Chattanooga, Johnston now had in Atlanta—a place too strong to be taken by assault and too extensive to be invested. To this end Atlanta had been fortified and Johnston had manœuvred.

Now he would lay down the buckler and part the sword from its sheath. Now he would constrain fortune. Now, by his perfect sinews, he would wrest the battle wreath which the cunning fiend had so long withheld by sinister touches on his thigh.

From Dalton to Atlanta, Sherman, by force of numbers, had been able to follow every retreat of the Confederate forces developed in their front, and then, with one or two corps, which he could afford to spare, make a flank movement imperiling their position. Three railroads then supplied Atlanta. To take Atlanta it would be necessary to take all three. On the 17th of July Johnston had planned to attack Sherman as the latter crossed Peach Tree Creek, expecting just such a division between his wings as Sherman actually made. He had occasion to say this, and did say it more than once, to his inspector general, Colonel Harvie. To thus successively engage the fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of his own had been the purpose of his every movement. Success here would be decisive, he thought, by driving the defeated army against the Chattahoochee, where there were no fords, or to the east away from their communications. On the precipitous banks of the Peach Tree the Confederate army awaited the hour of battle. The superb strategy of their commander and the superlative excellence of the position he had chosen stood revealed. Johnston himself, with his chief of engineers, Colonel Prestman, and his chief of staff, General W. W. Mackall, was seated at a table examining the ground upon the map and maturing the plan of battle when the order was delivered relieving him from command.

The goal had been reached, the victory organized; to his own vision the foe delivered into his hand, when he was again struck down; but this time not by a blow in the breast, which at At-

lanta, as at Seven Pines, was turned to the enemy. With a commanding grace in word and act, on the 17th of July he relinquished his command of the army, for which he had wrought so wisely and so well, and turned it over, with his plan of battle, to his successor on that day appointed.

I deem it just to give verbatim the instructions of Johnston to his strong, stanch hero, General A. P. Stewart. "Find," said Johnston to him, "the best position on our side of Peach Tree Creek for our army to occupy. Do not intrench. Find all the good artillery positions, and have them cleared of timber." He said that he expected Sherman would cross the Chattahoochee by the fords above the mouth of Peach Tree Creek and advance across the creek upon Atlanta. He added that Governor Brown, of Georgia, had promised to furnish him fifteen thousand State militia with which to hold Atlanta while he operated with his army in the field. He did not say that he would attack Sherman on the crossing of Peach Tree, "but," says Stewart, "his dispositions were evidently made with a view to so attack, and were inconsistent with any other purpose." That evening Stewart rode to Johnston's headquarters to report that he had made the dispositions according to direction. He was met by Johnston with the order for the latter's removal. Stewart has since said: "I would cheerfully have suffered the loss of either of my own arms to have been able to retain Johnston in command." There could have been no purer ransom for his general's sentence than one of those stout arms. It was said by General Carter Stevenson that he had never seen any troops in such fine discipline and condition as Johnston's army on the day he was removed from command. Constancy, stanchness, erectness, governed by a true discernment, are the attributes that conquer men and events. All these attributes were with Johnston's army the day he was removed. Ill they recked who changed that steadfast camp for the meteor flash of mutability. The authorities who made this change would rather have been dismembered limb from limb than knowingly to have done aught injurious to their cause. The motives for their action could be honest only, and were urged by pressure from without, which I doubt not was sincere. But to Johnston, and as I believe to history, it was as if the soldier in his tent had been stabbed by his own guard.

With wounds to the body Johnston was familiar; but a wounded spirit who can bear? How did he receive this by far his severest wound? What was the fashion of the metal which emerged from this searching crucible? Did the equanimity which stood by him in every other turn of fortune desert him now? No, this did not desert him. His own unquailing spirit was faithful to him. If in the soldier's great campaign "no unproportioned thought took shape in act," so now, in his unwished furlough, none took shape in word. It is one of the prerogatives of greatness to know how not to be the sport of circumstance. Misfortune broke over him in vain. He broke misfortune by being unbroken by it. He was master of misfortune. The adversity which does not shake the mind itself is shaken. Nothing could be finer than Johnston's demeanor in this his unlooked-for and to him unjust overthrow. Nothing froward, nothing unseemly, shone in him or fell from him. He was one whom the external universe might break, but could not bend to an ignoble use. His tall branch stood, like the sap of Lebanon, rooted in the real. There it stands to-day, and will to-morrow. The forest of appearance, that has no root falls to swift decay around it.

I bestow no particular praise on one for following conviction, albeit without the place proportioned to desert. A mercenary hero is a solecism. No one wins eminence by disregard of selfish interest in an army where it is universal. Virtue is tried by finer measures in that history. No corrupt, no venal thing survives to tarnish it. But of all adversity, there could be none more exquisitely fitted to freeze a noble heart than that which befell the General of the West. How much easier to bear the most cruel blow of adversaries when on either side are sustaining arms, when the strength of sympathy invests the overthrown with a dignity almost divine—the might of that incalculable arm which we call sympathy! But when, to his own view, his own stronghold is his worst hostility, when there is no supporting elbow within touch, as he looks out upon the hopes which can only ripen in his ruin, how clear in conscience, how tenacious and erect in spiritual power and purpose, the dethroned must be to be unvanquished! The day of Johnston's dethronement was his imperial day. It was the empire of a soul superior to every weapon.

The great campaign by which he will be forever judged is now beyond the wounds of the archers, beyond all slings and arrows, above and beyond outrageous fortune. From the dark defile of Rocky Face to the large prospect of Atlanta it will be not only a possession but a pattern for all time. Its rugged scenery is illuminated by the meaning with which the lines of greatness clothe the impassive and the obdurate. It has been made the mirror of a great mind. The map of it, the more it is studied, the more clearly will evince, in due expression and proportion and colors ineffaceable, the lineaments of a giant. It will be a canvas bringing to light that surpassing victory which cancels adverse fate and shines over it and through it.

It was upon a burning deck that Johnston was next summoned to the wheel. It was night when his star again began to burn. The Confederacy was in the article of death, when it once more sent for him whose hand nowhere appears in the drawing of that article. Johnston was sent for to repair the ruin which he at least did not prepare; to take anew the shattered remnant of that army wrought into such firmness by him, shattered by others; but which, though shattered, was still firm to him. The Confederacy lifted up its eyes and beheld all that was left of the Army of Tennessee, tossing and drifting like seaweed in the Carolinas, and a voice which no authority could subdue was heard crying: "All that is left to us is Thermopylæ. Oh, for a Johnston to stand there!" And a firm voice answered: "I will stand in the gap." The great gap he had to fill was the one which had been rent in his devoted files by futile battle. It was Thermopylæ, not in the beginning, but at the end of warfare. With the portents of downfall all around him, his erectness was untouched; his plume was still a banner; his name a talisman. The moral and military force which had been lost in Johnston will be measured for all time by the events of the interval between his enforced abdication and patriotic resumption of command. The impending wreck of things rallied of its own accord upon the disinherited knight. The hopes of which his downfall had been the pedestal were now themselves a ruin. Out of the lime pit of their destruction, out of their crash and chaos, rose from the rejected stone the straightness of the Doric Column.

At this time it was plainly Sherman's plan to march through

the Carolinas to the rear of Lee. When the Western army went to pieces in hopeless wreck in front of Nashville, the one hope of the Confederacy was the defeat of Sherman by all the forces which could be assembled in the Carolinas united to those of Lee, whenever the latter could most effectually withdraw from the lines at Petersburg. Everything depended upon the success of this movement and the subsequent union of the same forces against Grant. The task had sufficient elements of difficulty as originally presented. Just at this time a new one was introduced. On the 14th of January Schofield had been ordered from Clifton, on the Tennessee River, to Annapolis. From this point he had been carried by water to North Carolina, where he united to his own army the corps of Terry.

From the time Sherman left Atlanta every wave of opposition had abated in his front. He could march to the sea or to the mountains as he pleased. The indications were that the mighty host which had marched through Georgia in such comfort would cross the Cape Fear at Fayetteville to be joined there by Schofield, when, on the 22d of February, 1865—the day he was restored to command—Johnston was ordered “to concentrate all available forces and drive back Sherman.” The order was one less difficult to give than to execute. It was a question on the 1st of March which would reach Johnston first, his own troops from Charleston or Sherman’s army. Hardee did indeed cross the Pedee, at Cheraw, on the morning of the 3d, but his rear guard was so hard pressed that it had hardly time to destroy the bridge after passing over it. On the evening of the same day information was received that the broken columns of the Army of Tennessee had reached the railroad at Chester. Sherman’s order of march encouraged the hope that the tatters of the Confederacy might be gathered up in time to engage one of his wings. It was, however, not only Sherman, but Schofield, then marching up the Neuse from New Berne, with whom conclusions must be tried.

It was under such conditions that Johnston exposed to the world the electric force and vivid lightning of his arm. Here he gave the lofty answer he scorned to make in words to all who dared taunt him with want of daring. It should be some one not less seamed over with honorable scars who makes that charge. The battle-furrowed chieftain might have said, “Put your fingers

in my wounds, all ye who doubt." But the heroic answer ever is in deeds. So answered the captain, "who, careless of his own blood, was careful of that of his men; who knew how to take them under fire and how to bring them out." * From first manœuvre to final onset nothing can surpass the magnificent strategy he now displayed. It will have to blush before no other of the war or of the world. With decisiveness of command, which was met by celerity of execution, he at once ordered the movements which snatched from the very jaws of death the last Confederate victory. In the thrilling game of chess which he now played, no pawn was taken without his leave, while he darted forward and backward upon the board, each time giving check to the king. That game was played with the coolness and consummate skill of a master hand which knew no pause, no tremor, no uncertainty, and only lacked the force of numbers, which genius could not create, to shine by the side of Austerlitz. It was the grand audacity of a conscious master whose nerve matched his skill, whose ministers were strength and swiftness. His first movement was with the troops of Bragg, then near Goldsboro, added to those of D. H. Hill, just arrived from Charlotte, to strike Schofield at Kinston. The blow was sufficient to scotch Schofield's advance.

Bragg's troops and those of the Army of Tennessee were now ordered to Smithfield, midway between Raleigh and Goldsboro, it being at the moment uncertain through which of these places Sherman's route would be. Hardee was instructed to follow the road from Fayetteville to Raleigh, which for thirty miles is also that to Smithfield. On the 15th of March Hardee had reached Elevation on the road to Smithfield. On the 18th Hampton reported that Sherman was marching toward Goldsboro; the right wing on the direct road from Fayetteville had crossed the Black Creek; the left on the road from Averysboro had not reached that stream, and was more than a day's march from the point in its route opposite to the hamlet of Bentonville, where the two roads, according to the map of North Carolina, were twelve miles apart.

Upon this Johnston prepared to attack the left column of Sherman's army before the other could support it, by ordering the troops

* Report of Louis P. Wigfall in the Senate of the Confederate States, March, 1865.

at Smithfield and at Elevation to march immediately to Bentonville (where the road from Smithfield intersected that from Fayetteville to Goldsboro) to be in time to attack the next morning. By the map the distance from Elevation to Bentonville was about twelve miles. In two important respects the premises of action proved incorrect. The distance between Sherman's forces was exaggerated, and between his own reduced from the truth. Thereby he was prevented from concentrating in time to fall on one wing while in column on the march. The sun was just rising on that beautiful Sabbath in March when all except Hardee had reached the point of rendezvous. The gap made by his absence was for the time filled by the batteries of Earle and Halsey.

On the way to the attack, and just in time for battle, Johnston had met the shreds and patches of his old troops under the stanch A. P. Stewart. The best interpreter of a general's strength is the sentiment with which he animates his rank and file. The wild enthusiasm of these Western troops whenever they caught sight of their old chief was in itself an inspiration of success. It was evident that they were as confident under him as if they had never seen the days which tore them into strips. They felt they had a general whose life or whose fame was as dust in the balance where his duty weighed, under whom death itself was not in vain. The force which had been wedded to him by the campaign from Dalton to Atlanta had not been put asunder by the Tophet of Tennessee. At last the wayworn troops under Hardee, which had marched day and night to join battle, appeared upon the scene. The use for them was quickly revealed. All told, the torn remnants made an army of less than fifteen thousand men. At their head, Johnston burst upon Sherman's left wing with an electrical intensity which will live in military annals as an object lesson to show how a wasted force is endowed by a general's fire. The battle of Bentonville is that marvel—that final battle of the Confederacy which shed the last radiance on its arms as its candle flickered in the socket.

The batteries which had held the gap were now told to follow the dark plume and bright courage of Walthall, who commanded all that was left of Polk's corps. Hardee led the charge of the right wing. With an annihilating fury the hurricane of war swept Sherman from his first and second line, and on the 19th of March

night fell upon Johnston's victory. Had there been no other column to reckon with, or had not the discrepancy existed between the map and the facts, the blow which staggered would have prostrated. The victor would then have turned to throw his whole army upon Schofield. As it was, on the 20th the right wing of the enemy came up. On the 21st Sherman's united army was in position on three sides of Johnston. To oppose the increasing coil the line of the latter was bent into a horseshoe shape, the heel being the point of the one bridge left—the bridge at Bentonville over Mill Creek.

The time had come for the man of resource to make his exit. It was essential to make the road over that bridge as secure as a turnpike in time of peace. He knew well how to do it, not with fear but with confidence. Once more he looked to Hardee to deal the blow he wanted. That intrepid man, first kissing the pale lips of his dying boy, borne by him on the field, turned to the nearest cavalry command, and assuring them he had been captain of dragoons himself and knew how to handle cavalry, ordered a charge. On his magnificent black steed he led them, and poured their torrent on the opposing front—running back the skirmish line on the line of battle, and the first line on the second. Victory made the isthmus of contention safe. The nettle had been rifled of its danger. Then, with forces vastly more confident than when the fight began, Johnston withdrew, with the loss of a single caisson, from between the jaws of death by the one opening left. Like a whirlwind he came, and like an apparition departed. Under arduous conditions he had set upon a hill that most admired faculty of man—the faculty to seize and to use opportunity. At his side hung the weapon—drawn from a great general's arsenal—the energy to fuse the fickle conditions of an instant into the bolt of victory.

One may be permitted to believe that, with a natural sense of vindication, he had in this warrior fashion and with a warlike grace, inscribed upon the record of the time the quality of his arm; and with it the reasonable proof that, if the Johnston at Atlanta had not been removed, history would have engraved for him the epitaph:

“Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.”

* Captain William E. Earle.

One who saw him writes : * " As he listened to the receding fire of the foe, the brightness of his eye showed the satisfaction with which he looked on the restored spirits of his old comrades in arms ; and I was touched by the affectionate manner in which he ministered to the comfort of, and the words of cheer which he gave to, a number of wounded men who were carried by. I could then well understand the affection which was demonstrated by them at every sight of him."

In 1875 Sherman wrote : " With the knowledge now possessed of his small force, I, of course, committed an error in not overwhelming Johnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865." It was the ascendancy of the few over the many. In the last ditch Johnston's victory had been won—when there was little left beyond the field he had filled with his valor. His cynical fate poured all its craft into this last scoff, which left the truth illustrious when it could no more avail a perishing cause. It was as if his brow were torn with a mock crown at last.

Sherman now moved on to Goldsboro and effected the junction with Schofield, which could no longer be prevented. General Johnston marched to the vicinity of Raleigh and disposed his troops so that Sherman could not go forward to Virginia without exposing his flanks, while at the same time he placed himself so as to facilitate his junction with Lee, whenever the time should come to unite once more the two who rode into Vera Cruz together, for their last salutation of devoted valor. The respect which these successive revelations of resource and energy excited is perhaps illustrated in the terms which, on the 18th of April, Sherman accorded to Johnston ; and which, had they been ratified, would have saved the South the sorrow, and the North the shame, of the Reconstruction Era. The current of events chose otherwise ; but once more Johnston did all that sagacity could do to stem the current. To the last there was no spot upon his breastplate which his adversary's steel had pierced ; none which there was undue eagerness to challenge. From crown to sole he blazed in complete proof. At the end, his line was an undefeated and unbroken line. When the Great Umpire threw down his warder, the defense of North Carolina, covered with dust and bloody sweat, was standing with firm-planted feet against assault. There it was standing when the edifice of the Confederacy fell—

the last wall of its strength. It was bearing aloft its ensigns, "torn but flying," when the earth under it opened. Doubtless it is the spectacle of deeds and energies like these which caused the eloquent Union soldier, Colonel Edginton, to declare that the force and vitality of Johnston's character was like the ocean wave—not to be measured in time of storm, nor to be fairly estimated until rivalries have ceased.

With the return of peace Johnston was removed from the field of duty wherein he was best fitted to win renown, and where he had woven the texture of a character as fine as it was firm. For the most part his fine assemblage of endowments lay like a book within its clasp, or like a coal unkindled. Broken by intervals of important duty for a quarter of a century, Johnston found himself doomed to a life of comparative inaction. There have been few to whom it could be more trying to take off the chariot wheels of life's activity. Perhaps one of the hardest of the many trials of his patience was thus to loiter by compulsion on the way where he was wont to spur. To a breast ever thrilling with the impulses of action patience was made perfect by this last trial. Yet it were wrong to pass without a word the blessing Heaven did not deny him; the meet partaker of his puissance and his pang, who drank of the same cup with him, exalting and exalted by it; who gave him truth for truth, and, under all the blows of time, a constancy fixed in heaven—that blessing which, however the world might rock, was truer than the needle to the pole—the blessing of a wife's true heart. And when of this blessing too he was bereft, we all were witnesses to the chastening touch of a brave man's anguish; how sorrow, falling upon a character of such strength and depth, did not harden, but melted to a tender glory; how the snows of his last years were irradiated by a soft, benignant light, as of sunset on the Alps. This was the final forge in which the iron of his nature was softened to take a new existence and more exquisite temper. He was the picture of the veteran sitting in the evening before his tent, all unbroken by the years which are so wont to break. He was the even more splendid picture of an elevation which was not fortuitous, nor dependent upon fortune, as he sat, still erect, amid the ruins of his heart and the storm of life and fate.

So he lived among us his upright, straightforward, unaffected

life. So, as he lived and moved, the shadows of the dark reaper deepened round him, until at last we saw him standing on the confine of the great night. In his eighty-fifth year, there he stood, "worn, but unstooping." Nowhere could one see a countenance and frame more worthy to declare—

"The living will that shall endure
When all that seems shall suffer shock."

One who came within the circuit of this scepter of majestic age might well pause to speculate whether the iron sleep could steal upon the lids over which that iron will stood sentinel. He, too, could not be conquered until worn out by attrition. He could not be conquered then. The last foe of all he turned to meet in the old knightly fashion, and wrung from him the final victory, wherein he who conquers self is conqueror of death. Faithful son of the Church, he received his death wound, too, in the breast. Before the Universal Conqueror he fell upon his unsundered shield. He fell like a soldier. Closing his eyes to earth and opening them to heaven, he gave his soul

"Unto his Captain, Christ,
Under whose colors he had fought so long."

To this last Captain, who heareth and absolveth, his last report is handed. "There," he said, on his deathbed, to Dabney Maury, "we shall surely meet." Ah, there! In the light of that perfect eye which looks clean through appearance, and judges the real only—there is his great appeal! In those upper fields, where the venom of this earth is slain, its serpent crushed, where no false balance is and no inadvertency, his clear spirit will join and be felt, where the mighty influences of time, purged of their dross, encounter, as the stars in their courses fight. On the bosom of the Infinite he, too, is a star. In that last bosom, where the revenges of time are folded, earth's scarred warrior hath cleft a way to peace.

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